MEMORABLE 



i.^^^ 



PREDICTIONS. 



THE LATE EVENTS IN EUROPE. 



-^ £STBACT£B 



FROM THE WRITINGS 



ALEXIS EUSTAPHIEVE, ESQUIRE 



BOSTOJSr : 

fUBIiISHES BT MUJfaOE AND FBAXCIS^ 
SO. 4, CORNHIlt, 

1814. 



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ij'UBLISHERS' LETTER TO ME. EUSTAPHIEVE 



Bosjton, June 30, iS:.;. 
Sir, 

Having been the publishers of all your larger works in this 
country, we propose, if you consent, to make a collection of such 
extracts from your politicjvl and literary essays as appeared to an- 
ticipate the late glorious events, by which they are so amply verifi- 
ed. In so doing, we only intend justice to yourself, by presenting 
together what, if detached, might be lost in the mass of political 
writings ; and justice to the publick, by furnishing, as we conceive, 
useful information, derived from the facts and reasonings upon 
which all your predictions have been founded. With regard to the 
degree of interest which our undertaking may command, and upon 
which our personal advantages must depend, we have only to ob- 
sei've, that many of your prophetick speculations, made at times 
when it was impossible to prove their veracity, must have been 
overlooked ; and consequently would be perused now with all that 
pleasure which must arise from the certainty of their extraordina- 
ry fulfilment. We have also reason to suppose, that many short 
essays, equally successful, have appeared from your pen in the dif- 
ferent newspapers of the day, during the progress of the late aston- 
ishing campaigns ; and therefore take the liberty of requesting you 
to enable us to add them to the intended collection, that the whole 
may appear in the form of a respectable pamphlet. In hope of obr 
taining your permission for the above undertaking, we remain 
Yours, &c. &c. 

MUNROE & FRANCIS. 

Ak??is Eustjphieve, esj. Bpston. 



THE ANSWER. 

Messrs. Munroe & Francis, 
©entlemen, 

I HAVE received your letter of the 30th ult. and thank you sin- 
cerely for the flattering manner in which you have noticed my 
humble efforts. As regards the request you make, after some re- 
flection and due consultation with my friends, I have no hesitation 
to accede to it, and to furnish you with all such essays as remain in 
my possession, with the more readiness as I wrote nothing anony- 
mously or in the newspapers, which I meant to disavow, or should 
blush now to acknowledge. It is possible that my consenting to 
your proposal may expose me to the imputation of egotism ; nei- 
ther would I, by an affectation of humility which capnot impose 
upon any one, place myself so far above human nature, as to deny 
that the pleasure I feel, from the consummation of the late splendid 
events, is wholly free from that self-gratification which may be pla- 
ced on the score of vanity. But the candour which dictated this 
confession, will, I hope, strengthen my claim to be believed when I 
declare that I do not arrogate to myself either a gift of prophecy, 
or siiperiour talent and knowledge ; but that consequently, my 
chief and strongest motive, in consenting to your request, is more 
urgent and of a higher character. 

A forruiuable, and I may say, unprincipled set of men, here and 
in England have combined systematically to vilify and depreciate the 
Russian character and resources. I have dared singly to enter the 
Mk againSiit these Goliaths ; not because I have presumed, or have 
mietaken my pigray ^>t^ength ; but because I well knew, they reas- 
aned less fron^ ignorance than inclination, upon false data fur- 
mshed altogether by foreign writers, of whom the most favourable 
to the Rti&sia« character have treated it with some degree of in- 
justice. Even Sir Robert Wilson, of whom the Russians have the 
least to complain, has mistaken the humble, modest, and retiring 
de^f'ttoent of the Russian infeviour ofBcers, whose poverty and 
difference of rank precluded his personal knowledge of them, for 
theis' want of education, and ignorance of military duty, the knowl- 



LETTER FROM MR. EUSTAPHIEVE, 5 

edge of which they have since practically and so preeminently 
proved. While my antagonists, or rather the enemies of my 
country, trusted exclusively to foreign authorities, garbled to their 
own purposes, I looked for mine into the archives of the Russian 
empire ; and there, in the pages of truth, I found my triumph. I 
am willing, therefore, you should shew by your collection, how fai- 
I have been right ; and how far my opposers, have been wrong ; 
that it may be known how far native Russian authorities ought to be 
preferred, and Russia restored to the common privilege of all na- 
tions, hitherto denied her, of being represented by her oun histori- 
ans^ and of being heard in her own defence. 

This is my main object, which, if attained, will amply reward 
my labour. I dare now to hope, that it will be attained ; and wish- 
ing you all possible success in your undertaking, remain, 
Gentlemen, 

Your most obedient and devoted, 

ALEXIS EUSTAPHIEVE. 

BostoUj July 6, 1814. 



fUEDICTIONS, 

&c. &c« 



AS far back as May 1812, when the event of the Russian wat 
was of itself a prophecy as yet to be fulfilled, the author published 
his " Resources of Russia ;'* a work so amply verified in all its 
anticipations as to become almost a history of what was foretold in 
it. It is so well known here and in Europe, that we shall make 
but a few extracts from it, merely presenting the author's deduc- 
tion from the facts previously laid down. After shewing the 
means of defence which Russia possessed, he concludes thus : 

" And shall the increased resources of Russia— ^shall her prowess, 
so often tried and grown to maturity, be now deemed so little, as 
to excite no respect, and no confidence ? Shall her ad\'antages 
and her reputation, the laborious acquisition of years, be in a moment 
surrendered at the shrine of that terrifick idol, which the name of 
France has set up for universal worship and adoration ? Has the 
prosperity, bequeathed by Peter the Great to his country, so little 
solidity in it, that the first bold invader may, if he pleases, pull it 
down, like some gorgeous overgrown fabrick, too heavy for its puny 
and slender foundation ? JVo 1 Imjiosdble I The enemy that hopes 
to conquer Russia., on her oivn territory., must be firepared to pay in 
tenfold measure for each drop of blood she sheds^ and for each groan 
that may be extorted from her. Before she falls, every one of her 
700,000 warriors; and more, if necessary, must be destroyed j and 



8 POLITICAL PREDICriONS. 

every one will be preceded by many a foe to his grave. The Rus, 
sian soldier, ever since he has been invested wilh that name, has 
not once yet flinched from combat, and ere he di-^^s, in a cause so 
dear, loill execute such revenge^ as in a short tune ivill leave the ene- 
my no victims to feed it" 



Having removed all doubts as to Russian loyalty, and refuted the 
general notion of y^rezg-jz zTj^zifTzce in Russia, he comes to the fol- 
lowing conclusion :— 

" In short, among the causes which may operate against Rus- 
sia, foreign influence and corruption, which to be effectual must 

be extensive, are the least to be feared ; while on the opposite sidcj 
she has many sources yet unexplored, and perhaps unsuspected. 
It is probable, that the extremity of distress would only make Russia 
better acquainted ivith her oiV7i strength.; at all events, she is certain 
of commandiiig all that invincible force, tvhich eiithiisiasm can imjiartj 
and exalted patriotism can inspire" 



The next, in vindicating the military character of Russia, has 
the following prediction literally verified. 

" The last campaign in Poland, distressing as it was to the 
French, is nothing to what they must experience, ifihey dare again to 
invade it. At that time the sudden overthrow of Prussia enabled 
them to seize on many fine and fertile provinces, which furnished 
them with necessary supplies ; but tvhich are ?ioiv exhausted, or 
will be prevented from furnishhig any. The more men Buonaparte 
brings nvith him, and the farther he penetrates into Russia, the near- 
er he will draw to the fate of Charles XII. Again the Russian peas- 
ants will be removed, again their habitations will be destroyed, and 
again whole fertile regions will be, for safety, converted by the Rus- 
sians into a barren wilderness. The French, if they advance, will 
see nothing but the Russian bayonets bristling in front, and receding 
only to strike with surer aim ; nothing but fugitive Cozaks hanging 
on their wings, loho, used to this distressing mode of warfare, will 
harass them by day and night ; and nothing behind or around them 
but sterility, f amine f and desolation." 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 9 

The work ends with the followihg prophetic effusion. 

" Let, therefore, France buckle on her armour ; and in hostile 
array march against Russia. Let clouds, portending disaster, 
gather on ; and the threatening tempest again spread wide its rap- 
id wings, and pour its deluge upon the north ; Russia undismay- 
ed awaits, nay, invites the blow. Next to Providence, she relies 
on the tried heroism of her people ; and on the prayers of the suf- 
fering millions, whose champion she now stands forth. Her 
struggles will be against universal tyranny ; and her success ivill 
be the deliverance of all. Her safety will be the firotection, and 
her independence the relief and security of the ofifiressed. Her 
cause is the cause of freedom ; and every soil, trcd by the foot of 
a freeman, shall yield to it a tribute of sympathy. Her cause is the 
cause of humanity ; and wherever man drains the breath of life ^ 
blessings shall be its enviable portion. 

*' It is with Russia that the fallen nations can ever hope to rise. 
The frowning idol, under whose iron foot numberless victims daily 
expire, may yet be hurled from its ensanguined throne, and awe 
the world only by its tremendous ruins I The overgrown colossus, 
from whose fatal grasp Europe in vain strives to free herself, can 
only on its own element be crushed. The thunder of Albion has 
only struck at its shadow on the ocean ; but the huge substance, in 
■which all the ingredients of mischief are consolidated, still remains 
the same. Some of the distant sparks have only been intercepted ; 
while the main furnace, wherein such horrid conflagrations are 
engendered, still remains unextinguished. Even in the regions of 
the now respiring Lusitania, only some of the monster's limbs 
have been shattered ; the enormous body is still animated with 
life and vigour, is still fed by daily torrents of human blood, and 
endowed with the unnatural power of renovating and increasing its 
strength at pleasure. To assault its extremities is only to provoke 
its rage and fury ; but to encounter it at once, in all its dimensions^ 
heart to heart, is the only chance of destroying it. This may yet 
be hoped from the invasion of Russia." 

This tract at its first appearance, was generally considered as 
tjie very height of extravagance ; and the author, as if aware that 
B 



JO POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

in case of its successful realization, it would still be thought a meffe 
chance or a lucky hit, prepared himself, instead of watching in 
^nxious silence the commencement and progress of ihe war, to 
support his claim to foresight by occasional comments, on the cor- 
rectness of which we shall presently enable our readers to decide. 

The reiterated reports of the famous imaginary conspiracy in 
Russia, better known as" the plot of Speransky," first attracted his 
notice ; and notwithstanding the imposing aspect of those re- 
ports, commanding general belief, he had the courage to insert in 
the Boston Gazette of June 22, 1812, the following remarks, 
which were soon after completely verified, positive intelligence hav- 
ing been received from St. Petersburgh, by the official Russian char- 
acters in this country, of the acquittal and innocence of Speransky 
and his supposed accomplices. 

" The article which alludes to a conspiracy against the Em- 
perour Alexander, and which has appeared sn various papers, 
"with some pretensions to authenticity, carries within itself the 
presumptive proofs of its spurious origin, and cannot be 

credited by any one acquainted with Russian affairs. The 

general and desultory statement of an event so important, while 
matters of less consequence are fully detailed, must neces- 
sarily excite distrust, which is still further increased by an attempt 
to glance at some circumstances, no less contradictory than im- 
probable, which are said to have attended that event, A. conspira- 
cy of 200 men is not likely to succeed ; nor is it of a nature to at- 
tract the notice and interference of French agents, too skilful and 
expert to embark in a cause, which, from its extent, could not but 
miscarry. Moreover, as all the revolutions in Russia have been 
effected upon grounds exclusively national, and by men, who, in 
rank and property, before they can conceive so bold a design, must 
be placed above the temptation of a paltry sum alleged to have been 
expended by the French minister ; there is strong reason to 
doubt the existence, or at least the extent and successful exercise of 
foreign influence on the present occasion. It is well known that 
the French Ambassadour, notwithstanding his expensive efforts 
to ingratiate himself with the Russian public, has nev.er been ad- 
mitted to the private circle and social board of the nobii^ty ; and it 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. f I 

IS only from those who were immediately connected with the ad- 
ministration that he received any flattering attention. The Em- 
press dowager, besides, is a professed enemy of the French. It is 
she that refused her daughter's hand to Napoleon, who opposed', 
every interview between him sind Alexander, and constantly la- 
boured to destroy every vestige of French influence at the Court 
of St. Petersburgh ; it is therefore extremely improbable that the 
French Government, if it had the means of originating and organ- 
izing the supposed conspiracy, would exert those means in favour 
of its sworn and mortal foe, and against a Prince to whose individ- 
ual and almost solitary friendship it owed its temporary influence. 
Jiifot* would this be the order of succession, of the violation of which 
the Russians are extremely jealous. Alexander has three young- 
er brothers, who, in the event of his dying without issue, would 
certainly succeed him in preference to his mother, but who all 
have imbibed from her the same laudable detestation of French' 
pirinciples and usurpation. In short, the article in question, eithet 
in its details or in tolO) must be considered a wilful and wanton fa° 
brication'* 

While the apparently succcssfiiHnvasion of Buonaparte, and the 
first unfavourable report of the battle of Mojaisk or Borodino, crea- 
ted general despondency, our a\ithor stood forth as a public con- 
soler in the various pieces which we shall present to the reader, 
and the first of which, entitled " The state of war in Russia," ap» 
peared in the Boston Gazette of November 19, 1812, breathing 
the sanie prophetic spirit, undismayed by unfavourable appearan- 
ces. 

" Although, at the present moment of public anxiety, when 
doubts and apprehensions perplex the mind, and expectation lin- 
gers without relief, it is unwise and even cruel to raise false hopes ; 
yet it is no less criminal to suppress those which might be reasona- 
bly indulged. Laudable incredulity, and cautious reception of fa- 
vourable reports, ought in justice to be extended to those of a con- 
trary tendency, resting on no better foundation. Of this last kind, 
is the letter so extensively circulated, said to be from an intelligent 
Bostonian, passenger on board the Lark> It is altogether predicated 



13 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS, 

op the suspicious article in the Moniteur ; and therefore it de- 
serves not the name of document, being the " mere shadow of a 
shadow." At most it is the ifise dixit of an apparently prejudiced 
individual, in direct contradiction to facts ; as it pretends to state a 
general distrust in England of the measures of the Russian govern- 
iT^ent, at the very moment that the unerring Barometer of com-^ 
mercial intercourse, shewing the rapid and still increasing amelio- 
ration of the course of Exchange, indicates the progressive rise of 
public confidence. It is true that England is not free from the lo- 
custs hatched by the application of Gallic heat : from those volun- 
teer slaves, who are proud to wear the tinselled livery of the Impe- 
rial Corsican, and who of course will seize with avidity on every 
refuse which may serve for the banquet of their gracious master. 
They will rather doubt the Gospel, than a single word in that 
mostrous compound of fiction, and distortion of facts, known by the 
name of French Bulletin ; but the thinking, and, I may say, hon- 
est men in Great Britain as well as here, who seek for information 
themselves, are not so easily persuaded to shrink from imaginary 
victories, or weep at imaginary defeats. These know frorn the di- 
plomatic correspondence between the courts of Thuilleries and 
St. Petersburgh, and from the attitude of defiance assumed at the 
titne by Russia, that this latter power has not been inevitably com-' 
pelle^d to engage 3 powerful adversary without adequate resources, 
commensurate preparations, and correspondent resolution to per- 
severe in the contest. They know froip the same source, that even 
the treaty of Tilsit, 50 rnuch blatned because so much misunder= 
stood, was a salutary measiire, a ^vise expedient to gain titne, and a 
positive political advantage obtained at the expense of France, inde= 
pendent of many other considerations which tend to justify it, but 
which do not come within the scope of the present discussion. 
They also know, from the proclamation of Alexander, issued at 
Drissa, that the fate of Moskoiu would not be the fate of the Emfiire i 
that the possession of this ancient capital of Russia would by no 
means insure the successful career of the enemy, nor command sub- 
mission from the supposed vanquished, loho, in yielding it, would 
mly protract a determination, so often wished, to follow withjirm-^ 
fje^i? (k,e $y^t€W' originally g.dopted„ 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS^. IS 

" So far from desponding, there is every reason to hofie the 
best result from the present posture of things in that quarter. 
It would be unjust and ungrateful to doubt the prowess of the Rus- 
sians, and the integrity of their Sovereign, after so noble, and I 
may say a matchless retreat exhibited to the world, and so many gi- 
gantic sacrifices voluntarily made, with a view to a prospective and 
final benefit. Complicated and prodigious, as is the power of Bon- 
aparte in gaining, as well as inventing an imposing train of bril- 
liant achievements, he has not yet been able to satisfy any impar- 
tial man, any one who has not been sworn to worship and adore 
him, as a being infallible, omnipotent, and " supereminent," that 
he has obtained any single advantage over the Russian armies but 
^rhat was resigned to him fiom motives of policy, and wha^ 
amounts only to the p'-ivilege of advancingyanAcr into the jaws of 
famine., and the vortex of hostile elements, ready to contend with 
him . 

" But the battle of Mojaisk is to decide every thing — it may, or it 
may not. Tlie Russians probably will fght there ; they may retreat y 
and Kapoleon may get to Moscow ; but have they not retreated be- 
fore ? Have their armies been broken in the retreat ? It is these 
armies, and not Moscow, that he must conquer, ere he can hope 
for the successful accomplishment of his daring views. The Rus^ 
iians are prepared to give up their capital, rather than risk all 
their forces in one battle ; and this is sufficient for every purpose of 
hope and consolation. As to the report in the Moniteur, God 
grant it may be true. In all cases we expect Napoleon will claim 
victory ; but if in this one he has adopted a new method of an- 
nouncing it, preferring a private to an official communication, as 
none without his sanction could have been received within the space 
of sixteen days, 1 say again, God grant it may be true ',for there will 
be no doubt of his having the worst side of the battle in question, 

" I cannot conclude without an attempt to dispel the fears gener- 
ally entertained of corruption among the Russian nobility. They 
have more to lose by treachery, and more to gain by loyalty. Their 
national firide and predilections never can brook submission to a 
foreign power. They never yet have betrayed their country ; and 
it is unjust and ungenerous to suspect foreign influence where it 
never yet has shewn itself to any alarming extent. Their lives 



arid fortunes have beeil cheerfully offered, and therefore their indi- 
vidual passions and personal ambition are already engaged in the 
present contest. In short, t/ieij are entitled to the utmost confidence 
6f every brave, loyal ?>nd virtuous nation." 

Theamhot's nes:t article in vindieation of the Russian military 
takflts, and headed " Russia want^ able commanders," appeared in 
She Ceminel on the 2d of December 1812. Though the facts there- 
hi co^Rtained could not have been denied, the reasonings and sntici- 
fJatittns engrafted on those facts, were much doubted, and Only nO\v 
are ov ouglit to be fully acknowledged :— - 

« Accident and a peculiar combitiation of circumstances, tem- 
porary in their nature, frequently give birth to opinions which in 
f he progress of time attain a degree of permanancy totally unex- 
fjccted ; and, tvhile their original source is lost in the receding 
darkness of the past, they become, by a constant process of degen- 
eration, habitual and confirmed p»'ejudices, so deeply rooted as to 
ivithstand the most impressive evidence of strong and uncjuestiona- 
Me facts. Of this kind is the notion generally entertained on the 
European Continent, that England \s incapable of becoming a mil- 
itary nation, her soldiers being deficient in skill and destitute of 
valour ; a notion which under the sinister influence of France has 
gained such strength as to make it doubtful whether it may not 
survive the brilliant career of Lord Wellington, having already 
triumphed over the decisive proofs exhibited in Egypt and on the 
plains of Maida. A notion equally spurious, (cherished, in turn, by 
certain classes in Great- Britain^ and highly prejudicial to the Rus- 
sian Commanders, whose military character is thereby depreciated, 
and whose talents are systematically denied in face of solemn facts 
and unerring experience,) has been transplanted into the American 
soil, where, particularly in the l)ot-bed of Gallic corruption, it has 
frown so prodigiously strong that the hand of a Giant may well 
despuir of plucking it by the root. In vain Romantzows * van- 

"' The celebrated Russian General, tuho, with 17,000 7nen defeated fi Turkish 
anriy at Kiihul, in MolJavia, upwards of 100,000 men strong. 



POLITIOAt PREDICTIONS. H 

qiOish the tenfold hosts of foes — In vain Potemkins triumph over 
hostile towns and nations.. — In vain the invincible Souwaiow per- 
ches like an Eagle on the Alpean Summit, soars above all combi- 
nation of European skill and discipline, subdues Nature, tramples 
upon Treachery, andj after a resistless flight over barriers to any 
other mortal insurmountable, shapes his course hoirieward, and 
there, unconquered, reposes on the bed of glory.— These toils and 
these feats oi science and valour are in one instant forgotten ; and 
Russia, v/ho was already placed on the highest eminence of milita- 
ry reputation, is all at once swept down by the tide of public opin- 
ion, and however unjust and ungenerous this opinion, finds herself 
under the mortifying necessity to earn again the laurels which she 
had already earned, and again contend for the height which was 
already in her possession. Austria, exhibits now to the world sol- 
diers overcome, armies broken, Generals surrendered, and her 
national or political energies destroyed ; still she is not denied to 
have able Commanders, and her military skill is not questioned, 
^yen Prussia, annihilated at a blow, is treated with the same gen- 
erosity, and, I may say justice. Russia alone, it seems, cannot ob- 
tain any credit for her officers, and her military system, at the 
very ^iipment that she is the only Continental power wliich has 
been able to encounter the terrific Colossus of Europe without dis- 
may? without dishonour, without being injured. After a. horrible 
and giganic contest protracted to the utmost limits ofhum?kP en- 
durance, she has alone preserved her indepet^dence, and she ajope 
can say wiUi truth, that Iter armies never were dis/iers^d^ her com- 
manders were never circumvented, and her soldiers never surren- 
dered ; though a force doubly and triply superior assailed them un-* 
der the pressure of every natural ind accidental disadvantage, which 
could not be foreseen, and coul^ only be remedied by the most de- 
termined, yet vi'ell directed, valour. Such was her perilous and 
unprecedented situation in the last campaign, in the year 1807, that 
could she have exchanged it with the enemy, her prowess and skill 
would have been immediately questioned for iiot annihilating him ; 
for not doing that, the neglecting of which on his part, or not being 
able to a,ccomplis]i, has procured him fulsome praise and adulation- 
He was commended gn the very ground on which she would have 



16 POLITICAL PREDICTIOJiTS. 

been inevitably condemned. Strange perversity I Inconceivable 
infatuation ! 

" When the present contest commenced, a contest still more tre- 
mendous than the former, all the exotic doubts vyere revived and 
ill-boding prophecies were loudly reechoed throughout the Union ; 
and even the fear generally entertained, that Alexander would fight 
too soon, being removed by his defensive system of operation, was 
succeeded by an apprehension of an opposite nature, by which the 
very measure so much wished and approved, was magnified into 
the final accomplishment of conquest, and the subjugation of Rus- 
sia. 

« The recent honourable retreat of the Russians,inasmuch as a re- 
treat must ever be a trial of skill and not of strength, ought of itself 
to set the question at rest as to the Russians " being in want of able 
leaders." It is however no more than justice to go farther, and to 
say, that with the exception of the individual superiority of Bona- 
parte, the Russian Generals have uniformly proved their superiori- 
ty over all the rest of his commanders. The facts which admit of 
no reasoning will fully support this assertion. Massena was de- 
feated by Essen at Warsaw, though the former had the advantage 
of numbers. Bernadotte was beaten at Mohrungen by Prince Ba- 
gration, who in the present campaign has in the same way triumph- 
ed over the different French Generals opposed to him. Wing- 
teistein has also defeated Oudinot and St. Cyr in two encoun- 
ters ; while Tormasow routed Regnier, and Count Pahlen re- 
pulsed the main body under Bonaparte himself. This superiority 
further enhanced by the disparity of numbers, cannot be accidental, 
but proceeds from the regular education of the Russian officers, 
fitting them from their infancy for military service; and joining 
sound theory to subsequent experience. 

"It is certain that since Alexander's reign no success has ever 
been obtained over the Russians but where Bonaparte himself com- 
manded. When we consider, the forces of whole Europe, brought 
against Russia, under the absolute control of the greatest General 
of the age ; not to be in an instant annihilated is of itself a convinc- 
ing proof of skill in those who oppose them. I say skill, because 
in the contention of such enormous armies, it is skill altogether, 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. VT 

and not personal valour that decides the victory. To fall before an 
enemy so powerful and cxhaustless in resources would be no dis- 
honour ; but to check him even for a moment is a high military 
achievement which no sophistry can deprecate, and wtiich Russia 
has effectually done at the battle of Pultusk. and Eylau. Her egortg 
therefore to do more, are entitled to our full confidence ; and if she 
fall, it will be by a decree of providence, and not from want of able 
leaders. She will not have torefiroach herself with timidity or do- 
mestic treachery ; fot she will do all that is within the scope of hu- 
man means to effect against a supernatural power." 

The 18th bulletin at length was received, and drew from the 
author the following remarks, inserted in the " Repertory andGen- 
eral Advertiser," December 4, 1812. 

" The long expected Phantom from which many, even in antici- 
pation, shrunk with dismay and terror, has at length reached us in 
the shape of the 18th Bulletin. Terrifick as is its aspect, we will 
approach it without fear, and by removing the frightful drapery 
which envelopes it, boldly examine of what character and descrip- 
tion is its real nature and substance. Battle and victory have long 
been synonimous terms in the French Bulletins ; and Napoleon's 
claiming a victory whenever he announces a battle is only a com- 
pliance with a premeditated system invariably pursued, surprising 
and astonishing only by the fearful credulity with which it is gen- 
erally received, notwithstanding the knowledge and repeated expe- 
rience of its falsehood. The usual characteristicks or proofs of victory^ 
are disfiersion of the enemy ; his loss far exceeding that of the 
victor ; his battalions taken ; his Generals destroyed or made pris- 
oners ; his weapons and colours abandoned to the Conqueror, and 
above all, the rapid and destructive pursuit of the remnant of his 
broken forces. This is the touclistone by which the battle of 
Moskwa shall be tried. 

"We read in the bulletin of the Kin g of Naples' deciding the victory 
by passing thro' the breaches made by 80 pieces of cannon in the 
Russian columns, and thereby causing the dispersion of those col- 
umns. If by dispersing them, Napoleon means to say, they escap- 
ed beyond his reach, we agree with him in his construction of the 

word ; it is perfectly warranted by the-subsequent attempt at gues- 
C 



18 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

sing what has become of them, for we find that the conqueror of 
the clay after having annihilated the enemy, is so absolutely in the 
dark about their fate, that he cannot give us any other account of 
them, than what has been furnished by a Polish renegado,who,him= 
self, knowing nothing, and having no other means of obtaining 
knowledge, collects all his information from the Russian recruits ! 
So that a poor ignorant Russian Peasant, left on the field of battle, 
is the only authority on which Bonaparte has to rely in his accounts 
of the vanquished Russians. Is this the way in which a conqueror 
would announce the fate of those whom victory must have placed 
in his power ? 

" As to the proportionate loss on both sides, as we have no Rus- 
sian account to help us, we can estimate it fairly by recurring to 
the former statements of the French ; and as the greatest loss they 
ever acknowledged was at the battle of Eylau, we will make it our 
guide on the present occasion. 

"The nominal loss of the French, that is, acknowledged by them, 
in that horrible battle, was 1 general and 3 colonels killed, I mar- 
shal 1 general and 3 colonels wounded, and 6700 killed and wound- 
ed. The Russian loss as stated by the French is 7000 killed and 
from 12 to 15,000 prisoners, 45 pieces cannon, and 18 standards, 
neither of which were in reality taken. When it is considered 
that the advantages so peremptorily claimed and the losses ac- 
knowledged on their part, were in a battle decidedly unfavourable 
to them ; when it is further authenticated that the real loss of 
the French was near 40,000 men in killed and wounded, and that 
of the Russians 20,000 including the wounded; what must we 
think of a battle in which the French for the first time acknowl- 
edge the loss of 10,000 men, 5 generals killed, and 3 wounded ; 
while on the other hiind they loosely state the loss of the Russians 
between 40 or 50,000 men, (only 30,000 are accounted for) 60 
pieces of cannon, and no standards at all. — ™ 

"As to Battalions taken, Generals killed, or surrendered, and the 
number of prisoners, we find in the whole Bulletin nothing beyond 
a general assertion. Not a single regiment is mentioned as having 
surrendered, not a single Russian General or officer of rank is 
named among the slain ; and two or three are said to have been 
wounded, mtrsly on the spurious authority of the above mentioned 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. »f 

renegade, wlio only heard it from a raw Russian recruit. Not a 
single standard is taken, which is a marvellous exception to all 
French victories ; and the number of cannon, evidently stated at 
random, when compared with former exaggerated accounts, must 
dwindle into nothing ; the more so as the Russian batteries are 
said to have been taken. There is a curious confession in the bul- 
letin that the Russians removed their artillery in the rear, which 
sbeias they were not acting as if they were beaten^ otherwise they 
could not have had time to deliberate, and carry their purpose into 
execution. 

" But coming to the last and most decisive of all piroofs, we ask 
why has not Bonaparte pursued the fugitives, and delayed the 
possession of Moskow ; an object for which he so desperately con- 
tended, and the successful accomplishment of which, at this advan- 
ced season, must have been of infinite importance to him ? True, 
a private letter from Paris, states, that he was at Moskow ; but 
private letters are no authority, and if they were, new battles which 
the Russians are stated therein to have fought since the last, would 
only shew that they were far from being conquered ; that they only 
contended from the desire of making Moskow a dear prize, and 
not from the desperate resolution of saving it at all hazards. They 
fought to weaken the enemy, to make his progress slower ; and 
not to prevent him from advancing with his whole forces, which 
could only be done by risking all their means at 07ice. The execution 
of a plan of such magnitude must necessarily be protracted as to 
time ; nay its very success must depend altogether upon delay : 
It is, therefore, in perfect unison with the continued and masterly 
retreat of the Russians ; and explains the political necessity of their 
allowing the enemy rather to go to Moskow after a partial resist- 
ance ; than by a premature valour and decisive opposition ruin a 
system so wisely preconcerted. 

<' There is a certain expression in the bulletin, implying that the 
battle was fought in the rear of Mojaisk, which in its relative posi- 
tion to the French army, must have been understood between Mo- 
jaisk and Moskow. If this be correct, and there is an admission 
that the Russians had renewed the attack, it is not improbable that 
the French, having at first penetrated beyond Mojaisk, were after- 
wards driven back to it in a very different character from the one 
they have assumed. The probability is by no means diminished by 



So POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

the suspicious and unusual manner in which the Moniteur has ai)" 
liDunced the battle, evidently known at Paris long before its official 
promulgation. It seems upon the whole that the reputation of 
any one for judgement would not be injured by his venturing to 
predict that the Russians "iviU claim victory in this very battle ; 
and that Te Deum at St. Petersburgh as well as Paris, ■will be 
sung on the same occasion." 

When the news of the Capture of Moskow was first received and 
produced immoderate exultation among the American friends of 
Bonaparte, the author again addressed the public through the me- 
dium of the Boston Gazette, December 10th 1812. 

" It is now certain, that the Russians, so far from being defeated, 
have obtained a positive advantage over the enemy, by compelling 
him to fall back several miles, with a loss of 40,000 men killed and 
•wounded, a considerable number of prisoners, several pieces of can- 
jion and standards. The victors remained three days on the field of 
battle, burning the dead and removing the wouiided, which explains 
atoncetlie qontradjction of language and the obscurity of date in 
in the 18ih Bulletin, as well as the informal annunciation of the bat- 
tle at Paris. P'or three days, that is, as long as the Russians kept the 
field, Napoleon coi'ld not date the Bulletin according to his wishes ;. 
and waited, untj) by their retreat, Mojaisk being abandoned, he took 
possession of it, and headed his Bulletin accordhigly. That the 
Russians, after a victory so dearly purchased, (they acknowledge 
the loss of 30,000 killed and vpounded) should deem it prudent to 
retreat, and even abandon Moskow, rather than risk another battle 
with an enemy who vvas reinforced before them, shevps theabsurdi= 
ty of the idea entertained by many, that one genera! engagement 
must necessarily decide the fate of Bonaparte or the Russian emr 
pire. The Russians, by their voluntary sacrifices, have evinced 
their unconquerable resolution to await with patier^ce, and deserve 
by perseverance, the ul(i}~mce decree of heaven irt their favour, while 
their sovereign, penetrated with their zeal and devotion, has already 
redeemed the pledge he had given, not to listen to any insidious 
proposals of peace from the enemy. The contest has now assumed a 
different and a more awful character. On one hand a loyal people 
pomeiid for their liberty and existence } on the other, an insatiate 



POLITICAL PREDTCTIOXS. 21 

conqueror has staked all his conquests, his crown, his reputation, and 
his life, on the issue. Already dibappoinlment breaks out in his 
Bulletins. In vain he announces the capture of muskets, cannon, 
wine and other luxuries ; the 18th Bulletin, if there were no other, 
by convincing the most incredulous how far he can push his un* 
blushing falsehood, deprives him on this occasion of every chance 
of deceiving. No one can suppose, that the Russians, while they 
were able to remove every thing of value, should leave their gallant 
brothers and defenders to perish in the flames. Thank God ! they 
have not learned yet the art of poisoning their comrades from the 
invader of Egypt ; vjho^ ere long, will Jind these very sons of Russia, 
who, hcsays. ivere abandoned by her, arrayed in arms against him, 
and exactiiig a dreadful vengeance for the destruction of their cap- 
ital, and desolation of their country. We shall soon see, how little 
even a Bonaparte can do against famine, ruin, and the united en- 
thusiasm of a nation determined to defend itself to the last ex- 
tretnity." 

« The Repertory and General Advertiser" of December 15th 
1812, contains also the following notice concerning " General 
Kutuviow" from the pen of our author, in his usual spirit of 
prophecy. 

" Prince Kutuzow, descended from an ancient Russian family, 
is the illustrious remnant of the veterans who shed such lustre 
over the reign of Catherine the Second. He it was that made 
the celebrated retreat before the battle of Austerlitz, in which, to 
the regret of Russia and the world, his powers, as a commander 
in chief, were not fully exercised. He always retained the con- 
fidence of the nation ; and never ceased to be the darling of the 
soldiers, the pride of the citizens, and the oracle of the nobles 
When the enemy, contrary to general expectation, directed his 
desolating course towards Moskow, and the nobility, with their 
usual zeal and patriotism, charged themselves with the main 
burden and responsibility of war, on the condition of being allow- 
ed to appoint their own commander ; Kutuzow was unanimously 
proposed, and the choice, which he afterwards so nobly justified, 
■was confirmed by the emperor. After sustaining the dreadful 
shock of the whole French force, the Prince turned upon the en- 
emy, and finally drove this boasted conqueror of Europe from 



22 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

the field of battle ; finding, however, his own loss to be very- 
great, and his army reduced, while the enemy received sti'ong- 
reinforcements from the Vistula, he shewed pi^udence equal to 
valour, and rather than risk solid advantages for the transient 
eclat of fame, he abandoned Moskow, and with his victorious ar- 
my retired to another position, admirably chosen within 20 miles 
of Moskow. This position covers the main roads from Mos- 
kow, protects the important cities of Kaluga and Toula (the lat- 
ter is the armoury of the empire) and secures the interior coun- 
try in the rear, which is the Russian granary, and the land from 
which the principal supplies are drawn. Bonaparte's eagerness, 
on which the Prince justly calculated, to get possession of Mos- 
kow, has withdrawn all the intervening force between the latter 
and Tormasow who had advanced upon Smolensk ; so that by a 
single movement to the left, judiciously effected, the flank as 
well as the whole line of communication between Poland and the 
French at Moskow is menaced. Bonaparte dares not take the 
road to St. Petersburgh, as by such a step the whole Russian ar- 
ray would be placed in his rear, and his retreat completely inter- 
cepted ; and as he cannot obtain supplies by means of small de- 
tachments, in presence of so superior a force, he must move his 
whole army upon Kutuzow, and fight for food ; a mode of war- 
fare to which the French have not been used. The destruction 
of Moskow, by removing the only object for which it was neces- 
sary to risk a great baltle, has released the Prince from all re- 
straint ; and henceforth he •will fight only mohen he pleases^ and 
when he is sure of success. Along residence, with other events, 
have made Moskow deal' to him : and not being taught yet by 
modern policy to disguise his feelings, he announces the event 
in a tone of grief which has been mistaken for despondence ; 
but while he weeps like a man and citizen over the ruins of a 
beloved city ; he, with the heroism of a soldier, values its volun- 
tary sacrifice as the filedge of indefiendence — the preservation 
of honour at the expence of life- — and with the steady eye of an 
enlightened statesman, contemplates a future Moskow, rising like 
a phoenix from its ashes, at the moment that the gigantick sys- 
tem, now developing itself, shall have been matured and carried 
into execution. Already the convoys of the enemy have been 
intercepted,already numerous corps are organiKed to act in conc&rt 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 23 

Vith the elements and famine. While these hover on his wings, 
afresh army shall be planted between him and France j and he 
soon shall/ee/, what he begins to fear, the full effects of that in- 
-vincible national enthusiasm, which can, without hesitation, give 
up to flames the ancient capital of the empire, rather than pur- 
chase its safety even by appearance of submission." 

When the undisturbed continuance of Bonaparte at Moskow, 
and the removal of their effects by the inhabitants of St. Peters- 
burgh, produced an universal apprehension for the safety of the 
last imperial capital, the author failed not to relieve our fears by 
the following article in the Boston Gazette of Dec. 28, IS 12. 

" The desti7iies sf the civilizd world are now interwoven with 
those of Russia ; and the awful contest, on the issue of which 
depends universal freedom, or universal submission, must ex- 
cite deep interest in the breasts of the individuals of all nations. 
Every succeeding intelligence from Europe deserves to be 
closely examined, compared, and studied, so as to establish a 
fair balance between our hopes and fears ; and, as the one or the 
other may prevail, prepare us to encounter the worst, or give us 
the foretaste of better fortune. While the various and detailed 
accounts from St. Petersburgh, all bearing to the same point, 
and by their uniformity entitled to our confidence, furnish cer- 
tain data for reasoning, and lead us to the same conclusion ; the 
French bulletins, including the last, 23d, issued several days la- 
ter, by their correspondent tone, and their negative or silent 
corroboration, place us at once on a well defined ground, from 
which we can view the surrounding objects, and form our judg- 
ment, at least of the present, without fear of error. It being 
then ascertained that the French have for nearly a month re- 
mained inactive at Moskow, the question immediately occurs as 
to the reasons which induced them to adopt so novel a conduct, 
and as to the nature of those reasons being favourable or adverse 
to the common cause of humanity. Is it owing to the lateness 
of the season ? The winter at Moskow does not shew its rig- 
our till the middle of November, and the rains and snow storms 
preceding it, had not yet taken place, as according even to the 
French bulletins, the weather was fair, and " the sun fine," as 
fate as the 9th of October. Is it on account of some pending 



54 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

negociations ? The voluntary destruction of Moskow, KutU" 
sow's answer to Bonaparte, the first imperial manifesto, where 
Alexander swears " not to sheathe his sword as long as a single 
enemy remains in his territories," his declaration subsequent to 
the destruction of Moskow, but above all his last emphatic ex- 
pression on the 2d of October, that " every Russian will sooner 
drain the last drop of misery, than submit to a scandalous 
peace," are pledges so solemn and unequivocal, as to put any 
peace, but such as would be consistent with honour, totally out of 
the question ; and to leave no other alternative to the contend- 
ing parties but that of a complete victory or a complete dis^^race. 
If any thing could further strengthen this, it is the total silenc© 
of the French bulletins upon the subject ; as there is no doubt 
but a prospect of peace, so confidently promised before the bat- 
tle of Moskwa, and entirely withdrawn after it, would be so wel- 
come to the French exhausted and harassed soldiers, that Bona- 
parte would not have lost a moment to display it to their long- 
ing sight, had he the least hope or chance of fulfilling his prom- 
ise. Is it because there was no enemy near enough to call for 
some important movement ? We find that Kutuzow's whole 
army kept within a few werts of Moskow, and acting upon the 
flank of the French. Surely it would have been an object of 
some importance to dislodge the bold intruder, and drive him 
from his position ; we find, however, that nothing has been at- 
tempted against him of any consequence. Is it because Moskow 
has afforded abundant supplies for the French army, so as to 
supercede the necessity of seeking for them ? It is now a mat- 
ter of fact, that every thing had been previously removed from 
that city, and consequently no resources were left for the ene- 
my, unless it be the image of the Virgin Mary, ornamented with 
diamonds which is so pompously described in one of the bulle- 
tins ! ! Small parties, detached in every direction, in search of 
provisions, and uniformly driven back upon the ruins of Mos- 
kow, shew the ivant of supfilies and the necessity of a general 
movement which alone could attain the object in view. Besides, 
the French bulletins themselves prove tne scarcity of supplies, 
by their anxiety to convince the world of the contrar;r. Whoev- 
er has been a constant and attentive reader of these bulletins, 
knows very well what they announce with particular and repeat- 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 2a 

ed emphasis, in opposition to the apparent state of things, ought 
always to be reversed. When they say that Bonaparte's person 
was not exposed in battle, they assert what is a matter of course, 
what is generally known to be the case, and requires no asser- 
tion whatever ; in doing so, therefore, they excite the well 
founded suspicion, which will hereafter turn out to be a fact> 
that his person was in imminent danger. When they announce 
that 60,000 muskets were found in Moskow, a thing improbable, 
as such articles would have been removed in preference to all 
others, and impossible, as no town in Russia contains at this 
time so large a quantity, the demand at home being greater than 
the supply, they merely tell us that they are in want of arms, 
and remind us of the 160,000 English muskets taken by the 
French at Koningsberg during the last campaign in Poland, 
when it is well known, on the authority of the British parlia- 
ment, that not a single stand was sent there !* Indeed, when they 
go so far as to proclaim to the world that the French complete- 
ly routed the Russians on the Moskwa, and counted six Russians 
to one Frenchman on the field, when they themselves were 
driven back ten miles, and left the field to the Russians, who 
were for two days afterwards employed in burying the dead, 
and removing the wounded ; when they assert that the final over- 
throw of the Russians was prevented by hetman Platow's having 
covered their retreat, at the time that this aged warrior, as was 
afterwards proved, was actually pursuing the French ; it be- 
comes then our duty to distrust every account furnished by the 
bulletins, when not supported by corresponding circumstances. 
No motive was therefore wanting to spur the French to action, 
as far as supplies are concerned. 

" Are there no towns, besides Moskow, of consequence 
enough to become desirable objects of conquest ? Twer and 
Toula are not only important cities, but might be considered, in 
Bonaparte's present situation, as indispensable. The first, about 
160 miles north of Moskow, on the road to St. Petersburgh, com- 
mands the whole communication of the "Volga, and its possession 

* Only 50,000 stand of arms were sent, and these never reached the 

place. PUBIISHEBS. 

D 



26 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

would not only procure an immensity of supplies of every descrip-' 
tion, but enable him to distress St. Petersburgh, and the whole 
northern section of the empire, which is more or less dependent 
upon the southern supplies conveyed up that river ; — the seC" 
ond, about 120 miles south of Moskow, is the armoury of Russia ; 
the loss of it would be irreparable at this moment, as it would 
deprive the Russians of the most essential means of carrying on 
the war ; and yet, strange to tell, though both these towns are 
so near Moskow, and though the season was acknowledged to be 
favourable, no effort has been made to secure them, and thereby 
acquire those great advantages, of the full importance of which 
it would be injustice to the talents of Bonaparte to suppose him 
for a moment unconscious. 

« After mature consideration of all the above circumstanceSj 
and after all the necessary caution in indulging too sanguine 
hopes, the irresistible and truly gratifying inference is, that Na« 
poleon's inactivity is a matter oi necessity and not of choice. His 
foraging and reconnoitring parties, are scarcely safe under the 
walls of Moskow ; and so far from undertaking any offensive 
operations, he is obliged to fortify himself at Kremlin. As long 
as the admirable and skilfully chosen position of Kutuzow pro- 
tects the most important part of the Russian empire, and mena- 
ces the whole French line of communication, it will be impossi- 
ble for Bonaparte to take the road to St. Petersburgh, and expose 
his rear ; and consequently his main army to destruction. Were 
there no force whatever on that road to oppose him, still the im- 
possibility of removing his line farther towards the Baltic, which 
alone could enable him to advance upon the Russian capital, would 
prevent him from making the attempt ; unless Witgenstein's ar- 
my were destroyed, and Riga taken, events now rendered altogeth- 
er improbable by his withdrawing Macdonald from that positioH. 
When we take an extensive view of the Russian armies, occupying 
all the principal roads leading to Moskow, and extending a formid- 
able circle around the enemy ; when we consider that Witgen- 
stein's army, relieved by the absence of Macdonald, must naturally 
be pushing towards Smolensko, to which point, the centre of the 
French line of communication, Tormazow's army is also advanc- 
ing from the opposite side, so as to place themselves between Bon- 
aparte and his reinforcements from Germany and Poland ; and 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

Winzengerode's right was actually forming a junction with Kutu- 
zow's left, at Mojaisk ; we can anticipate no chance of escape for 
Bonaparte, except by a desperate retreat^ in which he would have to 
encounter two armies, one of which already had checked him at Bo- 
rodino, and the other from Moldavia, consisting of veterans ; and, 
if united with that of Witgenstein, amounting to, at least, 120,000 
men. Even this chance, which it will require his utmost genius 
to improve, if he remains a fortnight longer at Moskow, will be 
lost to him by the powerful interposition of the elements. With- 
out therefore offending Providence by confident anticipations, we 
may entertain the most reasonable hopes of the Jinal overthroio of 
the Tyrant^ at whose name the world has trembled so long, and 
whose overwhelming power has crushed so many inoffending na- 
tions. These hopes are still further strengthened by the embar- 
rassing state of his finances. Hitherto he fought for spoils, and 
after each bloody campaign, returned richer than he went ; but 
now he is engaged in two sanguinary contests, one in Russia and 
the other in Spain, neither of which bring him any compensation ; 
but are a heavy expense and one continual waste of his resources, 
to repair which he has neither credit at home, nor men possessed 
of sufficient capital to assist him by loans, as done in Great Britain. 
He has lived upon plunder, and probably will starve in search of it 
—a fate which he has amply merited." 

About ten days before the news of theFrench retreat from Moa- 
kow, and of Witgenslein's decisive attack upon St. Cyr, had reach- 
ed this country ; the author in " the Repertory and General Ad» 
vertiser," Jan. 1, 1813, furnished the public with the following 
bold yet correct speculations :-!- 

" The main French army, reinforced after the battle of Moskwa, 
whereby the rear was considerably weakened, is kept in check by 
Kutusow and Winzengerode, acting in concert towards the point 
of Mojaisk, who must be supposed to have been strongly reinfor-i 
ced, and whose strength must at least be equal, since they have 
been able to confine so enterprising an enemy to Moskow. On the 
road to Sraolensko, we do not find any French force of conse- 
quence, unless we turn northward to Riga, where St. Cyr, and 
Macdonald, command considerable bodies ; but where they have 



28 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

been successfully opposed and efl'ectually checked by the corps 
of General Essen, governour of Riga, and the victorious army 
of Witgenstein ; so that even at this point the force on both 
sides appears equally balanced. The Russians, however, by the 
inactivity of the enemy, by a greater facility of obtaining rein- 
forcements, can annoy the whole road to Smolensko, in such 
a manner as to make it both necessary and expensive to keep 
it open ; and * Macdonald has already been detached from St. 
Cyr, to act upon that road, having been previously reinforced 
•with the remaining reserve from Wilna. As this xmovement 
must weaken the French corps before Riga, and expose it to a 
defeat ; General Witgenstein, whose constant reinforcements 
appear to keep pace with those of the enemy from Wilna? 
ivill immediately attack St. Cyr, or leave Essen to oppose him, in 
either case follow Macdonald to Smolensko, keeping the chances 
of War equal. But the result of equal success, as to the field of 
battle, is a positive advantage to the Russians, inasmuch as the 
mere preservation of their positions distresses the enemy, by inter- 
cepting his supplies, which nothing less can secure, or restore to 
former facility, than a complete victory, an event extremely im- 
probable, after the failure of so many previous attemps to dislodge 
Witgenstein, and after so many trials in which the Russian Gener- 
als have uniformly triumphed over the enemy not commanded by 
Bonaparte in person. Every mornent therefore gained by the Rus- 
sians, even without a victory, is fatal to the French, as it exhausts 
their resources, and insures the operation of the season, which 
alone must destroy those resources, at the time when none can, 
and none has been procured on the spot. The most formidable 
progress, however, increabing prodigiously the balance in favour 
of Russia, is that of Tormasow's army, upwards of 80,000 strong, 
■which about tlie !2th of Sept. had pushed to Pinsk, a town in 
Volhynia, about 200 miles from Warsaw, 350 miles from Smo- 
lensko, almost in a direct line, and 300 miles across to the Baltic, 
in the rear of Wilna. If this army should remain in that position, 

* Thepapers erroneously announced at thip time, that Macdonald was 
called to Epnaparte's army. The mistake, however, was only in the Gener'^' 
al's name, as Oudinot actually performed what was here predicted, and his 
name, substituted for that of Macdonald, will make the above remarks 

jight. yUBMEHEBS. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 29 

it would menace the enemy's great line of operation ; if it should 
stretch towards the sea, all the French reinforcements in Germany 
would be completely cut of ; but if these reinforcements made a 
desperate attempt, notwithstanding the unfavourable season, to 
penetrate into Russia, Tormasow would render their assistance 
useless, by anticipating them, and advancing before them upon 
Smolensko. This last movement it seems he has already adopted 
after leaving some garrisons behind to check any force that might 
attempt to follow him. If Macdonald is strong enough to inter- 
cept him, or compel him to take a circuitous route, the road from 
Smolensko may be opened again, and the contest prolonged : but 
if he is defeated, which can scarcely be doubted, as by venturing so 
far he would place himself between W itgenstein who follows him, 
and Tormasow who is advancing from Pinsk,the fate of Bonaparte 
would be decided ; as no power on earth could then save him : — 
Compelled to a desfierate retreat, at a season too the most unfavour- 
able, this rash hut till now successful conqueror, would have first 
to encounter Kutuzow^s whole army, and then, if he should escape 
by sacrificing one half of his own, with the remainder would fall in 
with the united forces of Tormasow and Witgenstein that would 
comjilete his destruction. Nay, should the more rapid advance of 
Winter suspend all operations in the rear, and leave things in their 
present situations ; the same decisive advantages would be secured 
to the Russians, by the inevitable starvation of the French at Mos- 
kow, who must fight for their existence, and whose inability to do 
so, must, consequently, terminate their career. From all these con- 
siderations it is evident, that Napoleon, blinded by incessant good 
fortune, set his crown, fame, and life upon the cast of a die ; that in 
the vain assurance of dictating to Russia at Moskow, he has com- 
mitted a most palpable, and it is to be hoped, irretrievable errour, 
in extending his line upon a single narrow road, without any fortifi- 
ed places to support it, and about 600 miles in length, contrary to 
the most certain and indisputable rules of military science ; that 
TLnXuzovi , justly calculating on his eagernsss and imjirudent confi- 
dence, had left Moskow as a bait for him, and there entrapped 
him ; and that finally, if the contest should be settled this winter, 
it will be so in consequence of the successful movements in the rear, 
which excite now more anxiety, and must prove more decisive than 
even a conflict between the main armies — which indeed have gained 
such importance, as to make extremely hazardous, if not impossi- 
ble, the personal escape of Bonaparte," 



30 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

" The Repertory and General Advertiser" of January 12, 1813, 
contains the following effusion from the author, on the receipt of the 
great news of the liberation of Russia : — 

" The truly gratifying intelligence from the Russian armies, 
while it confirms our conjectures and former speculations, con- 
founds at once the hopes and wishes of those who have always 
sympathized with Bonaparte, and by a constant adherence to his 
cause, have evinced an ambition to equal him, if not in talents, at 
least in qualities much less to be commended. It is not, however, 
our intention to exult over those journals in which Russia was tri- 
umphantly announced as already conquered, and that the destruc- 
tion of her cities, instead of being the pledge of resistance, was the 
effect of despair. It is not our desire to remind certain Gentlemen 
of their eager and premature publications of decisive French victo- 
ries ; or to call for recantation on some, who, because they have 
been at St. Petersburgh, pretend to wield the destinies of the Rus- 
sian Empire ; detail the most extravagant theories, less practicable 
than even the Corsican's own project of invasion, and expect, that, 
at their bidding, nature will change her course, the annual fall of 
snow diminish, Moskow approach St. Petersburgh at least 200 miles 
nearer, and the Volga take a more convenient direction to enable 
the French to cut off all communication between south and north, 
and intercept ail the supplies going from the Ukraine to St. Pe- 
tersburgh. No — Our joy is too pure, too dignified to be debased 
with such alloy. It is enough that in the freedom of Russia, the 
hopes of the whole world are revived ; and that, should the enemy 
effect even a successful retreat, she has nothing to fear, and noth- 
ing to lose. She has ?tow tojight^ not so much in self defence^ as to 
crififile, and, iffiossible destroy the tyrant tvho else may jirey upon 
others ; while he no longer contends for conquest, but for fiersonal 
escafie and existence. Her own safety is established, and her efforts 
are now directed to the deliverance of other nations. Let not the 
%viliing slaves of Bonaparte build much upon his " orderly retreat" 
and safe return home. JSfever shall he come back as he went, for he 
left in Russia the best part of himself all that colossal and impos- 
ing substance which imagination had given him ; and he will 
henceforth appear but a little, sallow, 7neagre semblance of a man, 
such as he is in reality ; nor will he again afford his friends an op-' 
portunity of descanting on the miseries and slavery of the Russian 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 31 

fieasaJitry, on their state of barbarism and ofifireasion, only to be re- 
lieved by the merciful interfiosition of a JVapoleon ! I We shall 
leave to others the consolation of boasting " French skill over Rus- 
sian strength ;" we shall not even disturb the renowned Dr. Clarke 
in his visions about the depravity of morals, want of patriotism, 
treacherous disposition, boorish manners, brutal ignorance, super- 
stition, stupidity, dirt and filth, and every thing else equally true 
and charitable with which he has honoured the Russian nation : 
but we will just take a peep at the great man, who formerly was 
seen every where, but who now has dwindled into a dwarf, to be 
discovered only by the aid of a telescope. * Where be is gone, and 
where he has hid his shame, no one can tell, and every one wishes to 
know ; we undertake therefore to guess that he has taken the Smo- 
lensko road, for that is the only one that is left him, and indeed the 
only one that leads from Moskow. The defeat of Murat apfiears 
to have been the immediate cause of the evacuation of Moskonv ; 
though it is plain from the 24th bulletin, that the advance back- 
wards was already in contemplation. Kutuzow seems to have ma- 
noeuvred with such skill, rapidity and secrecy, that Bonaparte was 
first informed of his real designs by the broken legions of his good 
brother-in-law, whom it was necessary at all hazards to save. It is 
clear that Napoleon cannot retreat without a great battle, or without 
the permission of Kutuzow. If the \?i.X\.&v feels strong enough to inter- 
cept him, we shall hear of a dreadful conflict near the place where 
the other took place ; if not, he will let him pass, and follow him to 
Smolensko, hanging on his flanks and annoying his rear ; and as the 
French horses are famished, and the roads are bad, their march 
will be slow, and the greatest part of their artillery probably will 
be abandoned. In this state, constantly galled by the pursuing en- 
emy, they may possibly arrive at Smolensko, where Victor, if he be 
not previously cut off, may join them with 20 or 30,000 men half 
starved, and half frozen ; which will scarcely replace the losses 
suffered in the retreat, and constitute the last reserve, inasmuch as 
Macdonald and St. Cyr being defeated, will be prevented by Wit- 
genstein's successes from affording any important assistance. This 
last may even place himself between Bonaparte and Smolensko ; 
but supposing this impracticable, the French must still fall in 
nvith Tchitchago^'s army, which is in the rear of Smolensko. This 
General is supposed to have reached Minsk about 21st of October, 
the very day on which Moskow was evacuated. Being thus placed 

* At this time no intelligence of Bonaparte was received, pubhshebs. 



32 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

about 180 miles from the opposite side of Smolensko, if he moves 
towards it, he will reach it sooner than Bonaparte who has abut 250 
to go ; but if he should remain at Minsk, he would command the 
main Smolensko and Moskoiu road, by which the French must 
eventually /lass : and by communicating with Witgenstein at Po- 
lotsk, a distance of only 100 miles across, he would completely hemi 
in every French soldier, as if it were in a bay, the entrance to 
which, between the Dwina and the Dnieper, coming very near each 
other, would be in his possession. It is more than probable, that 
his fiosition, at Minsk nvillnot be abandoned, but rather strengthen- 
ed with a view to this decisive ofieration ; the most certain infer- 
ence, however, is, that Mojaisk being passed, the great and finish- 
ing battle, upon a scale more extensive than ever, will take place 
at Smolensko, or Minsk, according to Tchitchagoff's order to meet 
the enemy half way, or to wait for him. If tJonaparte, placed thus 
between Kutuzow and Tchitchagoff's army, is able to cut his way 
through, he will leave one half of his men behind, and return 
♦' shorn of his beams ;" but if he is defeated, he is lost forever. 
The chances are greatly against him, as nothing short of victory 
can save him ; while a defeat would only place the Russians as 
they were. Nay, a drawn battle, the utmost he ever gained over 
the Russians in the most auspicious circumstances, would now be 
sufficient to seal his ruin. Even the lateness of the season, by 
checking operations on both sides, would destroy his army, by the 
mere privation of supplies, which the Russians might continue to ob- 
tain by remaining passive, but which the French cannot with- 
out acting offensively. In short, every thing tends to strengthen our 
belief, that Bonaparte is afifiroaching the end of his career ; that he 
yashly committed himself by going to Moskow ; and that he found, 
though too late, there are armies beside his own, and Generals, be- 
sides himself and his brood, who can successfully launch the thun- 
derbolt of war, and who know how to repel, pursue, and chastise an 
insolent invader, bringing in his train all the dregs of Germany and 
all the degraded victims of self-prostitution in Europe." 

On the receipt of the 25, 26, 27 and 28th bulletins, where Buon- 
apiirle announced and described his retreat, the author inserted in 
"the Boston Gazette," of Jan. 21, 1813, these pertinent "Re- 
marks." It is needless to observe that tiie sentences in italics, in 
this as well as all other articles, are prophesies literally verified. 



POLITICAL PREDICtlONS. 33 

" At length, to the utter confusion and dismay of some, and to 
ihe joy of others with whom we are proud to associate, the world 
hears now from Bonaparte's own mouth, that he has been com- 
pelled to quit the capital which bounded his imaginary prospects, 
and, like some consecrated spot, the moment it was touched, was 
to convert his golden dreams into reality, and shew Russia pros- 
trated at his feet. The conqueror is conquered. He flies, and is 
pursued by those very men whom he taxed with cowardice and in- 
ability, v/hom he pretends to have beaten in every encounter, and 
whose subjugation he had rashly conceived possible. The labour 
of lliree months is destroyed by one ; and hundred thousands of 
lives, for which he must account somewhere, have been sacrificed 
in vain. His bulletins which record a confession so extorted, so 
humiliating to himself and his parasites, and so consoling to Rus- 
sia and those who sympathise in her cause, abound in such admira- 
ble specimens of flummery, frivolty, impotent anger, half-stifled 
admission, half-uttered complaints, sophistry, prevaiucation, and 
downright contradiction ; as to surpass all former exhibitions of 
the same kind, and to convince us how desperate must be the 
cause which requires such flimsy covering, and how serious the 
disaster which breaks out through all such contrivances, and braves 
every effort to conceal it. It was our intention to comment at 
large upon these incongruous details, detect their falsehood, and ex- 
pose their alisuidity ; but v/e find it a crude unwieldly mass, to 
digest which would be a hopeless attempt, and like the Hercule- 
an task of cleansing the Augean stables, is much beyond our pow- 
er. We resign the honour of the undertaking to those who, when 
the Russians retreated to conquer, proclaimed them as cowards, 
fighting only by running away ; and who, now that Bonaparte re- 
treats defeated, will no doubt make every exception in his favour, 
and still trumpet him as the conqueror of the north — to those 
who rather than fail in their zeal and loyalty, shut their eyes to ir- 
resistible conviction, with unblushing impudence denounced the 
Russian official accounts as forgeries, and like base impostors, pre- 
tending to read in futurity, asserted that Bonaparte, having taken 
Toula and Kaluga, was still at Moskow, and that Russia existed no 
more ; at the very time when the idol, for whom they so prostitu- 



34 ^ POllTBiAL #REDICtlONl&. 

ted themselves, was removing somewhat against will, to another 
more comfortable place of worship. Our perfect contempt for 
?hese wretches, would not permit us even to expose their depravi- 
ty, much less to make any reference to them ; but when we enter 
the temple of the Corsican deity, those who officiate as its priests 
can alone expound the mysteries, and the ambiguous language of 
the oracle. We therefore think it proper to leave it to themj to ex- 
plain, if they dare, the real meaning of the Bulletins, and reconcile, 
if they can, its numerous contradictions ; as to ourselves, our 
•' profound cogitations," with which upon the whole we are well 
pleased, urge us to lay open all our doubts, however degrading to 
the god, in order that our conscience may be clear, and our errors 
expiated on the altar of confession. 

« We are willing to take Bulletin 26th as it is — It tells its own 
3tory full as well as could be wished : except, that where Bona- 
parte talks of the violation of laws by the Russians, we are im/iiout 
enough to think of a robber or a thief, who, being forced to restore 
the stolen goods and iindergo a severe castigation, cries out that 
the laws have been violated in his person !— Nor can we help 
thinking that a new expedient of going further from St. Pcter^*' 
burgh, in order to approach it nearer, unless nature has changed its 
course and brought St. Petersburgh to Smolensko, looks very much 
like an official premeditated, and even unprofitable falsehood ; and 
much good may it do to the contriver ! . 

" Bulletin 27th evidently labours to diminish the importance of 
ibe battle of Malojaroslavitz, and furnishes conclusive firoofs ofittf 
decisive termination in favour of the Russians. Malojaroslavitz is \» 
the south of Mojaisk about 30 miles, and in a direct line from the 
main Moskow and Smolensko road. The French stepped aside to 
drive the Russians from that town, and the combat began on the 
24th. Bonaparte admits the Russians occupied very advantageous 
heights, but says they were driven back with great loss ; and yet 
OB the 25th his whole army appeared only in order of battle ; in 
other words, instead of pursuing, expected to be attacked by a beat- 
en enemy ! 1 ! Here suddenly, and no doubt purposely, the ac- 
count is broken off ; and the reader is carried to Bonaparte at 
Grodnevo, a village on the main road a few miles northwest of 
Mojaisk. Here we find him attacked by 6000 Cossacks, and tho* 



POLITICAL PBEUICTION*. Sfi 

he says they were sabred and otherwise destroyed, the admission 
that they had taken 6 pieces of cannon from a park, which is always 
in the centre of an army, and the remarkable expression that *' at 
9 o'clock order was re-established," plainly shew the attack was 
very important, and that there was disorder, which in the French 
nomenclature is synonimous with defeat. On the 2Sth the Em- 
peror went to his army at Malojaroslavitz, to reconnoitre the posi* 
tion of the enemy, the position from which, we were told in the 
beginning, the enemy was driven back I ! ! This curious enemy, 
that seemed to appear where he was not, retreated again, and was 
suffered to do so : but observe, the humane conqueror, out of pure 
compassion, returns on the 26th to Borowsk, and on 27fh to Vere- 
ja, two towns which lie directly on the line of his back-ward prog- 
ress to the main road from which he advanced to the attack. Who 
does 7iot fierceive^ that he was beaten and comfielled to fall back P The 
loss he acknowledges, and the death of his favourite Gen. Deizon, 
confirm still further this supposition. As to his speculations 
about the Russian Infantry, and grey jackets, they are too ridicu- 
lous, and deserve no more notice than his humanity, which, in the 
26th bulletin, prevented him from destroying poor Russians by 
fire ! ! 

" Bulletin 28th gives us a pretty accurate idea of all the horrors 
and privations which the French have suffered ; of the destructive 
activity with which they were pursued j and of the complete suc- 
cess of Witgenstein, who drove St. Cyr over the Dwina, and cros- 
sed the river in pursuit. 

" The language of the bulletin, if properly translated, would 
read thus : St. Cyr beat Witgenstein, but ran away in order to 
form a junction with Victor, and to beat the beaten Russian at some 
other time I A child might make out a more consistent story, 
were it not for the impossibility of getting over the stubborn fact. 
« In short, from attentively perusing the French account, we are 
convinced the success of the Russians is much greater than they 
themselves in the first instance claimed. From the slight way in 
which Bonaparte mentions the defeat of St. Cyr, we have rej\son to 
suppose the defeat of Murat, on which he dwells with such evident 
chagrin, to be more decisive and extensive in its effects than was 
^t first apprehended. It is further evident that at Smolenako he ie 



36 POLITICAL PREDICTION^. 

as badly lodged and fierhafis zvorse than even at Moskoiv ; and t>iat 
no place short of Warsaw or Konigsberg can afford him winter 
quarters ; to obtain which he must march about 500 miles in the 
depth of winter, through a Russian army from Moldavia, ivhich nvas 
su/ifiosed to be floated at Minsk, directly in his front ; and if so, 
must inevitably intercept him. If he escape safe, two thirds of his 
army at least, ivill be left behind ; and no temptation on earth will 
ever again induce him to invade Russia. J\''or imll he he able to 
tii,rn his arms against others, and against Sfiain in particular j for' 
the Russians unqiiestionably wilt follow him, and every territory 
he quits in retiring home, will give him a new enemy, whom the 
terror of his name can no longer hold in passive obedience. Prus- 
sia will be reinstated, and Gerrnany, if there be any virtue left in 
it, will recover its independence." 

Reasoning upon the same events in " The Repertory and Dail3f 
Advertiser" of January 26, 1813, the author fort;tels the over- 
throw and surrender of Napoleon's army, near Smojensko (verified 
in the defeat and capitulation of Davoust's and Ney's corps,) and 
also the final destruction of the invader's whole forcesj as the price 
of his personal escape. 

" The calculations which we have before made in regard to the 
movement of the Russian armies are more than realized by the 
events, and Napoleon is probably pent up in Smolensko, where his 
army, reduced by famine^ cold., and the repeated attacks of the RuS" 
sians must be overthrown in a general battle, or capitulate to the 
Russian General. It will be seen by Lord Cathcart's despatches, 
that the town of Malojarosiavitz was taken and retaken eleven 
times ; and that the retreat of the French in consequence was the 
most disastrous that can be conceived. The effective force of the 
main body when they began their retrpat was or^ly 85,000 men | 
since which time it has met with repeated losses and disasters 
•which have reduced it to less than 60 thousand. Thus in three 
months, after the invasion of the Russian Empire, by the most ar- 
rogant, presumptuous, cruel and villainous of mankind, with the 
greatest ^rmy which the moderiri world has c\'er seen ; through the 
prudence and generalship of Kutuzoff, the bravery of his troopsj 
and the firmness of Alexander^ the invading army is nearly annihi- 
lated. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. % 

" For what is its present situation ? 

" On its vight hand near Smolensko is General Witgenstein, 
who after beating St. Cyr at Polotsk and driving him to Lepel, 
proceeded to join Steinhill and attack both St. Cyr and Victor, 
He defeated them on the 31bt of October, sent forward a 
detachment to Witepsk, and was joined afterwards by Tchitcha- 
goflf near Orsha. On the left of Smolensko the main army, 
150,000 strong, under Kutusow, was at Lobkoro on the 13th 
November. General Platoff had crossed the Dnieper in front of 
Smolensk. The French are thus completely surrounded and 
without supplies. The report from Gottenburg that Bonaparte 
had reached Mohilow with 15.000 men where he met with Admi- 
ral Tchitchagoflf, is not confirmed by the subsequent accounts from 
that place announcing the Admiral's junction with Witgenstein. 
Desfierate as Mi/ioleoTi's situation must be, he may contrive to elude 
his enemies and get back to Paris himself—but his army must be des- 
troyed" 

In the " Boston Gazette" of January 28, 1813, the author in 
allusion to the same events, and in confirmation of his remarks 
speaks thus : — 

" From the great events that followed, it must be evident to eve- 
ry reflecting and impartial man, that the sanguinary and unprece- 
dented battle of Borodino was decisively in favour of the Russians ; 
and was the first mortal blow to the towering hopes and the unhal- 
lowed ambition of Napoleon, whose every subsequent step led him 
nearer and nearer to destruction. The victory claimed by Kutu- 
sow, marked in the first instance by the enemy's retreat from the 
fie'd, and doubted afterwards from the circumstance of Bonaparte's 
being allowed to advance, was not merely negative or unprofitable ; 
but of such magnitude and positive advantage, as to have enabled 
that General to redeem every pledge he gave, and to execute one 
of the most extensive and daring projects that ever was conceived 
by the genius of an experienced warrior. He was not content to 
chastise an insolent invader, and barter the future prospers and 
solid advantages for the present eclat of barren victory ; but looked 
further, and by having courage enough to bear the imputation of 
defeat, and seemingly to yield to the pressure, he had laid his 
snare so well, that the enemy was scarcely conscious of it until he 



^aS POLITICAL ?REI>IGTION§. 

^vas caught and so entangled as to contemplate his chance of 
escape with painful apprehensions and dismal forebodings. 
Justly calculating} that a second battle, in case of defeat, would 
put the enemy in possession of Moskow, and the resources 
of the surrounding country ; and, in case of victory, would only 
drive him back without depriving him of his reinforcements* 
and of the power of renewing his efforts ; the Russian General 
chose rather to play a sure game, by sacrificing the capital, and 
thereby gaining an important position in the rear of Bonaparte, 
whose rashness and sanguine expeclations, he well knew, would 
carry him to that city. Every thing happened as was foreseen ; 
and Bonaparte, from the moment of his entrauce into Moskow, in- 
stead of a conqueror, beheld himself entirely at the disposal of the 
Russian General. He could not move but where it pleased Kutusow 
to lead him. His small detachments were not strong enough to 
?elieve his necessities ; and his main army was not in condition to 
seek a general engagement, which was his only remedy, but which, 
In order to be applied, required additional reinforcements ; and 
these the interposing force of the Russian army, the effect of Bon- 
aparte's own temerity and improvidence, had rendered altogether 
useless. Here began the disasters of the French. The momei)it 
we were appris^ed of Kutusow's position, a single glance convinced 
us that, so far from their being able to advance towards St. Peters- 
burgh, as some absurd speculations seemed to imply, their first 
movement would be directed southward, whether Kutusow irresls- 
tably impelled them. Nay, we went so far as to predict, that the 
Ex-Conqueror could not even retreat nvithout fighting a great battle^ 
or obtaining Kutusonv's permission; and we leave it to the judgment 
of the candid reader, whether the battle of Malojaroslavitz has not 
verified our prediction. Independently of the Russian official ac° 
count of that battle, the failure, as to object, is of itself a strong 
and positive confirmation. Lord Cathcart supposes that the French 
made the attack with a view to penetrate into the southern provin- 
ces ; we think it, however, more probable^ that necessity forced them 
to this measure, in order to dislodge the Eussians from a fiosilion 
which, being nearer to Viasma, enabled them to intercept the retreat 
qfBona/iqrle to Smolensko by the main road ; this they actually 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. ^$9 

did, and proved his defeat in proportion as he was foiled in his at- 
tempts to atti.un either of those objects. 

" The previous brilliant affair with Murat, unquestionably pre- 
cipitated the evacuation of Moskow ; but the next reverse, second 
to the battle of Borodino in the scale of fatality, is the decisive vic- 
tory of Witgenstein j which, at the most critical juncture, not on- 
ly deprived the main French army of every assistance from its 
Tear, but even compelled Victor to fall back ; who, instead of en- 
deavouring to join Bonaparte, found it necessary to support St. 
Cyr, and was, in conjunction with this General, finally overtaken) 
overthrown, and driven back upon Wilna. The victorious Wit- 
genstein, who had so often defeated the enemy, and by maintaining 
his galling position on the Dwina, enabled Kutusow on one hand« 
and himself on the other, to command the whole line of French 
communication ; — this truly meritorions officer, whose name is as 
green as his laurels, by his last attack and ultimate success, sep- 
arated Victor and St. Cyr from the main body, cleared the way for 
the army of Tchitchagoff, which had already advanced to join him, 
(and now has actually joined him) pushed towards Orsha, insured 
a communication with Kutusow, on the left of Smolensk, com- 
pletely intercepted Bonaparte, and we doubt not will, with Tchitch- 
agofF's co-operation, make a third and the last stop, in the prog- 
ress of the tyrant, who a few days ago we only believed to be afi- 
proaching the end of his career ; but now our belief is turned into 
conviction. No vengeance was ever so speedy and terrible, no re- 
verse was ever so great and sudden, no conqueror was ever reduc- 
ed in an instant from a power so gigantic, to a condition so forlorn 
and miserable. The defeat of Xerxes* and Charles XII, on com- 
parison sinks into utter insignificance, inasmuch as their means 
were smaller, and they fell from a lower eminence. The French 
army which entered Russia, amounted to 300,000 men, without in- 
cluding the corps of Regnier and Prince Schwartzenburg. This 
statement is not only supported by Alexander's proclamation, but 
may be actually calculated from the French Bulletins, which in- 
deed swelled ihe number to 600,000, and thereby assured us at least 
of one half. The wreck of the main army, surrounded on all sides, 

* A million upon the ancient scale Js not equal in force to 100,000 men 
upon the modem system. puBiieoEBS. 



40 POLITICAL PKEDICTIONS. 

Kvho will all perish or surrender^ and other losses in Volhynia, on 
the Divina, and in Courland, ivhich are not taken into consideration ,• 
also, tlie corps of Macdonald, which being comfioscd mostly oj Prus- 
sians^ may be considered as gone, will increase the whole of the loss 
at least to 250,000 men ; so that the shattered remains under St. 
Cyr and Victor, should Bonaparte himself escape by a miracle and 
join them, is the only force that has any chance of returning ; but 
how precarious is even this chance ? The nearest place of ap- 
parent safety would be Konigsberg, I say apparent, because the 
Prusdans tvill throw off the French yoke, and receive the fugiti-ves 
as ofien enemies. The Russians besides will be fiursuing thew with 
sword and famine ; and the frost, winch is stated already at 2^ be- 
low 0, colder than any day we have had here this winter, will not fali 
#0 fierform its fiart ujion the half naked, flying nurslings of the south^ 
who would have to traverse about 250 miles from Wilna even before 
they could get to the firesides of their doubtful friends. If the road 
loWarsaw should be preferred, the distance would be much great- 
er, and the difFiculties more serious in proportion. The part of 
Poland allotted to Russia, is as loyal as any of the ancient posses- 
sions of that Empire, owing to the similarity of language, customs 
and religion. In the last campaign of 1806, the French were con- 
vinced of the truth of this assertion, and now they will feel still 
more sensibly that Russian Poland, as it is called, will give them 
no supplies ; first, because it is unwilling, secondly, because it can- 
not. Its northern provinces are naturally poor, and exhausted by 
the enemy ; while ils rich and fertile provinces to the south were 
never out of the hands of the Russians, who barbarously have out- 
generalled Bonaparte, and contrived to keep all the good things of 
that country for themselves. An attempt, therefore, to penetrate 
to Warsaw, would inevitably destroy the remainder of tbt French 
army ; the more so, as the Russians from their position could not 
fail of intercepiing it. In short, the chances are multiplying fast, 
not only against any of the French runaways in a body, but against 
the personal escape of Bonaparte and his Generals, It would not 
surprize us if every individual, from the l.ighest to the lowest, or the 
whole mass q/' 300,000 me?^, with the single excepJion of Macdonald"" ^ 
Prussian corjts,* were to fl?id their grave, or /:riso?:,i?i Russia. 

* Schwartzenburg-',"? Austrian corps bad already retreated, and was safe. 

PUBLISHERS. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 41 

" I cannot conclude without paying a tribute due to the Rus- 
sian commanders and the army. Never before was there a spec- 
*acle so august and magnificent ! On one hand, the venerable Kut- 
nsoWj whom war has nursed for 75 years, like the hoary Jupiter, 
conceiving, directing and sending forth his thunders ; Platow, 
equally ancient, and the thunderbolt itself, destroying all he touch- 
es ; and Bennigsen, numbering as many years, sweeping like a 
whirlwind through the ranks of the enemy, whose storming undi- 
vided rage he alone had formerly sustained ; exhibit the extraordi- 
nary triumph of old age over vigorous manhood, and prove that 
Russia had her heroes sprung from the inspiring soul of Peter ; 
and that, matured under the benignant influence of Catherine II, 
they were consummate Generals long before the French revolu- 
tion had brought forth her infant cackling brood. On the other 
hand, young Bagrations defeating the enemy at every encounter, 
and a Witgenstein successively victorious over Oudinots, St. Cyrs 
and Victors, attest the superiority of regular education over casuaj 
exaltation ; and of theory, supported by experience, over the mere 
practical knowledge characterizing the greatest part of the French 
Generals at present. If we look lower down, we shall find admir- 
able oi'der and perfect discipline to pervade the whole. We have 
seen the Russian soldiers retreat, and we now see them advance 
without the least confusion or disorder ; and while the enemy has 
censured his chief generals, (Davoust and Sebastiani) not a mur- 
mur, not a hint of disapprobation has yet escaped the lips of the 
flussian commander. Not an officer of note has been reprimand- 
ed or suspended for any failure in duty or want of ability in execu- 
tion. We recommend these facts to the serious consideration of 
all those who were, or are still inclined to question our former com- 
ments upon the superiority of the Russian Generals." 

In the same paper, on the 8th of February, in answer to certain 
demagogues, ivho still contended for Bonaparte's tiiumphs over 
the Russians, our author challenges them to solve the following 
problems or questions. 

" If Bonaparte was victorious in the battle of Borodino, what kept 
him inactive at Moskow for a whole month, in a state of starvationj 
iF 



4S FOLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

and what prevented him from procuring the necessary supplies? 
from seizing on the loaves and fishes carried up the Wolga, almo&t 
under his nose, and from seeking another general engagement 
with Kutusow, who was only a few wersts from him, and notwith^ 
standing Certain acute reasonings, was actually on the Nara> 
in the rear of the French army, whence, so far from being dislodg- 
ed or being afraid of an attack, he himself made the first onset, of 
the effect of which Murat and his great brother-in-law may better 
inform the world ? 

"If Bonaparte made an attack on Malojaroslavitz, either to pene- 
trate to the southern provinces, or open a shorter passage to Smo- 
lensko, what drove him back upon the main road, disappointed of 
either of these objects ? 

" If cowardice or inability made theRussians run away,what made 
the French fly from Moskow ; and what is the reason, that, when 
the Russians retreated, order prevailed among them and insured 
their safety j but when it came to the turn of the French to shew 
their backs, disasters on disasters followed them, thousands of 
horses daily perished (as is confessed in their own bulletins, which 
are considered infallible,) hundreds of waggons, scores of cannon 
were taken from them, and their revei'ses were so rapid as lo make 
the author of the " Resources of Russia" blush for his mistake and 
ignorance in not having stated them higher ? 

" If St. Cyr was not beateiv, why did Victor, instead of advancing 
to the aid of the main army, fall back to support him, and with him 
was driven from the Dwina, abandoning the field to Witgenstein, 
and Tchitchagofi", whose junction was so ominous to Bonaparte 
and the flower of his army ? 

" Lastly* if Bonaparte is not intercepted, surrounded and cut off, 
so as to make his escape a miracle, why, as it appears from the last 
Paris advices of Dec. 12, brought by the Post-Boy to Salem — why 
has there been no bulletin, or any oificial intelligence received up to 
that time at Paris ? Why are the Paris editors obliged to go to 
Vienna for news about their own troops in Poland ? Why even 
these accounts, uncertain, unofficial and desultory as they are, refer 
only to Prince Schwartzenburg's and Victor's corps, the only force 
that is not yet hemmed in by the Russians, and hangs in broken 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. v|S 

fragments in the rear ? If Bonaparte was at Orsha on the 15th of 
Nov. according to these random accounts, and near Borissow on 
the 27th, why should he prefer writing a private letter and not an 
official bulletin, the appearance of which he knew was indispensa- 
ble at a moment so criiical at home ? Nay, if he had escaped, why 
has he not appeared at Warsaw, with Victor, or at Paris, where he 
had time enough to arrive; no less than 38 days from the 11th No- 
vember,the date of his last 28th bulletin, to the 18th of December, 
to which the advices were received from Paris, M'hen the Post -Boy 
left Marseilles on the 24th December ? Why should Bonaparte 
consider his presence unnecessary at his capital, when conspiracies 
are forming against him, and rumours of his death are circulated 
and believed with such avidity, and so much to the prejudice of his 
most essential interests and personal safety ? We were going to 
ask, why PrinceSchwartzenburg, who,as Paris editors say, had de- 
feated Sacken, has not advanced an inch from his position, and for 
several days after the battle remained stationary ; but we deem it a 
degradation to reason upon such unauthorised, foolish and incon- 
sistent accounts, and finish with a prophecy, challenging a counter 
prophecy, that Bonaparte never shall see St. Petersburgh unless as 
a prisoner, and that Prussia against the next sfiring, will furnish an 
army of AO or 50,000 men., not to fight the Russians^ but to expel 
and chastise the Tyrant toho had enslaved her'' 

As the doubtful and anxious interval between the receipt of the 
28th and 29th bulletin increased, the Author sent an article to 
" the Repertory and General Advertiser," which appeared on the 
9th of February, and begins thus : — 

" Where is Bonaparte, where is the mighty man, at whose very 
name the world shook to its base ? This was the first question that 
occurred to us, and the first we wished to satisfy by perusing the 
late Paris accounts, brought by the Post-Boy to Salem. But all 
our researches were in vain, and the cloud which enveloped his 
fate, was only found to lour with increased darkness. We did not| 
and do not believe, the story of his assassination by his own soldiers, 
because the story itself comes in a very questionable shape, and 
because such an event could not have transpired aloney without 



U POLITICAL PREDICTIONS,. 

disclosing to our view, other circumstances relating to the move- 
ments and actual state of his army. But we nevertheless^ cannot 
refiel the conviction of his being, at least, fLolitically destroyed ; as 
nothing short of his being intercepted and surrounded, could sus- 
pend the communication between him and Paris, for the space of 
nearly four weeks. From June, when Bonaparte entered Russia, 
to the 1 1th of November, the date of his last Bulletin, little more 
than five months in all, there were issued no less than twenty-eight 
Bulletins, leaving thus between each an interval of about five days; 
it must therefore be owing to something more serious than a 
mere accident, that the usual routine of these bulletins is at once 
cut off, and at a most critical juncture, France is deprived of reg- 
ular intelligence from the army.'* 

At length the 29th bulletin arrived, and the " Boston Gazette'* 
of Feb. 15) 1813, presented the public with the following remarks, 
where the loss of a French corps, supposed by the author to have 
amounted to 12,000 men, turned out to have been about 10,000 
strong, which is very near the mark. 

" Nothing short of cruel and absolute necessity could have ex- 
torted such mortifying confessions as the 29th Bulletin contains ; 
such indeed as might well be suspected of being forged, had they 
come from any other place but France, and had they been more at 
variance with the Russian official accoimts both as to date and mat- 
ter. It appears from the intercepted documents, that the number 
of the French army, at the time of its departure from MoskoWj 
was 85,000 strong, and its loss, in several battles between Moskow 
and Smolensk, was 38.000 men ; so that when it reached the lat- 
ter place, there remained only 48,000 or 50,000 men, if we include 
Augereau's corps and other forces which were coming fresh to 
open a new communication with Kalouga. Eugene's corps was 
dispersed on the 8th of November, since which time nothing cer. 
tain has transpired concerning his fate. He is only once mention- 
ed in the Bulletin, in such a way as to make it evident that since 
the time above mentioned his movements had not yet been ascer- 
tained. The destruction of his corps, and;the capture of Augereau, 
reduced the main army to about 35,pop men, commanded by Mar- 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 45 

ahals Davoust and Ney, and divided into two columns, 15,000 men 
each ; the choice body of guards with Bonaparte, Murat, the staff, 
and ex-dukes or ex-generals, who lost their command by losinr^- 
their troops, forming the remaining 5000. In consequence of the 
movements of TchitchagofT, Bonaparte confessed that he could not 
keep at Smolensk, and having made this apology for not remaining 
80 miles nearer to St. Petersburgh, according to his promise, he 
left Smolensk on the !3th Nov. with a view of arriving, as he said, 
at Minsk before the enemy. As far as we can judge f<om the ac- 
counts on both sides, his army marched in the following order : 
Davoust in the advanced guard, the Emperor with his staff and 
guards in the centre, and Ney bringing up the rear. The indefat- 
igable veteran Kutusoflf, sent General Miloradovitz to intercept 
them, and this truly meritorious officer, who first met Davoust, 
succeeded in completely defeating him on the 16th of November. 
Bonaparte, who was present in person, fled with precipitation, and 
abandoned this corps to the Russians. On the i7th the rear guard, 
under Ney, was stopped near the same place, and towards the 
18th it was completely defeated, destroyed or taken. In these two 
actions, upwards of 20,000 prisoners taken, and a third at least kil- 
led, give us the whole force of Davoust and Ney, and finish the 
grand army that was at Moskow. 

« How many of the remaining 5000 escaped with Bonaparte, time 
alone will inform us ; but it is plain that they fell in with Oudinot's 
and Victor's corps, and that these were the only two engaged in 
the most important battle of Borissow, which, we are certain, /las 
consummated the unprecedented disasters of the French. Bonaparte 
acknowledged that his object was to get to Minsk, and thence eith- 
er to Warsaw or to Wilna by the main road ; and yet we find that 
in consequence of this battle he was compelled to abandon the main 
road, and fly across the country full of marshes, lakes and woods 
almost impassable. He is so conscious of this, that he labours to 
convince the world, that the road he took, where there was no road 
at all, was better than the road he left, which was the only road ; 
and that marshes, lakes, woods, and other disagreeable obstacles, 
■were all at once transferred from the wilderness he was passing, 
to the populous parts from which be was receding ! ! ! As to his^ 



46 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

taking 500 waggons, and twice 6000 prisoners, when he could not 

carry his own waggons or feed his own men, it is too ridiculous a 
bombast to be noticed, and being the only opening for a good tough 
story, he filled it without fnercy. We shall not however envy him 
so poor a consolation ; nor shall we inquire why, if he defeated 
TchitchagofP on the Berezina, " all the passes were still in the 
hands of the Russians." Though the battle, where his cuirassiers 
performed such wonders, took place on the 28th of Nov. he had so 
little leisure on, the road of his choice, that until the 3d of Dec. he 
could not, or perhaps forgot to issue the said bulletin, containing 
his dyinc; speech and confession. Surely there never was a I'e^ 
verse so great, a vengeance so awful i 

" Nor is there any prospect of relief a? Wilna any more than at 
Smolensk. Bonaparte will still be pursued even into the heart of Prus- 
sia without any hope of causing the Russians to "■ pause," He talks 
of replacing his artillery, recruiting his army j how and by what 
means ? He talks of 20,000 horses being in different depots ; 
where are the depots ? If in Poland, Poland is in the hands of the 
Russians, and so will be the horses. The Paris papers, which 
" lie worse than a bulletin," announce 120,000 men ready to 
march to Boi:iaparte's assistance : where are they ? From Warsaw, 
where Prince Schwartzenburg remains with his Austrians, not 
'very willing to serve Bonaparte, to the extremity of Courland, 
where Macdonald is stationed with his Prussians, still less 'willing to 
assist the Tyrant who had enslaved them, there is no force of any 
importance that can for a single moment check the course of the 
•victorious Russians. Witgenstein and Tchitchagoff in their rapid 
advance will not even experience the ivant of provisions ,• as Kutu- 
sow, being in the rear with his main army, supplied from the adjacent 
fountries, will not fail to support and facilitate their movements," 



About this time was published the second edition of the " Rc" 
sources of Russia," to which the author added " a sketch Of the 
present campaign," whose facts and reasonings or comments, 
though he had to grope his way in the dark, for want of positive or 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 47 

regular official intelligence, have been confirmed in detail by Kerr 
Porter's account of the same campaign — -a man who was an eye- 
witness to the principal transactions of that glorious period. We 
shall present here the author's statements with regard to the battle 
of Borodino ; chiefly because he particularly and uniformly seems 
to have considered that battle as the original cause and source of 
Bonaparte's disasters; because, until the above ample confirmation 
by Porter, of all the writers who touched on this subject in Ameri- 
ca, he stood alone, as to the latitude of this opinion,if we except the 
eloquent Mr. Harper, who soon after followed him ; because some 
writers, who publicly questioned his declaration, in the same 
sketch, of the innocence of Speransky, (confirmed since beyond all 
doubt by Speransky's well known safety, subsequent to the sup- 
posed conspiracy,* the reports of which have suddenly died away) 
widely differed from him on the issue of that famous battle ; and 
because the imaginary speech which he put into the mouth of Ku- 
tusow, is now a real and historical exposition of the policy of that 
great general. The extract begins thus at the page 118 : — 

" The battle commenced on the 4th of Sept. and lasted, with 
various success till the 7th, when it assumed its final and horrible 
aspect, turning the actions of the three preceding days into mere 
skirmishes, or sportive trials of strength. Since the introduction 
of modern tactics, there has never been a battle like this, as to the 
prodigious extent of forces engaged on both sides, the skill of the 
respective commanders and officers, the bravery and discipline of 
the troops, and the horrid slaughter of men, falling like a ripened 
harvest beneath the sweeping hurricane. Each moment a thou- 
sand mouths, as the 18th bulletin says, scattered death on all sides, 
and with torrents of human blood deluged the earth- In short, 
the horrors of this sanguinary day, surpassed the horrors of the 
8th of February 1806, as much as this last (the battle of Eylau) 
sui'passed, in destruction, all the intermediate and the preceding- 
battles recorded in the annals of the civilized world. There is only 
this resemblance in them, that the Russians in both fought against 

* This conspirscy tui'ns out in fact to have been a plot against Speransky 
himself and some of his friends, intended to ruin them nx the Emperor's 
opinion, 



48 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

superior numbers, and in both remained masters of the fieidj 
though the armies, on each side, were so disabled as to undertake 
nothing of consequence for some time after. The essential ad^ 
vantages, however, of the battle of Borodino, were evidently on the 
side of the Russians ; and a few facts will convince every impar- 
tial reader of the truth of this assertion. 

" The Russian accounts, which by their modest and temperate 
tone, when contrasted with the inflated strain of the French bullet- 
ins, created at first despondence, but now are entitled to additional 
confidence, expressly announced that Bonaparte was driven back 
about 3 o'clock at noon, and that the battle was won by the Rus- 
sians, who, according to subsequent reports, remained for two days 
on the field, removing the wounded, and burying the dead, and on- 
ly quitted it after a deliberate consultation ; in other words, in 
compliance with their original system. The French 18th bulletin, 
in describing this battle, evidently accords with the Russian ac- 
counts, if not in terms, at least in matter implied. It acknowledges 
the action was over, early in the afternoon, suppressing merely, 
that, though it was over with the French, it was not so with the 
Russians, whose fire had not ceased till night. But the date of the 
bulletin is conclusive, being on the third day after the battle ; that 
is, as soon as the Russians, at the expiration of two days claimed 
by them, had retired, and gave the French an opportunity of dating 
their bulletin on the field of battle. It is well known that the 
French, as well as other generals, if victorious, always date their 
despatches immediately after a battle ; and accordingly the Rus- 
sian general issued his own the next morning, on the 8th of Sep- 
tember, while Bonaparte deferred his till the 10th, a circumstance 
"which no sophistry can reconcile with his pretensions to victory. 
So desirous was he to repel the suspicion of having failed, that not 
being able to state the subsequent positions of the Russian army, 
as is generally expected from a victor, and warranted by Bona- 
part's former practice, he employed a Polish renegado in recon- 
noitring thefuguives ; and for the first time was obliged to substi- 
tute the supposed information, given by Russian sarjeants and re- 
cruits, for that which, if he had conquered, he had completely in 
his power to furnish in a manner much more entitled to credit. 
Indeed, sometime or other it will appear in history, that the mere 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 49 

desire of concealing- his defeat, induced him, contrary to the advice 
of his best generals, to advance at all hazards ; and approach that 
gulf of destruction, which he otherwise would probably have 
avoided. 

" Thus far the honour of the day remained v/iih the Russians ; 
and their victory could not be denied by any of those, with whom 
the mere keeping of the field is the best criterion of success ; but 
there are many, who, with more propriety, judge of the success by 
the consequences, and who will naturally ask, why did Kutusow 
retire, if he were successful, and give up Moskow to destruction ? 
The answer is, that Napoleon's advancing was a proof, not of his 
victory, but of rashness, the fatal effects of which he soon experien- 
ced ; and that Kutusow's retreat was the result of wisdom, which 
suspended, for a moment, his triumph, but soon more firmly estab- 
lished it, and in more striking colours displayed it to the world. 
As to the destruction of Moskow, there are facts enough to justify 
us in making the Russian general speak for himself, and thus he 
must have reasoned : — 

" I know, that the enemy cannot easily recover from the severe 
blow I have injlicted on him ; but 1 am also sensible, that, in the 
struggle, I have myself been much weakened. I have done enough 
for the honour of my country, and for my own refiutation ; a7id it 
is time to think of means, sure, yet the least exfiensive, to finish the 
work, which cost so much in the beginning, but whose progress is 
now rendered less difficult. If I resolve on another battle, I must 
sacrifice a great many brave men, and my utmost success can only 
be, to drive the enemy back upon his reinforcem.ents, which may 
sustain him, and enable him to renew his efforts ; but if I retard 
the hour of decision, until his festering wounds spread a mortal 
languor over his whole body, I shall ensure success, and save my 
soldiers, whose lives are of 7nore imfiortance to the country, than 
the destruction of the capital — the mere destruction of a certain 
kind of property — all measures having already been taken to re- 
move the inhabitants, with their personal effects. It is true, that 
the preserving of the city might not materially impede the final 
issue, on which I calculate with confidence ; but, as it is intended 
to starve the enemy in his new quarters, by destroying these, I 
wish only to preserve the lives cf the citize7is, who otherwise may 
probably remain there, and share the fate of their invaders. Be- 
G 



so POLITICAL PREDICTIOKS. 

eides, the nobility^ the merchants^ and other classes, being willing i6 
make this sacrijice, I shall choose the least of evils, by allowing the 
enemy to enter Moskow, whither, I doubt not, his rashness will 
lead him, but where he will give me an opjiortunily of encompassing, 
more effectually, his ruin.' 

" The council of war sanctioned this resolution, and the Russian 
general, like a skilful hunter^ who had mortally wounded a fierce 
animal, stefified aside to wait merely till his ferocious prey should be 
ensnared by its otv7i rage, and exhausted by its fruitless exertions, so 
as to be destroyed, in the end, with more facility and less sacrifice. 
Every thing was accordingly foreseen ; every necessary rneasure 
adopted ; all calcwlations made with wonderful accuracy ; and all 
expectations were crowned with perfect success. 

" The flames, which illuminated Bonaparte's entrance into 
Moskow, on the 14th of Sept. enlightened him, for the first time, 
on the reality of his perilous situation, and on the Russian national 
character ; which he had so far misconceived, as to flatter himself, 
that, from its supposed instability, from the fancied disaffection of 
the nobles, and the presumed weakness in the government, Russia, 
overcome by the spirit of intrigue, and ensnared in his artful nego- 
ciations, would not hesitate to commit at length the monstrous 
crime of suicide. It was in the smoking ruin of the ancient city of 
the czars, that he beheld a funeral pyre, on which were consumed 
all his hopes of dividing the Russian people, and either of alluring 
the peasantry with the glittering toys of French liberty, or of 
intimidating their emperor with the glare of the Parisian sword. 
It was there that all his imaginary projects of fresh triumphs, and 
of new conquests, in an instant vanished ; and the dark September- 
night, brooding over the vast conflagration, as if to conceal it from 
the eye of vengeful heaven, was but a faint image of the tyrant's 
frowns, and that outward gloom, beneath which raged the various 
contending passions of his soul :— 

Page 148, the author concludes the sketch in the following 
prophetic manner. 

'' It seems, as if the magnitude of object, and the immensity of 
preparation, v/ere only designed to make failure and destruction 
proportionubly extensive. No phenomenon was ever so porten- 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 51 

lous in the beginning, and so auspicious in its termination. Its first 
appearance was that of a baleful comet, or the huge eclipse, shed- 
ding " disastrous liglu" on the affrighted world ; but its exit left 
a mild and unexpected radiance be/iind, which rejoices^ and will con- 
tinue to rejoice., the now res/tiring nations. No spectacle, at first so 
dismal and terrible, was more magnificent in its progress, and none 
was ever more brilliantly closed. The very ground which, five 
•months since, had trembled beneath the daring and lawless foot of 
the boasting, insulting, and remorseless invader, now reposes be- 
neath the congenial and well known tread of its legitimate owners. 
Poland too receives the Russian armies, and again sees their 
standards wave on her ramparts ; but she expects fieace and hafipi' 
ness^ and fears not to be deceived. Instructed by the painful experi- 
ence of the past, she returns to the bosom of her natural protector^ 
with whom by custom., religion.^ language., and the satne origin, she is 
closely and inseparably united.* Kutusovv, who entered Wilna on 
the 12th, forms the prominent character in this last and truly sub- 
lime scene. He seems the centre of motion, and the soul of action, 
while all around him is rapidity, order, harmony, and activity ; a 
combination of skill, discipline, and zeal, which makes each agent, 
in his particular sphere, equally great, and which renders any com- 
parison, or discrimination of merit, impossible. All have done 
their duty ; all have deserved well of their country ; all have 
commanded the world's admiration ; and all, through the various 
changes of time, with joy and gratitude will be remembered by 
posterity. 

" Thus ends the most eventful tragedy that ever was performed 
on the world's stage ; a tragedy, where nations were spectators, 
where upwards of 700,000 men appeared as actors, where reality 
surpassed the poet's faithful imagination, and where the invisible 
hand, which directed all, had disposed time, plot, and incidents 
according to the established, and most approved rules of the drama. 
The previous correspondence, and the proclamation immediately 
preceding, form the prologue to the bloody business. From the 
middle of June, to the middle of August, the various movements 

* It is a well known fact, that the Russian government always has beeo 
the most popular in Poland . 



52 POUTICAL PREDICTIONS. 

and manceuvres, on both sides, make up the first act, and lay the 
foundation of the plot. Fronri the 18th of August, beginning with 
the battle of Smolensko, to the 6th of SepteiTiber, is a second act ; 
where the plot is rising, and beginning slowiy to develop itself. 
The third act commences with the horiid btittle of Borodino, on 
the 7th of September ; and, though the change of fortune has actu- 
ally taken place, hopes and fears are so artfully balanced, that 
the interest increases, and expectation becomes more and more 
excited. The fourth act begins with Murat's defeat on the 18lh 
of October, and the consequent evacuation of Moskow. Here, 
the great reverse assumes a decisive character ; the plot is ripen- 
ed into explosion ; the causes, leading to the main catastrophe, 
are boldly and openly brought into action ; incidents thicken on 
incidents ; events follow each other in rapid and brilliant succes- 
sion ; and the act concludes with Bonaparte's entrance into Smo- 
lensko, on the 9th of November. The audience are now impatient 
for the fifth act ; and at length it appears with the retreat from 
Smolensko, and the destruction of Davoust and Ney's corps, be- 
tween the 17th and 18th of November. This is, as it ought to be, 
by far the busiest act. It impels the spectators along, and, gath- 
ering strength in its accelerated progress, it hurries them from 
scene to scene, until they reach the final catastrophe, scarcely sen= 
sible of the distance they have traversed. Here they pause, and 
here the hero of the piece delivers his last speech and confessionj 
(29ih bulletin) retires io die (^polidcaWy) behind the scenes, and leaves 
the subordinate actors to shift for themselves ; ivho, one by one, 
quit the stage, and go nvhere they can, strifified of their false orna- 
ments, divested of their scenic grandeur, and restored to their nq.- 
five and original obscurity" 

It is remarkable that the author's calculation of the whole proba-? 
ble French loss, in killed and wounded, npi including officers, made 
from no particular data, but apparently at hazard, on comparison 
with the oiScidl return published at St. Petersburgb and not receiv- 
ed here till some months after \\\q sketch was printed, varies only 
in a few figures, as may be seen froim the folloMdng, 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 53 

According to our author the French loss was, 

In killed 186,000 

Wounded 166,0U0 



Total 352,000 
According to the official return, 

In killed 135,635 

Wounded 210,530 



Total 346,165 

The probable number of the fugi- 
tives who escaped beyond the Vis- 
tula is yet more remarkable for its 
correctness ; for while our author 
supposes it to be more or less ----- 18,000 

The above official return, after de- 
ducting the Prussian and Austrian 
corps in the manner of our author, 
states the number positively at - - - 15,000 

The author next proceeds to speculate with his usual boldness 
on the future state of Europe, or the future conduct of the Euro- 
pean powers, in consequence of the Russian successes. This was 
risking at once his whole reputation for foresight and judgment ; 
but this confidence in himself, again most triumphantly justified 
by the events, shows that his knowledge of European affairs in 
general, a point which he probably wished to establish, was no less 
accurate than that of the Russian affairs in particular. He thus 
begins with Russia, page 157 : — 

" The policy of Alexander is open and manly, soaring above 
mean intrigue, and low subterfuge. He honestly declared to the 
world, that the restoration of the Prussian monarchy to its inde- 
pendence and integrity was essential to his interests, as it would 
form a bar of separation between his and the French empire. He 
also made it known through Kutusow, that no peace can, or shall 
be made, until the French have repassed the Vistula. Therefore, 
when it is considered, that this comes from an emperor, who has 
just redeemed the pledge, given to his people, of" never sheath- 
ing his sword, as long as a single enemy remained on his territo- 



54 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

ries ;" it cannot be doubted, but he tvill pursue the enemy beyond 
the Fistula, — to Berlin, — and further, if necessary ^-^^to rescue, in 
the first instance, the king and ki77gdom of Prussia from thral- 
dom, and thus inflict a noble -vengeance on the shade of Freder- 
ick the Great, whose jealousies and hatred of the Russian nation, 
and whose unworthy conduct towards the founder of the Russian 
empire,* are an indelible stain on his own memory. 

" The well-known disposition of Alexander, whose ambition is, 
to be the pacificator, and not the conqueror of the world ; his extreme 
reluctance to shed human blood, even in cases of necessity ; and 
the vast expenses and sacrifices attending a foreign war, might in- 
duce us to believe, that he would not in any event advance beyond 
the Elbe : but, on the other hand, his wisdom, and the dearest in- 
terests of his country, 1)3111 not permit him to throw away the advaU' 
tages he has acquired ; to allow the enemy to recover breath ; and be, 
at the end, compelled to go through the same process, in order to 
re-purchaSe the same advantages. Delay, being favourable to the 
enemy, is of course prejudicial to himself; and, in the present cir- 
cumstances, would be a grievous fault, almost irreparable. It is pro- 
bable, therefore, that the Russian emperor tvill pursue the war, un- 
til the Rhenish confederacy is broken, the duke of Oldenburg res- 
tored to his dominions, Holland rescued from her bondage, all the 
ports in the north of Europe are opened to commerce, and an hon- 
ourable, general peace is obtained and established on a permanent 
basis. 

" The Rhenish confederates, who groan under French oppres- 
sion, are mostly related to the emperor. The dukes of Weimar, 
Baden, Mecklenburg and others, connected with him by family 
ties, which nothing but the predominant power of France could 
break for a moment, all entertain strong hopes and expectations of 
being delivered by him ; and he will not abandon them, when Prov- 
idence has novj bestowed on him the enviable power to save ; and 
when not to save, would shew his unconsciousness of his great des- 
tiny. He will protect them for the same reason, that he protects 
the king of Prussia and the duke of Oldenburg, who are likewise 
his relations. 

'< As to bis views of conquest, they do not extend beyond Poland. 
It would, however, be a just reward for his exertions, and a bene- 
ficial exchange to the inhabitants themselves, to leave him in pos- 
* Peter the g"i*eat. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 55 

session of the country, as far as the Vistula, and of the Austrian 
part of Poland He might then /?roc/am himself king of Poland^ 
unite and consolidate the fieofile, and gratify their Jiride by shew- 
ing to the world, that, as a nation, they are still iri existence. It is 
of the partition of their country among the diflerent powers, — sep- 
arating, as it were, brother from brother, and father from son,— 
and not of dependence upon any one in particular, that they have 
chiefly complained. It is also certain, that, if they were left to 
their own choice, they would unanimously prefer the protection of 
Russia, because she is more able to defend them ; and because 
her government, wisely and mildly administered, was rendered 
still more popular by local prejudices, in her favour ; prejudices, 
which arise, as was already mentioned, from the similarity of lan- 
guage, customs, and other circumstances. Prussia, for the loss of 
Aerfiart, might be easily indemnified in Saxony, whose kisg, if we 
except the elector of Bavaria, is the most attached to France, and 
therefore may justly be treated like an enemy. Austria also, 
would think herself amfily paid, for the loss of her share, by the 
recovery of her German and Italian states, which she can easily do 
with the assistance of Russia." 

Of Prussia he speaks thus, page 1 63 : — 

" Prussia will unquestionably join Russia, both from good willy 
and from the force of circumstances. From France she experienced 
nothing but disgrace and oppression ; from Russia, she has known 
nothing but kindness and friendship, and now from her alone she 
can expect safety, protection, and the restoration of her lost inde- 
pendence. She cannot hesitate for a moment between a deadly 
foe, who has thirsted for her ruin, and a faithful friend, who has 
shed his blood in her defence. The Prussians hold the French in 
abhorrence ; they do not think themselves fairly conquered ; and 
pant for an opportunity o^ vindicating that military character, for 
which they were so celebrated in Frederick's time, and the suppos- 
ed loss of which is most galling to their pride — a source of con- 
stant humiliation, to remove which they would spare neither blood 
nor treasure. 

" They are not, besides, corrupted by French influence, like 
their German brethren ; and still have virtue, talent, and patrio- 
tism enough to deliver their country from ignajninious bondage. 



56 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

They luant but an impulse, and Russia is destined to give it^ 
D'Yorke's convention with the Russian general, is a certain pledge 
of thei7' hearty co-operation in their owti cause, and it is not in the 
p ower of Bonafiarte to check them. If he restores their king, the 
presence of their sovereign, whose present language is only the 
language of restruint, not of the heart, will animate them to great- 
er exertion ; but if the tyrant should remove him, they will be the 
move incensed, and stimulaletl to levenge. Be it as it may, they 
will receive the Russians as friends and brothers, and will open to 
them their towns, their houses, and their arms, iviih most cordial 
welcome." 

On the subject of Austria, to whom our author is not very par- 
tial, he speaks with great doubt, despondence, and reproach. It 
must be confessed that his suspicions of her have not been wholly 
unfounded ; and it is evident, that, though she joined the allies, 
a certain reluctance and hesitation were discernible in her con- 
duct, throughout the whole campaign terminated in the cap- 
ture of Paris. After the battle of Dresden, according even to 
Lord Cathcart's despatches, she appears to have wavered, and 
nothing but Alexander's presence, and his bringing extra force into 
action, could have prevailed on iier to go on. During the inva- 
sion of France, she again showed symptoms of discontent, as ap- 
peared from a ministerial message to the British Parliament, 
where the expression '' The s»liies are now unanimous," must have 
exclusively applied to her, as she alone could have wished to pre- 
serve Bonaparte, for the sake of his son ; nevertheless our author 
had still some hopes of her, as may be perceived from the follov/« 
ing passage, page 166 : — 

" If Austria therefore takes the part of France, her Polish pos- 
sessions will be lost without an equivalent : but if she thinks, that 
her arms furnish better means to repossess herself of the Italian 
states, and extend her power to the Mediterranean — an object of 
great interest to her, — she will join Russia, and be, for once, on the 
right side of the question. This is certainly the course of wisdom ; 
for with Russia she can be what she was, and with France she wilt 
be less thaii she is." 



POLITICAL PREDICT10N3. 5? 

Of Sweden the author speaks thus, page 175 : — 
" If Sweden, however, wishes to recover Pomerania, sAf m«s?, q/" 
vecesaity, act nvith Russia and England : indeed, from her geo- 
graphical situation, she has no other choice than to be the ally of 
both, nnd no other chance oj'/irosfierity." 

He then proceeds to the rest :-^- 

" Denmark, whether she wishes, or not, mustfolloiv in the train 
of the northern powers ; she ivill however wait, as long as she can, 
to see which side is likely to prevail in Germany. She has been a 
mere tool, a miniature of France, and the satellite of Bonaparte, 
whose acts of plunder and piracy she has been aping to the utmost 
of her insignificant power. Ii is of very little consequence which 
way she goes, provided she does not continue privateering against 
the commercial property in the Baltic ; for then she will find, to 
her cost, that her power of doing mischief is of short duration; and 
that Holstein and JVorway, perchance, may be disposed of, not ex- 
actly to her liking. 

" The Rhenish confederation, or princes composing it,— 
though they are tired of being less than the prefects of Bonaparte, 
— though they hail with joy their prospect of deliverance, and are 
inclined, from family connexions as well as other motives, to fa- 
vour the Russian interest, — are so weak, that they will not dare to 
stir, until the French shall have left them, or the Prussians, if not 
Russians, shall have entered their territories. Then they certain- 
ly will. The fallen tyrant of Europe, as he recedes towards France, 
will midtiply his enemies ; and Russia will find new friends, as 
she advances from her own territories. 

" Turkey, by her recent conduct, has most unequivocally 
shewn her preference of Russian to French alliance ; and was the 
only power, that did not desert Russia. As there is no douht 
but her adherence to the Russian cause proceeded from an antici- 
pation of its success ; such adherence must be now strengthened by 
the fears of provoking the prodigiously augmented power of Rus- 
sia ; and by a desire of conciliating her emperor, who knows hovr 
to estimate and remember good ofRces. The Turkish divan are 
perfectly acquainted with the character of Alexander ; and are 
aware, that to be upon friendly terms with him is tlieir best securi- 
ty ; and that, as long as they do not compel him to measures of 
H 



5S POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

hostility, he xvill rot injure them. For these reasons, Turkey cer- 
tainly will be on the side of Russia ; and, as was before observed, 
will take the field, and is actually engaged, by treaty, to take it 
against Austria, the moment the Luter should make a serious dem- 
onstration against Russia. If Austria, contrary to ail expectation, 
should join France, the whole of Europe will be in flames, and di- 
vided into two parties * that is, France and Austria, on one side, 
will have to contend with Russia, Prussia, Turkey, and perhaps 
Sweden on tlie other ; Austria., however., with all her imfirudencey 
is not likely to take such a step., 

« Of Great-Britain very liftie can be said ; her policy and 
conduct being less subject to change and speculation. She is the 
natural ally of Ru-isia, and profits, more than any other power, by 
the Russian successes. All her channels of European commerce 
Kvill be restored / and her prosperity, from the intercourse with 
the continent, will be revived with greater vigour than ever, as the 
tyranny of the French, and the desolation caused by their wars and 
decrees, have annihilated continental manufactures, and therefore 
prodigiously increased the demand upon England. The ground- 
work of the restrictive system, operating against her, will be entire- 
ly destroyed i and it will be completely in her power ^ by using her 
advantages with wisdom and moderation. — by adding to her own 
naval power the influence or mediation of Russia,— ifo turn her en- 
emies to friends., or to entail on them exclusively all the losses and ca- 
lamities of war. 

" The last quEsrioN, ho%v far France will be able to check 
the progress of the KiLHsians ? it would take a volume to answer. 
Suffice it therefore to observe, that France is not in a condition to 
exert herself with her former success. The incessant and ruinous 
Wars, in which she has been for a seiies of years involved; the enor- 
mous and wanton waste of blood and treasure ; the total stagnation 
of commerce, and the consequent reduction of her national resour- 
ces, at the moment when her necessities have increased in double 
proportion ; have so embarrassed her finances, and exhausted her 
effective population, as to render her efforts comparatively feeble, 
and unavailing. This is no dream, no rash, vain, and extravagant 
•anticipation % but an absolute fact, which the first trial will estab- 
lish beyond all possibility of doubting. li will soon be seen, that 



P0LITICAL*PRFDTCTIONS, 59 

she is not half so able vow to dtfetid herself, even at home, as she 
ivats ten years ago. It will be seen, that her brilliant career, rich 
in -unsubstantial triumphs, but floor in solid advantages, was un' 
dermining her vital strength, and propelling her back to relative 
impotence. It will be seen, that, by persecuting commerce, she has 
punished herself much more, than her tributary nations— injinitely 
more than England — and has inflicted a fatal blow on her own 
prosperity . The system of exaggeration, for many years success- 
fully pursued by her— which overawed the weak and timid, check- 
ed the strong and daring, and imposed upon the world at large— 
cannot last for ever ; and the illusion it created loill soon be broken^ 
when her real strength will afipear much below its gen'-ral esti- 
mate. There was an artificial splendour thrown around her, 
which bedazzled the mind, and diverted it from contemplating the 
substance itself. She appeared like some object looming at sea, 
and diminishing in size as it is approached ; or, to speak more 
pointedly, she was in the state of the human body, diseased with 
dropsy, where the enlargement of external parts was mistaken for 
a symptom of health and vigour. 

" Her conscriptive system, the parent of fallacious theories,! 
which, even in the eyes of distinguished men, men whose talents 
and labours are an honour to their country, gave her a magic su- 
periority over all the rest, was only the effect of unnatural irrita- 
tion ; producing an extraordinary exertion, which must inevitably 
be followed by correspondent lassitude and weakness. It was the 
speed of a race-horse, galled by the spur, or excited by ambition, 
beating all the rest upon a short distance, but finally giving way 
to a common well-conditioned animal, proceeding with his regular 
pace. A vast body of water can only be kept together by an equi- 
librium, or by its outlet being proportionate to its inlet ; but if, by 
the breaking down of the bank, or any other cause creating an un- 
usual impulse, its regular channel of egress should swell into an 
overwhelming torrent, the streams, which feed the main body, can- 
not supply the deficiency quick enough, and the whole must be, 

f It is singular, that those, who, upon such theories, supported the irrC' 
dstibility of France, had entirely ovevlooked that in Prussia the same sys- 
tem was rigorously and habitually enforced ; and yet no other power, that 
pretended to military distmction, was ever so easily and rapidly overthrown. 



60 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

sooner or later exhausted. So it is with the French conscription, 
which becomes less and less productive every year. In ordinary 
times it has only been sufficient to repair the annual losses of the 
army ; and in the late terrible, (hough, in appearance, most pi'os- 
perous wars, it could only supply the deficiency by anticipation. 
How impoverished then, and how inadequate must be tiiis source, 
after such a campaign, as the last ; a campaign, which must ac- 
celerate the issue of the previous concurrent and debilitating caus- 
es ; terminate the feverish energy, imparted by the revolution ; 
throw France back, weak and exhausted after the paroxysm, into 
her natural state ; and to produce that consummation of disasters, 
which she was for some time approaching, but which was hid fronfi 
the inattentive spectator, by the imposing splendour of her tri- 
umphs. 

" The consummation of disasters is not meant here to imply the 
downfall and total dissolutipn of France ; but that critical state, in 
which, her wings being clipped, and her claws drawn out, the 
whole body is so enfeebled, that years of peace and rest can only 
restore her, and one violent attack more would be fatal to her ex- 
istence. The nation, which could bear so much reduction, must 
still be strong, like a man of robust constitution, who may even in 
his illness overcome a healthy adversary of weaker frame ; never- 
theless, her power of conquest is destroyed, and her ability to de- 
fend herself is so far impaired, as to render her safety doubtful^ and, 
the cafiture of Paris by the Russians much more firobable, than the 
marching of the French to St. Petersburgh, For it cannot be 
doubted, but the Russians, in case France persists in rejecting all 
terms of accommodation, will fiursue her broken legions,, even to 
her cafiital—to the -very heart of her own empire. If they do so^ 
and they must, unless peace prevents them i they must conquer 
in spite of all predictions to the contrary, as the chances are re- 
versed, and doubled in their favour. France, in 1799, was much 
Stronger than she is now, and her armies yvtve entire ; and yet 
the Russians, who invaded her at that time, \yere prevented froni 
marching to Paris, merely by a disagreement between Paul nnd 
the Austrian cabinet. Her resistance, therefore, would be feeble 
indeed, when, besides the invading force being ten times greaterj 
her own resources are dimiuisbedj and her armies swept from the 
face of the eartti. 



POLiriCAL PREDICTIONS. 61 

" France cannot recover her loss in Poland. It is not merely the 
men, who composed her army, that she has lost ; but all the phys- 
ical and mora! means, indispensable for its support, were also des- 
troyed. It was a nation sunk at once. It was embarking the 
capital and the interest in a hazardous voyas^e, on which no insur- 
ance Was made, but all was trusted to the superior strength of the 
vessel ; and then loiing both by a sudden wreck, from which neith- 
er planks enough to build a boat, nor men enough to navigate it, 
could be saved. The ruined merchant, however, has in this case, so 
far the advantage, that, if his credit be good at home, he may get 
assistance, embark in some ntw enlerpiize, and by one lucky turn, 
recover all ; whereas France, whose financesare too embarrassed to 
relieve her poverty, has no credit whatever. Wlio will trust her? 
Of vviiom will she borrow, when her own merchants are ruined, 
and when strangers, whom she affects to consider as friends, no 
longer diead her power, which h id already extorted from them 
the gieatest part of their property ? Will the runaway dukes and 
marshals open their private purses, and will Napoleon, or his ra- 
pacious ex-empress Josepliine, empty the treasures out of their 
private coffers ? They may do so, rather than be driven from 
their '' bad eminence ;" but the resource is precarious, insufficient, 
and at best, of a transient nature. Unless, therefore, Bonaparte 
has the magic power to make war without money, call up his dead 
warriors from their graves in Poland, or create new ones, by sow- 
ing the dragon's teeth upon the field ; he can as easily stop the 
motion of the earth, as check the progress of the Russians^ or, by 
preserving his allies^ preserve his oivn ponver. 

" That he will endeavour to make a show of force in hopes of 
keeping his allies in awe, is most certain ; but that he will dare to 
jneet the Russians half way, or that he can expect to frighten them 
from their purpose, whatever it may be, is extremely improbable. 
"VVhat force can he now bring against them into the field, with 
any prospect of success ? Of the whole French army, never ma- 
terially exceeding 400,000 men, 250,000 (the stated proportion of 
Frenchmen) sacrificed in Poland, 100,000 toiling in Spain, and 
about 50,000 dispersed in various parts of Germany and Italy, to 
keep the faithful allies in obedience, make up the whole number, 
and leave scarcely the semblance of a regular army in the interior 



62 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

of France. The Spanish war, which was undermining his resour- 
ces, even before he went to Russia, by being a constant and heavy 
expense to him, without any plunder in return, to enable him, as 
was the case in other places, to rivet the chains of slavery by the 
hands of the victims themselves ; must still emfdoy his famishing 
troops there, and he dares not, at least, will not, recal them, until 
he is driven to the last extremity of confessing to the world the 
real incomfietency of his means at home. He knows too well, that 
by such a step, he would invite lord Wellington's attack ufion some 
vital jiarts of France ; and therefore thinks it best to defend him- 
self in Spain ; cunningly turning the measure of necessity into an 
appearance of dffiance and triumph. The recal of troops from that 
country would be the most conclusive, and the greatest proof imag- 
inable, of his despair, and of his want of confidence in his 350,000 
conscripts and miliiia men, so exultingly announced in all the pa- 
pers. 350,000 men, and no more, when a great " display of 
force" is so indispensable — and when, according to the constant 
practice of exaggeration in prosperous times, and with less motive, 
the whole must have been estimated, at least, one half above its real 
number — is a pitiful force, and a terrible falling of from the 800,000 
men, which had so often appeared on paper, and made the world 
tremble. But let him hitve it all as he states it ; let it be suppos- 
ed probable, that a man, who never told truth when falsehood was 
altogether unprofitable, should tell truth now, when falsehood is so 
essential to his interest ; and what then ? Is his militia, pompous- 
ly called " cohorts," and intended only for home defence, but now 
forced to make en offer of their services for other purposes, any 
proof of his being well provided with regular troops, or of his be- 
ing able and willing to march against the Russians far beyond his 
own frontiers ? Or are his conscripts, forming the remainder, 
mere boys and raw recruits, the specimen of the immense effec- 
tive force still left him ? Can these, with their looks, appal the 
victorious veterans ? Will he dare to meet, can he hope to over- 
come the Russian vvaniors, who have destroyed his best troops, 
with tliese beardless striplings ; who, unless prevented by the bay- 
onet behind, will run away at the sight of a Cozak ? No. He 
must first raise them, then drill them, and ask the Russians not to 
kiU the poor creatures, until they are grown in size and discipline. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 63 

« To RAISE THEM in iiumbers sufficient to fill up the dreadful 
chasm, made by the last campaign, is impracticable, on account of 
the previous great scarcity of young men, caused by the merciless 
scythe of war and conscription. But, supposing it to be practica- 
ble, the measure itself is a very hazardous experiment, being pe- 
culiarly oppressive at this moment. The loss of 250,000 men, in 
so short a time, must have made mourners of many parents ; and 
yet, while their hearts are bleeding with the wounds just inflicted, 
they are called upon to deliver up their remaining sons to the 
same untimely and horrible fate. It is not in human nature to 
bear such misery with patience ; and there is no sacrifice, no seif- 
devoiion of which a parent is not capable, in defence of his offspring. 
The young men too must enter the service with prospects and 
emotions very different from those, which heretofore were wont 
to animate them. Their confidence in their chief is now destroy- 
ed ; and the magic spell of iiis name, which decoyed them to the 
jaws of death, while it petrified their enemies, is now dissolved for- 
ever. He has been so completely disgraced, compelled to so in- 
famous a flight — for there was nothing in his retrograde progress 
deserving the name of retreat — that of his former military reputa- 
tion he has not saved enough to assure the soldier, that, in case of 
adverse fortune, the talents of his general would, at least, save his 
honour. A loss of name like this, is the most grievous and fatal, 
that can happen to any commander. The imagination of the 
young conscript, under such an impression, no longer soars like 
an eagle, over the ocean of futurity ; but, like a timorous dove, 
hastily turns away, and scarcely dares to cast a single look behind. 
His terror and despondency are in proportion to that youthful ar- 
dour, that fearless ignorance, and those buoyant hopes, which 
•were formerly his conductors to the field of battle. He is now 
fully informed of the danger that awaits him, and views it in its 
real frightful aspect ; for there is no protecting and kindly deceiv- 
ing phantom to step between, and cover it with its gorgeous veil. 
Instead of the wide and tempting road, bestrewed with laurel 
leaves, and leading through the golden regions of glory ; he sees 
a rugged path, overgrown with piickly thorns, conducting from 
one precipice to another, and lost amidst the graves, from which 
the spectres of his brethren and countrymen rise up to warn him 



64 POLITICAL PllEDICTIONS, 

of his doom. Against the enemy, of whom he cannot now even 
think without trembling, he expects no success ; but if he should 
conquer, a still greater misery awaits hini on the snowy plains of 
Poland. With such prepossessions, therefore^ as these, conscripts 
will not be of much service to Bonaparte. 

" The exalted idea, however, that many have not ceased to en- 
tertain of the personal abilities of Bonaparte, excites apprehension, 
that he still will be able to repair his disasters, and even to act 
■iTith vigour on the offensive. Some have gone so far, as to deem 
his personal escape sufficient to counterbalance the loss of his 
whole army ; and some, advancing still further, have declared, 
that of the two alternatives, the safety of his army was less dan- 
gerous to the world, than the safety of his own person. To all 
ihese a very short answer can be given. 

" Bonaparte is a mortal, and therefore cannot do that, which 
omnipotence alone can effect-. ..repair the unexampled disasters, 
that, with one fell sweep, made his myriads disappear, and his 
power vanish. 

" As to his personal safety, the ensuing spring ivill convince the 
world, that it owes its imfiortance more to imagination, than reality. 
It was France, that made him formidable. To break her power, to 
paralyze its systematic exertion, as has been done, is not only to 
reduce him to a mere harmless man, but to prevent her and her fu- 
ture rulers, from being equally formidable. The will and means 
of oppression were not created by him, but always existed in 
France, and formed a part of her political system ; these may have 
been directed by hiai with greater energy, but undoubtedly would 
pass the same to his successors. It is therefore of more conse- 
quence to rifle the nest, vviiere yoiing vultures are nursed, than to 
kill their guardian, who may be succeeded by another ; or to des- 
troy the contents of the modern engine of death, than to extinguish 
Ihe match* which may be relighted, and applied by another hand. 
The escape of Bonafiarte was even necessark; to complete the triumph 
obtained over himself and France. Had lie fallen on the field, or 
been taken prisoner, the disasters of the French would have been 
altogether attributed to his absence ; and the idea, that he could 
have averted them, would prevent the world from appreciating the 
powerful efforts of Russia ; nay, it would have blinded all F'rench- 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 65 

men to the reality and extent of their misfortunes ; so that, under 
the standard of another, they still would enlist with unabated con- 
fidence ; and France might still inspire that terror, of which she is 
now deprived. It is only by shelving^ that France^ with Bonaparte 
himself for her ruler ^ can no longer maintain her ground of elevation^ 
that mankind in general will bt convinced of the full extent of what 
has been done by Russia ; and they^ at no distant period, will be con- 
vinced, Bonaparte may say, that his disasters were owing to the 
elements ; but, had he been victorious in the preceding battles, the 
elements would have acted rather for, than against him ; and the 
battles of Borodino and the Nara could not have compelled him to 
remain inactive, and then to retreat at a very unfavourable season. 
Even when he was retracing his steps, the elements were no more 
inimical to him, than to his pursuers ; therefore, the excuse will 
not pass. The whole truth is, that he has been beaten in every en- 
counter^ each time with greater loss ,-* and the result is^ that he is 
ruined." 

* In proof of this we subjoin the author's own note to the official tables 
afterwards published by him, with the translation of the Russian Pamphlet 
concerning the French losses :— 

" The attentive inspection of the preceding tables, founded altogether upon 
official documents, enables us to judge not only of the precise loss by other 
causes besides the sword, but of the uniform skill, persevering courage, and 
striking activity of the Russian officers and soldiers. It brings us every 
where upon the visible traces of that superior and all-combining mind which 
directed the whole ; and of which the injustice of some foreigners, levelled 
more or less against every thing Russian, has attempted to rob the venera- 
ble Kutusow. It also furnishes a complete refutation to the assertions of 
the same systematic revilers, that Napoleon's defeat was caused by the 
*' frightful climate" of Russia ; for, independently of the testimony of the 
French bulletins themselves, which announce " fine weather," as late as 
the beginning of November, preceded by the complete rout and disasters of 
the French, it is now clear, that, even before their retreat from Moskow, 
they had already lost 61,620 killed ; 6 generals, 865 officers, and 41,016 
rank and file, prisoners ; 10 standards ; 103 pieces of cannon ; and 415 caia- 
3ons or ammunition waggons : a loss which the apologists of Napoleon will 
find extremely difficult to reconcile with his pretensions to victory, or with 
their own support of those pretensions upon the alleged influence of the 
dimate." 
T 



m FOIilTICAL PREDICTIONS, 

About this time also the memorable Russian festival took place 
in Boston, to which various poetical effusions were contributed, 
and published in a pamphlet called " Sketch of the church Solem- 
nities at the Stone Chapel." Among these contributions is our 
Author's hymn, which we extract entire, marking as usual the 
prophetic stanzas, which evidently goes farther than the events of 
the Russian Campaign. 

*' Moving- with Tempest's rapid pace. 

By mad ambition fir'd. 

And best success inspir'd ; 
Th' oppressor of the human race 

With strength that never ftil'd. 

The world's great hope assail'd. 

But him by rage impeli'd 

Th' Omnipotent beheld ; 

And thus from heaven's dread height^ 

Denounc'd his boastful might. 

Recit. Vain and presumptuous mortal, Hold ! 
For purposes my own. 
To thee and thine unknown, 
'Twas I that made thee strong and bold,. 
Above the rest extoll'd. 
The terror of the world. 

Enough / thy course is o^er, 
J hurl theefrotn thy fotur s 
Unpitied, haWd by alt. 
Shall be thy destirCdJall. 

1 give thee rashness for thy guide^ 

Thy armies shall be lost. 

Like Pharaoh's countless host;, 
Whelm'd in Arabia's crimson tide. 

Soon men of greater name. 

Shall blast thy short-liv'd fame. 

Their Eldest shall in speed. 
Valour and martial deed. 
Surpass thy Youngest band 5 
For such is my coiomand. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. H 

Air. Thus spake the Lord of all ; and lo '. 
The promis'd heroes rose. 
With thunder on their foes ; 
The el'ments clos'd the scene of woe ; 
Crush'd is the tyrant's power ; 
His host returns no more." 

An ode was also contributed by the author on the same occasion, 
which ends with the end of the Tyrant. 

" Whew Gallia's Chief his myriad-host survey'd. 

And Kings, in arms, at his command array'd ; 

On Sclavia's soil his banners he unfurl'd. 

And on her sons his mighty thunders hurl'd. 
He rashly thought, her legions overthrown. 
And speedy fall would make the world his o^vn. 

*' But Sclavia boasted of a loyal race, 
Who met him breast to breast, and face to face : 
More valiant, and no less in battle skill'd. 
They smote the tyrant on th' ensanguin'd field : 

They wrested from his giant-grasping hand 

The prize of empire over sea and land. 

<« He, conquest, lawless sway, and plunder sought ; 
They, for their altars, king, and country fought. 
Heav'n smil'd upon their efforts, and they sav'd 
The nations, his ambition had enslav'd. 

ffatl Coinmerce, Freedom, Peace .'—andfiourish all .' 

For, he achieved his oviti, not Sclavia's Jail." 

This solemn festival terminated in a public dinner, after which 
the author, in his official capacity, as a Russian Consul, addressed 
the guests, and in the following words anticipated the conduct of 
Alexander, assigning at the same time the reasons for such antici- 
pations : — 

" Reflections arising from this well known disposition of the 
Russian Emperor, complete our joy by giving it the sanction of 
prudence and cool judgment ; for the immediate advantages of the 
present happy change are not likely to be counteracted by the events 
mtk nvhich futurity ie firegnant, Mexander cannot become the 



W S»OLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

persecutor of those ^ lahom he rescued from persecution 3 or with- 
draw his protection from those, ivho nvish and deserve to have him 
for their protector. The greater the influence of Russia, the great- 
er will be the security and happiness of nations. It is the limita- 
tion of her power in Europe which the great son of Chatham en- 
deavoured to establish, from apprehensions altogether groundless, 
that has raised France to her dreadful eminence ; and this illustri- 
ous Statesman, who lived to be undeceived, never ceased to regret 
the error he thus commitjed. Russia, being in her natural state, 
and in no need of artificial or cKtraordinary means to sustain her- 
self in a new and painful, though imposing, attitude, advances in 
her career with regular pace, removing obstructions immediately 
in her way, but leaving all other roads to the free use of her fellow- 
travellers. Her power therefore never can be so fatal as has been 
that of France, who, impelled by the revolution beyond her natural 
strength, required unnatural means to feed it, and thus became at 
length the monster of war, subsisting on the spoils of others, and 
devouring her own children in order to prolong her feverish exis- 
tence. France appeared like some high frowning cliff whose 
snowy summit, suddenly heated, descends in overwhelming tor- 
tents, and leaves in the parent-mountain, and all around, the deep 
and melancholy traces of its devastating course. Russia, on the 
contrary, resembles an extensive, smiling plain, where waters, col- 
lected from natural springs, piov?j gently on, and, receiving in their 
progress many a tributary stream, swell into a majestic river, dan- 
gerous when disturbed by tempest, but otherwise safe and peaceful^ 
bearing on its bosom the labours and hopes of mankind, and dis- 
tributing abundance and happiness through the regions it passes. 
Such then being the difference between these two powers, our joy 
is but a tribute to humanity, whose sufferings we have heretofor«^ 
bewailed. It is an offering to Heaven, which in aiding the efforts 
of Russia has heard our prayers, and rescued the world from that 
■ruthless tyranny whose sway was as extensive, as its annihilation 
is unexampled," 

"While the reports from France were swelling Bonaparte's fresh 
farces, the author thus commented upon these reports in the Bos- 
ton Gazette of April 8, 1 8 1 3 :«=■ 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

" The latest intelligence from France " is wonderful, most won- 
derful, and again most wonderful !" It is in France that we find 
soldiers springing up like mushrooms, nay much quicker ; for at 
the mere nod of Bonaparte, they have already been created, grown 
to maturity, and in a few weeks multiplied like FalstafF's buckram 
knights, from 300,000 to 700,000 men, who, according to the Mon- 
iteur, will form an army twice as numerous as the one that was 
carried into Poland. As this last army, however, was staled in the 
12th bulletin at 680,000, either the Moniteur commits now a small 
mistake, or the great Napoleon himself had then told something 
very much like a falsehood. We profess ourselves adepts in decy- 
phering the French arithmetic, and will therefore save the Moni- 
teur the trouble of correcting errors by doing it ourselves. The 
French calculation is, that France has 300,000 men in the interior, 
300,000 in Spain, and 200,000 in Poland. Unless therefore the 
Moniteur means to reckon French prisoners remaining in Russia, 
the account will stand thus : 

French army in Poland - . - - 000,000 
Do. in France - - - - 100,000 

Up. in Spain - . . . 100,000 



200,000 
" We are quite sure that this account is nearest to truth, as it is 
but fair to deduct 200,000 from France and Spain, knowing this to 
be the exact degree of superfluous embellishment with regard to 
Russia. We will leave the Moniteur, however, to its own insig- 
nificance, and come to Bonaparte's own speech of Feb. 16th, open- 
ing with the destruction of more towns and cities, than can be coun- 
ted on the map of Russia in twice the extent he passed. 

" This production, the very climax of wonder, where, besides so 
many cities being destroyed which never existed, the most decisive 
defeats are, by a word, converted into victories, and where the dis-? 
asters, which might have " broken (Napoleon's) heart," are so easi- 
ly transferred to the elements, reminds us for the first time of the 
existence of Bonaparte, whose blood, chilled by the frightful cli- 
mate of Russia, is resuming now its wonted current under the war- 
mer influence of a southern latitude. It seems as if Napoleon, af- 
^er staying two months at Paris, was just beginning to feel at home, 



TO POLITICAL PREDICTIONS- 

and to recover in some measure from the terrour with which th«* 
sight of a Cozak had inspired him, and from the pain which the 
Russian lash had inflicted upon his body. To a rhapsody, so char- 
acteristic of his Corsican Majesty, our answer, as far as the ele- 
ments are concerned, has already been anticipated ; we shall,there- 
fore, notice only the unusual reserve and caution, which the tyrantj 
ever since his return, has observed towards Russia, venting his 
spleen altogether on the Tartars and the English. Without in- 
quiring whether this moderation proceeds from his having been 
chastised, hun^bled, and beaten into good manners, or fr'om the 
mortifying conviction that he can no longer execute his threats 
against Russia, it is plain that the words " Russia shall re-enter her 
frightful climate'^ are intended to quiet the fears of his p-eojilCf 
vjithout subjecting him to any pledge which he despaired of re- 
deeming. For, happen what will, Russia must, some time or other, 
re-enter her territories of her own accord ; and so bear him out in 
his assertion. The pompous declaration that he will not abandon 
his allies, means neither more nor less, that he will be under th© 
necessity of dcfe7iding them, or rather himself in their lerritorieSf 
against the approaching Russians" 

On the subject of the vigorous resistance of the French, as an- 
nounced in Paris papers, the author has the following observation 
in the same Gazette of April 15, 1813 : — 

" While Paris papers gravely announce that a vigorous resistance 
33 making every where against the Russians ; that troops arefllock- 
ing from all quarters to « set bounds to the Russian plan of inva- 
sion" (a confession rather inadvertently made) ; that Prussian Po- 
land is in a state of profound tranquillity, and that no Russians had 
yet passed the Vistula as late as the 29th of January ; while Bon- 
a'parte threatens in his speech tl)at " Russia shall re-enter her 
fiip;htful climate," without however pledging himself to compel 
hxv to this retrograde step ; while, in imitation of the Russians, (it 
.'.ecms they can teach him sometimes) he proclaims the mighty 
and loyal contributions of his good cities, (about four horses from 
each upon an average 1 1) ; and wliiie his creatures on this side of 
the Allaniic, swallow greedily every bait upon his hook, swell with 
repl'-'tion, and by their own bigness measuring that of tlielr mas- 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 71 

tei'j wish lo frighten all those who consider Napoleon as an old spi- 
der, no longer able to spin his web out of his own bowels— Wiiile: 
all these things are occupying the mind of the timid, exciting the 
disgust of the wise, and delighting the '< officiating priests" of the 
Corsican deity, behold ! the tidings from the north have reached 
our shores, the bubble is burst, and the hopes of democracy have 
vanished like the " baseless fabric" of a vision. Admiral Tchitch- 
agoff commands the centre, Sacken the left, and Witgenst;jin the 
right, notwithstanding the French accounts would have it, that this 
last general disagreed with Kutusow, because Kutusow was un older 
man, and because the French gentlemen at Pozen could not fiene- 
irate the designs of the Russians J ! .' The gentlemen in question 
have found by this time, that in Russia, as in other countries, the 
difference of age operates in favour of an older commander, that the 
designs of the Russians are easily knoivn ixndfelt, and Russian gen- 
erals, one and all, always agree in beating the French, whenever 
they can overtake them. 

" In truth, when the severity of the season, the excessive fatigue 
of pursuit, and the difficulty of supplies in a country so desolated 
hy war, are duly considered, the conviction will be that the prog- 
ress of the Russians, whether in skill or activity, has been altogeth- 
er unexampled. From the 25th of December, which left them 
near Kowno, to the 14th of January, which brought them to Mari- 
en warder, they have travelled the distance of 250 miles, being 
about 15 miles a day, notwithstanding the taking of Konigsberg, 
and other French " winter quarters," which must have materially 
retarded their march. We hear of no diseases, and of no com- 
plaints of any kind ; and therefore, drawing the most favourable con- 
clusions with regard to the Russian staff and commissariat, the su- 
perior discipline of the soldiers, and the pre-eminent wisdom of 
their commanders, we have no fear of Bonaparte, disgraced as he 
is, ever being able to conte7id against such men with any prospect 
of success — men, who in 20 days, in the depth of a northern win- 
ter, have cleared the whole of East Prussia of its invaders, and made 
the Vistula already a witness of their victorious career. Though 
the official accounts do not carry the military operations farther 
than this river, yet there can be no doubt that the Russians have push- 
f^d therr successes far beyond it, a?irl not only WarsaiVy but Poze?i, 



f2 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

fthe Viceroy's " head quarters" J must have, soon after, fallen intQ 
their hands ; and the next arrivals will confirm this, in the manner 
that the last have confirmed the surrender of Mlbing, Marienburg and 
Marienivarder. In short, Thorn, and the whole chain of fortresses 
on the Vistula, which the French pretend to have so well garrison- 
ed, ivill share the same fate ; and instead of a key to the Russian 
empire, will serve as its barrier against French or any other aggres- 
sion. Danlzick may hold out for a 'while, but must finally surrender 
".vithout materially imfieding the firogress of the Russians, and 
without /tutting them to much exfiense, in blood or treasure. They 
have only to leave a sufficient army behind to fir event the garrison 
from making defiredations on the country, and by flushing towards: 
Berlin and Stettin, ivhich filaces they ivill reach firobably about the 
middle of February — they will cut of all the sufifilies, and every 
communication with Dantzick, whose garrison, thus insulated, in <t 
hostile country, rather incumbered than benefitted by its numbers, 
and without the least firosfiect of relief must sooner or later sur- 
render at discretion, or evacuate the city before the Russians can 
get so far in front of it. In either case, therefore, the Russians 
will be masters of Bantzick — a place, in every point of view, the 
most important on the Vistula. 

" The report of the king of Prussia's escape, is by no means im' 
firobable, as the French, since he has been carried to Breslaw, make 
no mention of him, or of his farther removal, which would be ren- 
dered necessary by the advance of the Russians. Bonaparte has a 
difficult part to act towards this king, as by restoring him, he would 
•rive Prussia a head, of whose co-ofieration with France he is at best 
doubtful', and by removing the king, he would infallibly rouse and 
linite the whole kingdom of Prussia against himself, and throw it 
into the scale of Russia ; an event, which in sfiite of all his efforts, 
must and will take filace. The entrance of the Russians into Ber- 
lin, will be the signal for all the Prussians to join the Russian 
standard. Bonaparte may cajole Francis, and he may kiss the shoe 
of the Holy Pontiff, the very man whom he a few weeks since treat- 
ed lik^ c slave ; but neither the friendshifi of Austria will answer 
his wishes, nor the prayers of the Pope, raise his warriors from 
the grave ; and thus, by enabling him to check the rafiid firogress 
of the Russian arms, afford some consolation to the weeping friends 
of the " supereminenl." Napoleon,'' 



POLITICAL PREDICTI0N9. f$ 

A certain editor, undertook to predict the plan and manner of 
the Campaign in Germany, giving the victory beforehand to Bona- 
pai'le ; accordingly our author came out with the following remarks) 
in the Boston Gazette of May 6, 1813 :• — 

" We promised to make some remarks upon the late predictions 
of this would-be oracle, concerning the event, manner, and issue of 
the approaching European campaign, that is, continued by the 
Kusslans, and to be resumed, when and where he can, by Bona- 
parte ; but, thank God, Kutusow and his brave soldiers have spared 
as the trouble of exposing the ravings of an impudent and ignorant 
pretender, by waking him from his dreams, and by pulling down 
his castles in the air as fast he builds them, and as soon as we have 
announced him to be an impostor. We take our pen merely to 
give him advice, that when next he lays down Bonaparte's plan of 
operations on the Elbe, the Oder, and other rivers in Germany, he 
should ascertain first, whether these riven, and Germany itself, are 
in Bonaparte's power ; and should first assure himself that the 
uncivil Russians, by taking all these to themselves, would not spoil 
his fine calculations, conspicuous no less by their precision, than 
by their modesty ; and that Bonaparte and his Generals would not 
leave him in the lurch, and after a good deal of vapouring, run 
away from all their eligible positions, or talk of going to Frankfort) 
when they can not get even to Berlin. Mr. D. ., before he ven- 
tures to make Bonaparte drive back the Russians to their frightful 
climate, and march to St. Petersburgh as fast as he did to MoskoWj 
will do well to consider whether the Russians may not firorve disobe- 
dient to his decree^ and drive the French beyond the Rhine ; whethev 
7narching to St. Petersburgh is not more difficiUt than marching to 
Paris ; and whether by goin^ there. Napoleon would not be farther 
from his resources, and slower in coming back to them. Finally, 
we recommend to Mr. D to think before he hazards an opin= 

ion, and to convince himself at what place the tide would turn, 
before he tells us of its turning and rolling back to Poland. If he 
thinks it natural that the tide should so turn, we can tell him that 
he is right ; for the tide has turned, and now flows back precisely 
to that place from which it has been, for years, inundating and 
alesolating the European continent.— We also agree with himj that 
K 



¥S POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

thete "ai-e no resources on the Russian soil" for any but the Rus* 
sians. Exoticks do not thrive there, and we verily believe, that 
he himself, inexhaustible as he is in resources, would starve 
there, and add his own to the heap of corpses bestrewing the roads 
in Poland. We shall not quarrel with him about his calling the 
Russians " slaves," provided he allows that they in no one instance 
resemble him ; and provided he is not inclined to dispute that a 
slave who prefers death to foreign slavery, is more to be envied 
than a freeman who lives only to be the voluntary slave of a 
foreign tyrant. We are not surprised that he, should on every 

occasion vent his spleen upon the memory of the venerable 
Souwarow, for it was Souwarow that taught the Russians to 
beat the French j and it is his spirit that to this moment inspires 
his countrymen with invincible courage ori the field of battle ; but 
we cannot help expressing our wonder, that this same man should 
so far allow his passion to obscure his judgment, as to cast, by 
calling Souwarow " barbarian," obloquy and censure upon his own 
worthies, the French Generals, who were beaten by this barbarian, 
and who, at least some of them, had the magnanimity to confess it, 
and to do justice to his talents and conduct ; an assertion, which, 
if doubted, we can prove by reference to the French authorities." 

In the Boston Gazette, of May 10, 1813, our Author gave to the 
!IPublic, what he properly denominated " Prospects in Europe :— " 

" Lest it should be said, that we are finding fault with the pros- 
pective reflections of others, on the probable state of Europe, with-= 
out stating our own, or subjecting ourselves to the same hazard of 
being mistaken ; we are willing that our present sentiments shoul«l 
be recorded, tried by the subsequent events, and contrasted with 
the speculations, deriving their importance merely from being so 
eagerly countenanced by the Presidential paper at Washington. 

" We claim no particular merit for having predicted that Prus- 
sia would cordially join in the Russian cause, and that Sweden 
would also follow her example, the cause being common, and the 
measure of resistance, a necessary result of French aggression, and 
of the restless impatience with which that aggression was endured. 
As little do we claiip for having constantly derided the expectations 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. f5 

of Poland rising in favour of France, and of Finland being restored 
to the Swedish crown ; a country which, from its geographical 
situation, was rather an incumbrance, and which, according to ov\t 
former opinion, partly confirmed by the subsequent language of 
Bernadotte himself, ought to have been ceded to Russia, long ago, 
by the milder process of negociation, and with a prospect of indem- 
nity in Norway, more beneficial to the kingdom of Sweden. It is 
enough to remind the reader that these changes have already taken 
place ; and that they are a fair pledge of what may be said of sther 
powers in anticipation. Austria^ if she does not join Russia^ ivill 
not ofifiose her ; or, if inclined to take an active part at all, will 
unquestionably prefer to act •mith her, in sfiite of the matrimonial 
alliance so much relied ufioUf tuith Bonafiarte. Saxony is already 
occupied by the Russians, and her fugitive king is rendered a 
harmless enemy, and inefficient friend. Denmark^ by the advance 
of the Russian troofiSy will be separated from the rest of Europe s 
and far from being of any service to France, must consider it a 
favour to be allowed to remain neutral. In short, by the non-resist-r 
ance of some, and by the positive co-operation of others, amongwhoni 
even Holland may be included, the whole of Germany, whether 
actively or passively, will be enlisted on the side of the Russians, 
This we consider as a ground of conjecture, comparatively safe ; 
but, whatever may be the risk) we are not deterred from going ^ 
few steps further. 

" By the last advices, from the north and south of Europe, the 
progress of the Russians, appears to have been successful beyond 
example ; and can be sufficiently appreciated from a volume 
of evidence furnished even by the Moniteur itself. Persons 
acquainted with the difficulties of military operations in northern 
climates at this season, and in countries previously desolated by the 
enemy, can alone conceive the full importance and the extraordi- 
nary activity of the Russians, who in the depth of winter, from Dec. 
25, to March 10, have passed the Vistula and the Oder, penetrated 
to Hamburgh, reached the Elbe, and traversed the distance of 
more than six hundred miles from the Niemen. It is no longer 
possible for the French to conceal their lossss, or invent excuses 
for abandoning one position after another ; and even Napoleon's 
greatest adnairers, who, under the pretext of winter-quartersj de= 



/ 

voutly and successively fdlowed him to Smolensko, Wilira, War- 
saw, Koniajsberg, Pozen, Frankfort, and farther, must now be 
tired of chasing the phantom of his "grand army,'* which has so 
constantly eluded their grasp, and which is no where to be found, 
except on paper. To prove how disproportionate has been the 
real to the nominal French force, announced in Paris papers, since 
the defeat in Poland, and no doubt intended merely to allay the 
fears and apprehensions of Frenchmen, we need only recur t© 
1 20,000 men, said to have been already collected near Wilna, to 
** cause the Russians to pause ;'* and to the various corps concen- 
trated in East-Prussia and Saxony, which, on the approach of the 
Russians, it seems, vanished into the air like the witches of Macbeth, 
and left us a sort of a talisman, by the application of which we can 
instantly reduce to its diminutive size the poor little frog, that tries 
to swell and look^ at least at a distance, like an enormous bull. 
Of this character is also the display of force, with which the Moni- 
iteur of March 1 f th, attempts to deceive all those, who are unwil- 
ling to reflect for a moment, that, if such force existed, it ought to 
Jiave prevented the Russians from advancing ; or, if it were dis- 
tributed in garrisotis, it is now rendered useless, by being already 
placed, sotne in the midst, and some in the rear of the Russian 
armies. Indeed, when we weigh the importance of preserving 
those bf the German States, which furnished Bonaparte with vast 
supplies and resources, which served him as the means of aggres- 
sion, and would now serve as the barrier of self-defence ; when 
we find these allies abandoned in succession, and suffered, without 
a struggle, to drop off, one by one, and follow in the train of the 
victorious Russians ; and when we recollect that it is the haughty 
conqueror, the daring, active, Bonaparte, that is thus rendered a 
passive spectator of the increasing demolition of his own work, we 
need not seek for any other proof, that his pow^r of coercion is 
destroyfed, and that nothing biit stern absolute necessity, arising 
from the want of adequate force, could have produced on his part 
such unequivocal relinquishment ofevery essential advantage here- 
tofore enjoyed, and now indispensable for the preservation of his 
own empire. It is evident that the Russians, who seem to be fully 
sensible how much is to be gained by that celerity of movement, 
Which would pot allow the enemy to take breath and recover his 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS, ff 

Strength, will, gain the Rhine, strip Bonaparte of every ally to 
the east of that river, and pause no longer than ivill be neces- 
sary for the main body to come up, and facilitate tht concen- 
tration of forces. Their left will esrtend towards Wirtemberg and 
Baden [the former the birth-place of Alexander's mother the Em- 
press Dowager, and the latter also the birth-place of his present 
Consort] ; their right will stretch towards the north so as to assist 
Holland, and maintain an open communication with the sea ; and 
their rear will be supported by the interiour states of Germany. 
Surrounded thus by friends and relations, supplied by sea and land, 
commanding the good wishes of the inhabitants of the regions 
through which they pass, and, like a snow-ball, swelling in their 
progress — reversing all the circumstances of Bonaparte's advanc- 
ing to Poland — they certainly will cross the Rhine, and press on a 

battle, which it is their interest now to seek, and Napoleon's how 

the times are changed ! — to decline. Men of military reputation 
in France, are of opinion, that he will not trust his new levies in a 
general engagement, and will act for some time on the defensive, 
until his remaining veterans in Spain can be brought to his assist- 
ance ; but though this is by far the wisest policy, such is the situa- 
tion of Bonaparte, such is his pride, and reluctance to undeceive 
the world and the French people on the score of his means and tal- 
ents, and such is his characteristic rashness and confidence in for- 
tune, that we think upon the whole, he will meet the Russians on 
the field as soon as he can command any force of consequence against 
them. We leave it to the deep foreknowledge and keen foresight 
of the never-erring D , to note with precision, at what particu- 
lar place the battle will be fought, what will be the course and di- 
rection of columns on both sides, in how many divisions the res- 
pective armies will march, and from what spot, or at what time 
exactly they will start ; but we undertake to say, that Bonaparte's 
threat, to punish the Russians for their rhodomontades, will not be 
executed to the satisfaction of himself or his friends ; and that 
if he ventures on a great battle, his final overthrow will be acceler- 
ated, and the most auspicious issue to mankind in general may be 
anticipated, without any fear of disappointment . It is not, to use 
D— -.*s phraseology, « in the nature of things that any other result 
should foUoWo" 



ys POLITICAL PREBICTIONS. 

During this interval, was re-published in this country « The 
Edinburgh Review," containing a scurrilous review of the au- 
thor's " Resources of Russia." As he had the advantage of the 
first attack upon the reviewers, and thus precluded every suspi- 
cion that his sentiments concerning them might have in the sequel, 
originated from their abuse of his work, he treated their splenetic 
ebullition, as a thing fully expected by him, with silent disdain, 
and with that consciousness of triumph which proceeded from the 
events having fully verified his political creed, in direct opposi- 
tion to theirs. He treated their language and efforts to assail 
liim, as the language and efforts of embittered disappointment 
and defeat. Perceiving, however, that his silence, mistaken for 
submission, encouraged some of the inferior satellites of the Ed- 
inburgh reviewers, in this country, to open their puny batteries 
upon him, he at once scorned the insects hanging on the leaves 
of a tree, and laid his axe to the tree itself : that is, he wrote his 
'^' Reply to the Edinburgh Reviewers," and thereby silenced all 
the rest. 

We have no hesitation to express our opinion, that he has 
been successful in exposing their mis-statements, total want of 
candour, and real or pretended ignorance of Russian and Euro- 
pean affairs in general ; or, to adopt his own expression, " their 
awkward yacetiqitsness, egregious ridiculousness ^ too poetical ima" 
ginatiouy general inconsistency y and conspicuous absurdity" Ift 
short, he every where brings his solitary strength against the 
ijnited force of these ci-devant giants, and stakes his reputation 
against theirs upon the further issue of events. 

On the subject of i^ustria hg thus refutes them, and hints at 
the probability of her joining Russia against France, page 9 :— 
« Precisely of the same character is their rhapsody about the 
Austrian fears and jealousies of Russia ; a power, who, accord- 
ing to their system, never can be equal to Francd, and yet 
more to be feared than France ! ! The Edinburgh reviewers 
may shew much ingenuity in reconciling this palpable contradic- 
tion ; but it requires more influence than they possess, or ever 
will possess, to persuade any person of common sense and reflect 
tion, that the fear of one who never wronged us, never took up 
^rms against us, never seized upon any of our possession^, but 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 7^ 

Aas-been a long-tried, friend, guided, even i:a moments of an- 
ger and dissatisfaction, by principles of honour and moderation— 
that the fear of one who bravely, generously, and repeatedly shed 
his best blood in our cause, can even for a moment counterbal- 
ance the fear of a powerful, unprincipled, and experienced ene- 
my, the resentment of past injuries, the painful consciousness of 
present humiliation, the mortifying conviction of increasing ag- 
gression, and the anticipated horror of future misery. The Ed- 
inburgh reviewers, it seems, have yet to learn, thai the ap/tre- 
hension of what Russia may possibly undertake hereafter^ is -very 
different from the certainty of nvhat has been, or is to be inflicted 
on Austria by the implacable ruler of France^ urged rather to 
claim as his own, than spare the mutilated fragments of her em- 
pire, in virtue of that fatal and degrading bond of consanguinity, 
which has enchained her to his bloody car, and imparted a cer- 
tain fascination to the real cause of terror, which frightened her 
from every exertion favourable to her friends, and conducive, 
ultimately, to her own safety," 

Page 20, the author proceeds thus : — 

" The irresistibility of France has long been the pretext with 
the party to justify their refusal of assistance to the continent ; 
and a cloak to cover their reluctance to oppose France in her 
career ; so that it is not for want of their good wishes and meas- 
ures that she is not irresistible. This precious quality of irre- 
sistibility^ which, like a woman's honour, cannot be impaired 
without being destroyed, has been severely tried, as far back as 
the year 1799, by the old Suwarow in Italy ; but " the talents," 
or the Edinburgh reviewers, which is the same thing, still 
preached its durability to the world. It was rather rudely ques- 
tioned at the battles of Pultusk and Eylau, but the Edinburgh 
reviewers still preached, until they preached away the friendship 
©f Russia, and then, with an ideotic stare stood incredulous, or 
wilfully heedless of the mischief they had accomplished. The 
battle of Aspern, so honourable to Austria, was likewise a bitter 
test ; but still they preached on ; until, at length, the veterat» 
Kutusow had rent the veil with his native sword, stripped naked 
the preaQhing fanaticks and impostors, and left them no alterna- 



SQ POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

tive but to plead error or hypocrisy. Nay, had he lived longed, 
he would have anticipated the proof of timt, in showing that 
France is even vulnerable ; for, whatever hopes they may en- 
tertain of her convalescence through the temporary success of 
Bonaparte, they may be assured, that France herself cannot ea- 
sily recover the blow she received in the last camfiaign^ the effects 
of which I have elsewhere endeavoured to foretel^ and see no 
reason to change my opticks of futurity. Bonaparte may re- 
cover, he may by an intrigue with his weak father4n4aw, by a 
temporary peace, or even by arms, preserve his own political 
existence, brilliant as ever in afifiearance i but, every moment he 
lives, every mangled corpse he adds to the pile which prop* up 
his tottering throne^ is fatal to France ; and every drop, feeding 
the tide of blood that keeps afloat his bark of despotism, is drawn 
from the veins, from the very heart of France, who, if not speedi- 
ly relieved, must sink from total exhaustion. There is a power 
that evidently protects Bonaparte, for some purposes as yet t» 
he accomplished ; arid twice it sent Death to save him, by remov- 
ing Suwarow and Kutusow from his way, both at two critical 
periods which seemed to threaten his destruction. If it be not, 
therefore, impious to scan the unrevealed decrees of Providence, 
a belief may be indulged, that it is to chastise other offending nU' 
iions, then to punish France herself, the guiltiest of them all, and 
end, perhaps for ever, the tyrannical influence she has so long ex- 
ercised over the European world, that Heaven still preserves, 
and still permits the demon of ambition, while he makes her a 
scourge to the rest, to feed upon her vitals, and not to quit his 
hold, until, fieshless and juiceless, she is cast off, like a withered 
leaf, a prey to every puff and gust of wind. It will be found, 
that her conscription system, and her internal, but not eternal 
resources, strained within, and unsupported without, whereon 
the Edinburgh reviewers, and other better men, misled by them, 
have founded her imaginary inviJicibilitij and Bonaparte's irre- 
sistible power, are but the life-stream of a bleeding giant, which 
in its torrent, though it overwhelms the insects within reach, weak- 
>ens himself, and must, in the end, terminate his own existence. 

" As to the incompetency of Russia to defend herself, and re- 
sist France, from what has been said in the preceding paragraph, 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 81 

or rather, from what has been done by Russia in the face of the 
whole world, it would be now a superfluous multiplication of 
words to tell the Edinburgh reviewers that they were willing or 
ignorant enough to be mistaken, and have not had so much 
magnanimity, or even common decency, as to acknowledge their 
error. It would be equally superfluous to give another proof of 
their admirable foresight as to Spanish afiairs ; for it was a part 
of the same political system with them, that Spain could not be 
defended." 

In the last page but one, he thus concludes his « Reply" :— 
" From what has been stated in the preceding pages, in ex- 
planation of the factious motives and views of the Edinburgh 
reviewers and their friends, no one can be at a loss, why they 
have uniformly endeavoured to fix the odium of the partition of 
Poland exclusively upon Russia, treating Austria and Prussia, who 
participated in the spoil, with comparative lenity ; or why, pro- 
fiting by the event which excited every where so great a sensa- 
tion, they have, in contradiction to themselves, held up, as high- 
ly dangerous, the Russian power, which, on other occasions, 
they have aff'ected to despise. It is sufficient to observe, that 
the influence of Russia was inauspicious to their interests at 
home ; and, therefore, they resolved to make war upon her mor- 
al and political character, in which resolution they have ever per- 
severed.* Unfortunately, their efforts were but too well second- 
ed by the ferment which previously existed in the publick mind, 
and in such a degree, that Mr. Pitt himself, hurried away with 
the torrent, appeared in opposition to Russia, and by checking 
her progress in Turkey, unwittingly contributed to the raising 
of that stupendous fabrick of French grandeur, which he after- 
wards in vain laboured to demolish. Painful experience, though 
too late, has proved that he was mistaken in his calculations, and 

• " On one occasion only they deviated from this I'esolution : it was when 
Mr. Pitt declared himself against Russia, and thus converted Mr. Fox into 
her temporary friend ; which plainly shows that all the actions of the dan- 
gerous faction to which the Edinburgh reviewers have attached themselves, 
have no other object but to oppose the existing administration in order to 
get the government into their own hands.*' 
I, 



82 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

that Russia, — there being a necessity, as long as France exists^ 
of a counteracting check to her aggrandizement, — is the only 
power (not Austria, as the Edinburgh reviewers feigned) capa* 
ble, with the moderate support of others, to give this beneficial 
check. She is also the most eligible for this purpose ; for, what- 
ever her ambition or projects may be, it is certain, that lawless 
and wanton usurpation, for the mere pleasure or lust of conquest, 
is totally incompatible with her essential interests and pursuits. 
The increase of population, progress of commerce and civiliza- 
tion, promotion of agriculture, and every improvement relating 
to internal industry, all depending on the state of peace, have 
been her constant and undeviating aim ; consequently, a power, 
with so sacred an object in view, never can be destructive to 
her neighbours. Add to this, that she is in her natural state, 
and not excited, like France, to that feverish energy, which is 
and must be kept up by forced and artificial means, fatal to all 
who breathe within her atmosphere. The very circumstance of 
Russia's dividing her spoils with others, proves her far less dan- 
gerous than France, who, whenever she Can, tattes all ; while 
the improved condition of Russian Poland, though it shows the 
ambition of Russia, shows also the more lenient nature of that 
ambition, robbed of its terror by the good to which it aspires. 
It is clear, therefore, that whatever Dr. Clarke, or the Edinburgh 
Reviewers, have advanced to the contrary ; they themselves, if 
not influenced by opposite interests, would confess that Russia, 
is the only continental power, nvhose moral and physical energieSf 
loith a view to the past, present, or future, entitle her to the hopes 
and confidence of JEurope" 

A few weeks after the " Reply to the Edinburgh reviewers," 
our author translated the official Russian Pamphlet which we have 
alluded to, and annexed to it his " Strictures on the Correspon- 
dence respecting Russia," published by Mr. Walsh of Philadel- 
phia, as we think, in an unfortunate moment for this gentleman. 
After convicting Mr. Walsh of self-contradiction, and still more 
palpable aberrations than those of the Edinburgh reviewers, be- 
tween whom and him, no one can for a moment mistake a political 
union of sentiment, originated on one hand, and borrowed on the 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 83 

other, the author in the page 114, thus places himself in opposition 
to Mr. Walsh : — 

" When a writer undertakes to speculate upon futurity, and to 
trace on the map of time the course of a great nation, expecting 
that he would carry the public along with him ; he ought at 
least to have given some pledge of his past correctness, and some 
security, that those who may place their confidence in his fore- 
sight may not be deceived. It is not to be expected, that any wri- 
ter, unless inspired from above, can foretell every thing with cer- 
tainty ; but the mistake into which he necessarily falls, must be 
redeemed by some prominent truths and leading events verifying 
the most essential parts of his predictions : else he cannot, with 
any semblance of propriety, set up a public claim to divination. 
What is Mr. Walsh's claim in this particular ? The very subject 
of which he treats, and proposes farther to treat, is that in paiicu- 
lar, on which he has been mistaken, scarcely with one exception. 
His remarks on the means and energies of Russia, in his letter on 
the " Genius of the French government" — in which remarks I in- 
stantly recognized the sentiments of the Foxites or Edinburgh re- 
viewers, and, in substance, the very language of the Morning 
Chronicle — show him not only deficient in knowledge, with res- 
pect to Russia, and convict him, by every succeeding event, of 
fallacy in his statements, reasonings, and anticipations ; but, what 
militates still more against his claim, they show him unrepentant, 
uninstructed by experience, and obstinately persevering in the same 
illusive doctrine. So early as the time referred to, he was already 
enslaved by prejudices borrowed from the English opposition-party, 
with whom he unfortunately associated, and by a certain system of 
his own creation, so far as to betray the same want of candour 
which he has since displayed without even a blush : for, in draw- 
ing a comparison between the military prowess of France, and that 
of Russia, he stated only such battles as were in favour of the form- 
er, and studiously* and therefore intentionally, suppressed all such 
as were in favour of the latter. I flattered myself, however, that 
in all this, there was less ill will than weakness, arising from an ex- 
treme desire to establish a favourite system ; and Mr. Walsh must 
be sensible of my delicacy towards him, since I have carefully 
foreborne to remind him of his aberrations, though to do so, in 



84 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

treating of the subjects which continually brought me into contact 
with him, I felt myself more than once very strongly tempted. 

« With regard to France, Mr. Walsh's claim is scarcely less 
questionable. It is true, that here, no longer confiding in others, 
he trusts himself, inspects every thing with his own eyes ; and, in 
matters of fact, displays extensive knowledge, uncommon infor- 
mation, acuteness of research, a preeminence of industry, and 
felicity of selection : but the moment he quits these, and attempts 
to convert the real causes into ideal effects, precisely the point on 
which his claim now is to be tried, he loses himself in an ocean of 
uncertainty, steers no settled course, and arrives at any port, but 
the one of original destination. From his own clear facts, and 
able premises, he draws altogether opposite conclusions ; and from 
the very oppression, tyranny, fiscal burthens, stagnation of com- 
merce, and the consequent reduction of resources, so well observ- 
ed by him, and so well described, he deduces the national gran- 
deur and power of France, and predicts (among other things, not 
quite realized) her subjugation of the Spaniards. He delineates 
her horrible system of conscription with unsparing accuracy : yet, 
on this very system, fixes her invincibility and irresistibility, for- 
getting, that a temporary paroxysm of madness, though outrageous 
in the extreme, obnoxious to the bystanders, and scarcely to be re- 
strained by any external force, leaves the fiatient, in the end,profior' 
tionably weak, weary, and exhausted. If Mr. Walsh is not already 
sensible of this truth, he may be soon made so s and his firetensiorts 
to unveil futurity, nqt established by the past, or the present, will 
be totally done away by what is likely to happen at no distant period of 
time. One would suppose that predictions escape his lips or pen, 
only to be falsified by every arrival from Europe, and scarcely had 
his first letter made its appearance, than a torrent of fresh events 
defornied all its features, and left that of his opponent (Mr. Har- 
per) a firm and conspicuous rock of triumph. When will Mr. 
Walsh learn prudence ?" 

Page 120, the author concludes his strictures in the following 
manner, reiterating the opinions he formerly expressed in his ad- 
dress to the Bostonians, as to the comparative danger from France 
and Russia :<~» 



POUTICAL PREDICTIONS. 95 

«• If Mr. Walsh reasons only as a severe moralist, not allowing 
that a nation without ambition is like a body without a soul, and 
that it is as easy for him to exclude that ambition as to annihilate 
the passions of an individual ; he must condemn every nation on 
earth, for every nation has made occasional conquests, from impe- 
rial France to the republican states of America, whose rulers, 
though but young beginners, have no objection to put on the con- 
queror's boots, and to march to Florida or Canada. 

*' But, if Mr. Walsh speaks, as a statesman, of nations as they 
are, and always have been, not as what they ought to bej as they 
never have been, and never can be ; the only consideration then is, 
whether the ambition of one nation is better or worse regulated, 
induced by stronger or weaker motives of excitement, and more or 
less fatal in its tendency to others, than the ambition of another : 
let us then for a moment take this view of France and Russia. 

" France preys upon others in order to prolong her present po- 
litical existence, and to find abroad that food which begins to fail at 
home, from the unnatural increase of her appetite : Russia uses 
others only as barriers to defend what she possesses, and to secure, 
not to prolong, her political existence, supported by natural nour- 
ishment. France seeks conquests as the sources of life, as the at- 
mosphere without which she cannot breathe : Russia seeks them 
as the enjoyments of life, with which she can dispense, and as the 
means of embellishment which she can easily resign. France 
spares nothing in her career from good to ill ; Russia, who ac- 
cording to Mr. Walsh himself, must grow better to arrive at the 
dangerous point of her power, sarves all she ca?i, in ha' progress 
from ill to good. France, like a fierce volcano, preys upon her own 
entrails, and, in wild eruptions, destroys all around her to an im- 
mense distance : Russia, healthy within, increases in size, by the 
strength and regular groivth of youth, and either embraces others in 
her way, or disfilaces, without destroying them. France preys upon 
commerce, wastes all the comforts of life, and hurls herself and the 
surrounding nations, from freedom to despotism, and from knowl- 
edge to ignorance : Russia cherishes commerce, seeks the comforts 
of life, and, in raising herself, must also raise others, from despotism 
to freedom, and from ignorance to knowledge. In short, France 
commenced her descent, fatal to her neighbours, from the zenith. 



S6 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

of civilization : Russia on the contrary, ascends from the nadir 
of barbarism, and has not yet attained the height of civilization 
to which she aspires. If this contrast be not imaginary, and I 
feel confident it is not ; who can hesitate a moment to choose 
between these two powers ? 

" I perfectly agree with Mr. Walsh, as to the future reduction 
of French fiotuer, and I rest my opinion precisely upon the 
grounds which he himself has furnished in support of the irresis- 
tibility of that power. I have already said, and repeat it again, that 
Bonaparte has done much towards the ruin of France, and tvilt 
finally consummate it, if he lives longer : but this by no means proves 
that Russia is to succeed her in the unfirincifiled and wanton course 
of aggression ; firsts because such a course is incompatible with the 
essential interests of Russia : secondly, because, as Mr. Walsh 
acknowledges, in contradiction to himself, " there is a better chance 
of escaping from her ;" in other words, independent of the proba- 
ble check of dismemberment, there will be sufficient checks against 
her even in the power of Austria ; for it is evident, that the reduc- 
tion of French power can never take place, without increasing the 
power of Austria in correspondent proportion" 



We will now follow the Author to that momentous suspense, 
which preceded the invasion of France by the Allies, and during 
which they issued their famous declaration, the spirit of which was 
misapprehended in London. On this subject there appeared in 
Boston papers certain speculations from the London " Courier," 
intimating a defection in the Allies from the common interest of 
Europe ; which speculations, being erroneously considered here 
as emanating from some ministerial or official source, produced 
general discontent and despondence. Our Author, ever at hand to 
counteract unfavourable and unfounded impressions, immediately 
addressed the public through the medium of the Boston Gazette, 
Feb. 10, 1814, as follows :— 

" Public anxiety, and expectation of great news, were prodi- 
giously increased by the mysterious conduct of the speculators and 
original holders of the English papers, received by the late arrival ; 
but when the veil of secrecy was removed, aiid the " great news" 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. W 

proved to be little more than a bubble, despondence and the vex- 
ation of disappointment immediately succeeded, and drove back 
the tide of public opinion, leaving anger alone to rear his fulmina- 
ting head from the dry land, which so lately was overflowed with 
joy and exultation. The Allies are already denounced as infamous 
traitors to Great Britain, and to Sweden ; and the exploits of the 
latter two, are extolled to the very sky, far above the exploits of the 
other three, for the mere pleasure of a more striking and effectual 
condemnation ! Is this just ! is this generous ! Is it possible that 
the character of Alexander has gained as yet so little in the public 
estimation, as to be suspected of wanton treachery — and upon what 
grounds ? Upon the declaration of the Allies to Bonaparte ; upon 
the speech of the latter to the senate ; and upon the comments of 
the Courier. Let us for a moment examine these ! 

" The declaration of the Allies is only a repetition of the declar- 
ations formerly made by them ; and it pledges them to nothing 
that is incompatible with the interests of Great Britain, The 
British government, according to the minister's own assurances in 
Parliament, were privy to all the final views and projects of the 
Allies, and of course have sanctioned them. What have then the 
Allies done by their offer to Bonaparte ? Nothing more than 
merely offering a basis to treat upon, previously adjusted between 
them and Great Britain, reserving the final settlement of details 
for the special concurrence of each interested party. The point 
of time, at which such an offer should be made, must also have 
been left to the discretion of the Allies on the spot ; and they 
merely exercised this discretion, as to time, without going a step 
further. England is in the situation of a partner at home, who has 
given powers to his other partners abroad to settle some momen- 
tous business, and to make advances towards the same ; and it by 
no means follows, that she is to be excluded from the settlement, 
merely because in making an offer to settle, they did not specially 
consult her, having in truth no occasion to consult her on a subject 
on which she had already granted her consent. The aMirehensions^ 
therefore^ arising from the declaration of the Allies, are altogether 
unfounded. 

" As to the speech of Bonaparte, what is it but such a speech as 
he would be expected to make, and such as he has often made ? 



S8 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

Why does he withhold from the public, the original documents^ 
containing the offered and accepted basis ? Why does he talk of 
delay in the assembling of the Congress, just as he talked of the ex- 
pected Congress at Prague ? Why does he adhere with such earn' 
estness to the possession of Italy, when its cession must be the 
sine qua non in the basis offered to him ? From this speech, a 
person of discernment can see any thing sooner than a prospect tf 
peace. Some gentlemen here, have mounted the stilts of giant 
fear, and have already predicted the coalition of all the European 
powers against Great Britain ; their inveterate jealousies of her ; 
the revival of that horrid phantom, armed neutrality ; and the un- 
conditional demand from her of the restoration of all the colonies 
she conquered from France. Really there is a great deal of fancy 
in this. Whatever may be the conduct of Austria, with whom} 
we are satisfied, the first defection must eventually originate, Alex- 
ander is still the soul of the coalition ; and we are yet to learn 
what inveterate jealousy Russia ever entertained of Great Britain^ 
whose interest has always been reciprocal, whose mutual friendship 
has been steady and regular, and whose mutual disagreements were 
merely exceptions to the regular course of their common policy. 
We should also wish to know what could Alexander gain by Eng- 
land's giving up her conquered colonies, of which not a single one 
belongs,or would belong to him ? What sudden excess of generosity 
towards France should outweigh his positive obligations towards 
Great Britain ; and what compensation the prosperity of France 
would be to him for the loss of his whole fleet, which is now in 
Great Britain, and which of course would be retained there in case 
of his rupture with her, inevitable from the indulgence of such 
extraordinary affections for her rival ? Sense and reason must be 
subverted before such fears can be supposed to be well grounded. 

" The Courier's remarks are very much honoured in being allow- 
ed to produce such effect on the public opinion here. Howeveri 
they are but the remarks of an individual, an editor of a paper, 
penned upon the spur of the occasion, and in his usual manner. 
But it is said, the Courier is an official paper : this is not true. 
The London Gazette is the only official paper in London ; and the 
Courier is merely a paper, whose politics are favourable to the 
ministerial party, and beyond this; has no communication whatever 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 1^ 

with the government. After all, the Courier's remarks amount 
merely to a slight apprehension of the wavering policy of Austria 
(a thing exceedingly probable) and do not extend to Alexander and 
Frederick ; while the expression " Great Britain and Sweden ap- 
pear net to have been consulted," is a mere supposition, vviiich, 
whether true or not, naturally explains itself, by what we have al- 
ready suggested. Great Britain, however, must evidently have 
been consulted, through her Ambassador on the sf>ot, even as to 
the offer itself ; but it is also evident that Lord Cathcart's commu- 
nications, to the government at home, particularly if any misun- 
derstanding has prevailed between Austria and the other Allies, 
would not be divulged to the public, through the Courier or any 
other paper whatever : and would produce the effect, which has 
actually appeared in the personal departure of the prime minister. 
The editor therefore reasons as most editors do. from his own sur- 
mises, and judges from appearances, because the facts are concealed 
from his knowledge. 

" Let us then do justice to the Allies, and not condemn them 
upon mere insinuations : let us wait a little longer, and we arc con- 
fident the Jinal issue ivill bear us out in the opinion, that no fierfidious 
desertion of Great Britain and Sweden is contemplated, or ivill be 
suffered by the jillies, as long at least as Mexander is one of the num- 
ber." 

The news of the Allies having at length passed the " Rubicon," 
and thus justified the confidence which the author claimed for 
them, had scarcely reached America, when he gave the follow- 
ing climax of his prophecies, in the " Boston Daily Advertiser" 
of March 14, 1814, which is as singular and unexpected, as the 
events which consummated its fulfilment, are extraordinary and 
unprecedented i — 

" All our anticipations, as well as our assurances to the publick, 
that no premature or dishonourable peace was intended by the 
Allies, have been completely verified. It is as plain as day, that 
the Allies have denounced Bonaparte before the French people ; 
and thus have given a pledge that no peace will be made with the 



m POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

Tyrant upon any terms. His complaints, as reported lo the Con« 
servative Senate, put beyond all doubt that the Allies have issued 
a manifesto, the contents of which will be found consolatory to the 
French p-eople, exfiressive of respect for their rights and liberties^ 
disdaining every invasion of France for the fiurfioses of conquest 
or dismemberment y and making the war personal against the des- 
potic usurper, and in favour of the French nation which he has 
enslaved. Bonaparte must be hurled from his sanguinary throne 
before any peace can be concluded ; and his fate has accordingly 
been predetermined. As he has not shewn a single instance of that 
magnanimity which would induce us to believe that he would sooner 
die by his own hand, than bear his humiliation — we foresee no other 
alternative left him but to be slain by others, or escape by flight (to 
America.) The Allies are already on the road to Paris ; and nothing 
can check them but a peace terminating inBonaparte's political annihila- 
tion. — One part of the Allied Army already has advanced from Basle 
to Befort, and another is marching through Lyons to the same point, 
commencing at a broad base, and proceeding by two roads, which 
form an angle at Paris , so as to reunite them at that capital. There 
are no obstructing fortresses in the way ; and if there were, the 
Allies have force enough to leave troops in the rear to watch themywhile 
the main force is marching forward^ according to the plan they have 
uniformly pursued. — The left wing will probably co-operate with 
the Austrian army in Italy, so as to cut off the Viceroy and his 
army with one stroke ; while Bernadotte will advance from Holland 
through the Netherlands to the same point of union— Paris. 

" There are some who fear the consequences of entering France, 
for various reasons, to which it is not necessary here to allude ; to 
such we shall give a short reply. 

" The present invasion of France is not like that of the Duke of 
Brunswick ; because, while the invading force is much greater, not 
only the means of resistance on the part of France are much smal> 
ier, but the enthusiasm which prevailed in the French people is 
now totally destroyed. The unsuccessful invasion of Russia, by 
Bonaparte, has likewise no analogy to the invasion of France, but 
rather helps the conclusion as to the success of the latter. Bona- 
parte went to Russia for the purpose of conquest ; he had to en- 
counter a nation whose resources were in full bloom, whose armies 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 91 

were all rcBerved for the final contest, and whose loyalty could not 
be shaken by a temporary occupation of the Russian provinces. 
He had to deal with a sovereign, who, to the just cause of self de- 
fence, had legitimate and personal claims on his people's affection. 
Do any of these apply to the present state of France or her Tyrant ? 
No. France is invadedybr the purpose of deliverance^ and not of 
conquest ; and Russia is the surest guarantee of the promised in- 
tegrity of the French empire ; for, as Russia, from her local situa- 
tion, cannot hold any part ef it, she will never consent to its dia- 
membertnent in favour ofoihers, and thereby labour for their aggran- 
dizement to the prejudice of her own interests. France, besides, 
is invaded after the French armies have been destroyed ; when 
her resources, effective population, and materials for the army have 
been woefully exhausted ; and when their Tyrant has neither per- 
sonal nor legitimate claim on the love of the French people. We have 
seen that Lord Wellington's invasion not only has not produced 
the so much dreaded rise of the French people en masse, but rather 
approximated him to their good will, manifested in their supplying 
him with all the necessaries of life. We shall see, therefore, the 
same conduct of the French peasantry towards the Allies, who, as 
they advance, will be hailed as liberators, rather than opposed as 
enemies, and unite the inhabitants in one sentiment hostile to Bona- 
parte, and propitious to the restoration of the ancient monarchy. 
This naturally brings us to the consideration of the probable ulte- 
riour views of the Allies. 

« It is supposed, not without reason, that Austria will resist any 
change of government, to the exclusion of Napoleon's young off- 
spring, the grand-son of the Austrian Emperoqr ; and we have no 
doubt that the Allies have given a pledge to Austria in favour of 
her ambitious pretensions in the person of the young King of 
Rome. This pledge, however, has been already redeemed by 
their offers of peace to Bonaparte, with an additional view of put- 
ting him still further in the wrong, should he refuse. He has 
done so by claiming Italy as his own ; and we see Austria united 
with the rest, to hurl him down from his throne. His fall we deem 
now certain ; the rest must depend up.on the will of the French 
people, and this is the chance on which Austria has been compelled 
to rely. If the French nation wish for JVapoleon's son to govern it. 



92 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS- 

Aiistria's views will be promoted by the Allies : but if the French 
nation call for the Bourbon family, the Allies toho have pledged 
themselves not to interfere in the choice of government by the peo- 
ple, will undoubtedly restore Louis XVIII, and Austria will have 
no alternative but to submit, and submit she must. It is a peculiar 
trait of wisdom in the conduct of the Allies, that they have carefully 
concealed their final projects, in such a way as to be at liberty, 
without violating any previous pledge or offending the pride of the 
French nation, to regulate those projects by the circumstances and 
events which may arise from the progressive state of their affairs." 

The boldness of these last predictions, having so deeply involved 
the author's reputation, it was supposed, he would be content to 
wait for their idealization without venturing any further ; but he, 
only a few days after, intended to surprise the public with other 
predictions still more remarkable for their minuteness, which 
can scarcely be believed to have entered his head or that of any 
other man, but which like others are completely verified. They 
were sent to the same paper, but,being returned, were not publish- 
ed till the 9th of June in the Boston Gazette. We give them place 
here according to their original intention : — 

" In the Daily Advertiser, of 14th March, we ventured to fore- 
tel the entrance of the allies into Paris, the restoration of the ancient 
monarchy in France, and even the probable escape of Bonaparte 
from Europe, and his final appearance in America. Though 
these opinions were deemed at that time full of extravagance, they 
become less so with each arrival from Europe, and the last predic- 
tion, though qualified with certain contingencies, is the only one 
that remains as yet involved in doubt and improbability. On this 
subject it is sufficient only to ask, where is there another spot on 
earth where Bonaparte would be received, in case he should evade 
the sword of his enemies, and the fury of his own subjects ? Leav- 
ing, however, his fate to the disposal of Providence, we will hazard 
two predictions more, in hopes of relieving the anxiety of those, 
who, not without reason, apprehend the destruction of Paris, and of 
those monuments of arts which are deposited in that metropolis. 
As Alexander, by the confession of the French themselves, is the 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 93 

principal mover of the coalition, and consequently the arbiter of 
the fate of France ; his well known character, no less than the 
motives of policy, which we shall shortly explain, warrant us in 
our assurance, that Paris will be spared and respected ; and that the 
pictures and statues which rejzdered famous the territories formerly 
possessing them, iviil 7iot only be saved, but restored to their original 
repositories, whence the hand of Mipoleon had dragged them to the 
French Capital. 

" Farther, we hesitate not to express our belief, that if any mis- 
chief is done to Paris, by conflagration or any other means, it will 
be caused either by useless resistance on the part of the city, or by 
the spite and vengeance of Bonaparte himself should his remaining 
satellites be daring enough to execute hia sanguinary orders, 

" The motives of policy which must influence Alexander in re- 
storing the monuments of arts are too obvious to be overlooked, 
supposing that his magnanimity was questioned. There are some 
masterpieces which are invaluable, and could not be divided, or 
possessed by any one of the allies, without exciting jealousy and 
discontent in the others ; consequently the restoration of them to 
their original places will be the best and easiest method of recon- 
ciling all the parties, at the same time of preserving the consisten- 
cy of those professions which have been made and reiterated by 
the allies. The greatest danger to France must hereafter be ap- 
prehended from the ambition and neighbourhood of Austria, who 
will have gained in proportion to the weakness of the French pow- 
er. Russia alone can and will check every such attempt upon the 
independence of France." 

At this time unfavourable rumours, through Bermuda, reached 
this country, of the defeat and retreat of the Allies from France ; 
and while the news, believed by many, produced much alarm and 
agitation among the well-aflFected to the great common cause, our 
author again appeared in the character of a consoler, in the " Bos- 
ton Gazette" of April 21, 1814, where he says :— 

'* The late report, via Bermuda, about the defeat and retreat of 
the allies, has been received, we think, with more credit than it de- 
serves. There is a constant influx of false and contradictory riv 



g-4 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

niours in England ; there are, besides, many newspapers disaffect- 
ed to the government, which catch at any thing favourable to Bon- 
aparte. We ought, therefore, to assure ourselves first, of the re- 
port having been actually brought to Bermuda, and then, of the 
source from which it originally came, before we can permit our- 
selves to reason for a moment upon the supposed defeat. There 
are facts, officially known to the world, which are better than any 
private information, and vfhich are totally at variance with any sup- 
position to the disadvantage of the allies By the late arrival from 
Pari^, up to the 9th of February, we are certain that Bonaparte 
had then no army numerous enough to engage the allies in a gen- 
eral battle ; it is morally therefore impossible that in affiv days he 
could have mustered such an army. He might possibly have in- 
creased his number by detachments from Soult ; and if the allies 
were defeated, and retreated 90 miles, the time required for these 
operations would scarcely allow them to be known in London be- 
fore March 1 J up to which it is said the papers were brought to 
Bermuda. As for the pretended firing on the French coast ; it 
might have been occasioned by the approach of the British ships 
in the channel, which is often the case. At all events it can have 
DO connexion with the supposed defeat of the allies, as the firing 
was announced in London on the 1 1th of February, and on the 9th, 
which is our latest date from Paris, there was not the smallest ap- 
pearance of an engagement, as the hostile armies were not even 
near enough for such a purpose. Who can then believe that from 
the 9th to the 10th a great battle could have been fought, and the 
Bews of its result already conveyed to the coast ? The utmost that 
we can alloiv for this report, is, that it may have originated in the re- 
pulse of so?ne small corps, or in the retreat of the advanced bodiesj 
inho kept a head near 40 miles, and on meeting ivith any considerable 
force, would naturally fall back upon the main army.** 

So little was our author dismayed by these unfavourable reports, 
that at this very time of doubt and suspense, he produced on the 
stage an operative melo-drama, in three acts, entitled " The Cozaks 
on the road to Paris," the spirit of which may be judged from the 
speech, which he puts into the mouth of the Cozak chief, thus ad* 
dressing tne inhabitants of Fontainbleau : — 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 90 

" Dismiss your fears ! IFe are your friends . It is not against 
France that wc are armed, but against her tyrants and op/ircssors. 
Frenchmen ! some of you have done our country much harm, but 
this we have forgotten, and remember only to serve yours. It is 
true, a full retaliation is now in our power ; but we scorn it. A 
nobler vengeance brings us here. JVe come to break your ovm 
chains, and restore you to that freedom, of which you have attempted 
to defirive us at home" 

The above extract not only shows how well our author under- 
stood the character of Alexander, but it shews that sentiments of 
such unexampled forbearance and magnanimity, as were soon af- 
ter displayed in the concluding events, were not confined to the 
breast of one Russian ; and thus furnishes the keenest comment 
upon all those who have endeavoured here and in England, to 
belie and vilify the Russian character. 

The author concludes this piece with a chorus sung by the 
French peasants in honour of Alexander, which is a complete an- 
ticipation of what has since taken place at Paris. It was arranged 
to the tune of the celebrated Russian Polonesso. 

" Long live Alexander ! 
Long live the deliv'rer ! 

Glorious 'inong the kings he blazes^ 
Distant nations sing his praises. 

Millions bless his noble deeds. 

Peace bestrews his path viith roses, 
justice 'neath his shield reposes, 

Freedom lives, oppression bleeds, 

Mercy from, his heart isfioming. 
Good for ill he is besiothing, 

Heav'n his virtuous triumph speeds , 

Gallia joins the lauding voicisy 
And viith Europe now rejoices .• 
For she is no more enslaved, 
Cmquer'donly to be sav^d." 



96 S'OLITICAL PREDICTIOJSfS 

When, at length, the French official accounts up to February 
28th, received here, seemed to confirm the preceding reports of 
the defeat and retreat of the allies, and made the most confident 
men despair, our author stood forth unshaken in the grounds of 
his former belief, and thus endeavoured to revive the public hopes^ 
in the Boston Gazette of April 25, 1814, describing the respective 
positions and movements of the contending parties, with the 
probable results of their final operations, exactly as they were 
fouiid afterwards to have actually taken place : — 

" The late arrival from France brings us a chaos of nsws, which 
cannot be easily reduced to order ; nor shall we attempt it. It is 
sufficient that our surmises of Thursday last are amply confirmed, 
as to the supposed check given to the allies, which at most we 
consideted as partial, and confined to some advancing troops falling- 
back. About the middle of February there was likewise so much 
boasting in the French papers, as fully to explain the rumours 
which reached us from England, but which are entirely done away 
by the later dates from France. As the French official accounts 
are so scanty, a circumstance decidedly unfavourable to Bonaparte; 
and as the unofficial paragraphs are altogether unworthy of notice, 
at least it never has been our habit to reason upon them, we shall 
lake some prominent facts, which, being established by these ac- 
counts, will form so many pivots for our general remaiks. 

" The first fact is, that there has been no general battle. A mere 
skirmishing cannot decide the fate of the campaign. The French 
naturally would exaggerate their successes in partial actions with 
more impunity, as there is less danger of detection ; but, though 
we are satisfied the next British accounts iviil give a different com.' 
filectiori even to all these actions, the final result ivill not be in any 
practical degree infiuenced by them. A general engagement must 
swallow up all successes on either side, and this has not yet taken 
place. The hostile armies, however, are evidently manoeuvring 
for it, and all the various small encounters with which the French 
papers are filled, are only precursory movements to that dreadful 
conflict, which will, with one blow, hurl Bonaparte from his eminence^ 
or drive the Allies from France, Let us, then, wait with patience 
for the event of such a battle. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. JT 

" The second part is, that there is 7io negocia^ ion for peace. This 
of itself speaks a volume in favour of the Allies. It is not to be 
doubted that, if they were checked, they would seriously encourage 
a negociation with Bonaparte, whose dethronement would then be 
hopeless. 

" The third fact is, that the Jllies have not retreated ; at least 
not upon the general scale — On the contrary, some of their troops 
are now much nearer to Paris than they were before. To the 
question, whether Bonaparte can compel them to a retreat, we 
would reply by a reference to the battle of Brienne. There Bona- 
parte had collected the best of his army, and yet Blucher alone, 
with only a reinforcement from the main Bohemian army, was 
more than a match for him. It is absolutely ridiculous to read the 
French accounts of the manner in which the strongest Allied Armies 
were annihilated, without even a battle ! ! ! 

"The fourth fact is, that Bonaparte, though he has given us his 
own positions, he has not ventured to tell us where the Allies were. 
If, by going himself in advance of Troyes, he had driven them 
back upon the Rhine, would he have suppressed so important a 
fact ? We suspect, therefore, that though the Allies have allowed 
him to go to Troyes^ they., themselves, are nearer Paris than he wishes 
them ; and either he is inclosed in a net, as he was before the battle 
of Leipsic — or they have taken a northerly position., parallel to his 
line. We are inclined to adopt the latter opinion., the more so, as it 
is admitted in the French papers that the right wing of the Allied 
Army was at Meaux, only 25 miles from Paris, The advantage of 
this position is evident, as it secures the communication by sea 
and with Holland, separates the Netherlands from France, and 
provides for the junction with Bernadotte, who, by the last ^ itish 
accounts, was advancing towards the Lower Rhine. It seems, that, 
as Bonaparte was pressing upon the left of the Allies, they pressed in 
their turn upon his left, and both were endeavouring to concentrate 
their forces for a blow, which must be decisive. 

" Such is the appearance of the respective bold positions of the 
contending armies, that if the Allies succeed they will at once cut 
ejf Bonaparte from his capital ; but if he should prove victorious, 
N 



3S POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

he will cut them off from the Lower Rhine. As rashness^ however^ 
is a more decided characteristic of Bonaparte^ than of the Allies^ we 
are confident the scale mil be turned against him ; as they would not 
lifave advanced so far, without feeling themselves in adequate force.'* 

At length on the memorable day, the 1 1th of May, the brig Ida, 
from Rochelle, brought the first glorious news of the entrance of 
the allies into Paris, and the next day the following short article 
from the author, appeared in the " Boston Gazette" : — 

" All the reports, which had reached us concerning the suppos- 
ed defection of Austria, may be explained without being wholly 
discredited. That Austria was averse to the dethronement of Bon- 
aparte, there can be no doubt, from her well known political char- 
acter, and her interest in the continuation of the Bonapartean dyn- 
asty. We have formerly hinted our suspicions, that the Allies 
had pledged themselves to support Napoleon's son,merely from the 
circumstance of their not proclaiming sooner the restoration of Lou- 
is, which kept the French people in a state of apathy and uncer- 
tainty, mistaken here and in England for their attachment to Napole- 
on. We think, however, that by persuasion, intimidation, and 
other means, the Allies have prevailed so far with Austria, as to 
co-operate with them in obtaining fiossession of Paris^ the result of 
which is, that the fears which she must have entertained of losing 
her influence, whenever Paris should fall into their hands, are like- 
ly to be realized. It is quite evident, that if the people of Paris, 
whose example must operate a change in the ivhole Empire^ should 
prefer the Bourbons to the Bonapartean dynasty.^ the Allies, without 
-violating their previous pledge to Austria, will naturally support the 
pretensions of the French people , and render every opposition on her 
part perfectly nugatory. She will be forced to sruim with the tide^ and 
content to share in thfi benefits of general emancipation." 

The same day, and in the same paper, appeared the following 
" extempore lines," addressed by the author, in which he, with 
equal success, predicted the security of American property at 
B«vdeauxj then occupied by the English :-*- 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. ,-^ 

'* Hail, Ocean's ambling daughter, Ida fair. 
The fairest of the watery nymphs, immatch'd 
In speed and beauty, pride of all thy friends 
Wlio S3W thy birth, and rapid growth, and who 
Beheld thy first essay, with virgin-keel 
To press the main, whose gently yielding waves 
Soon clasp'd thee in their am'rous arms, then rosCj 
And on their crest united bore thee up 
Their loveliest Fairy -Queen ! Once more we hail 
And welcome thee back to thy native shore ! 
Many a danger hast thou pass'd : of these 
The sea, with all its quicksands, rocks, and storms^ 
Was but the least. A giant-foe, whose form, 
Like some huge shadow, is reflected seen 
From ev'ry coast, and on each distant flood, 
Inclos'd thee with his thousand arms, and watch'd 
Thy courses with his thousand eyes : yet thou 
From North to South, from West to East, and back. 
Safe and unhurt, hast pass'd. And tlio' thou bring'sj; 
No foreign stores, no prize, save thy rich self. 
Yet on thy airy steps tread smiling hope 
And joy exuberant, which from afar 
Salute our longing eye and thirsty ear. 
To Freedom's Sons thou. Freedom's triumph bring'aii, 
And the stern Tyi-ant's fall. How envious then 
Thy destiny ! The glorious news requir'd 
A messenger as glorious as thyself ; 
And Heav'n, in fav'ring thy escape, has shewn 
Its final choice on thee was fix'd. Come, then. 
And in thy native harbour taste repose ! % 

Fear not ! The treasures thou hast left behind 
Shall ne^er he plunder'd by the hostile band. 
Which, through proud Gallia's bold invasion, means 
To save, not to destroy. Again thou shalt 
Traverse the friendly bosom of the main. 
To thee so faithful ; and when war's hoarse voice 
Is hush'd, and peace unfurls thy snowy sails. 
Thou shalt with ample bounty yet repay 
The parent's care that foster'd thee — the love 
That nurs'd thy infancy, and sent thee forth 
So well protected, on the watery world." 



l€0 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

On the receipt of the official accounts from England, confirming 
in detail the glorious news brought by the Ida, the author thus 
took his leave of his adversaries and Bonaparte, in the Boston Ga- 
zette, of June 1 3 :— 

" At the sound of the name, heretofore appnliing, but nov7 
harmless and pitiful ; at the mere mention of the sinp;ular being, 
whose word, and whose nod yesterday, as it were, commanded 
millions of lives, but who to day lives himself only by sufferance, 
and lives a lingering death ; the heart is overpowered with min- 
gled and undeJscribable emotions, the mind is lost in a whelm- 
ing flood of ideas, and the tongue, not daring to trust the 
utmost strength of language, puts on the fetters of silence 
and remains in fearful suspense. A few months back, a mere 
moment in the space of eternity, a mighty conflagration was 
spreading over all the world ; and yet, while approaching its ut- 
most height, we see it suddenly extinguished by a second univer- 
sal deluge ; a deluge, which, to increase our special vponder, has 
left no wrecks, no horrors on its traces, but in the heart of the ve- 
ry furnace, wherein the flames engendered, has deposited the cra- 
dle of peace and prosperity ; the noble twins of an almost unexpect- 
ed birth, who from their rapid and gigantic growth will soon ex- 
tend their arms from North to South, and from East to West, em- 
bracing every fiart of (he Globe. A fierce Comet was on the point 
of consuming this devoted earth, when the sudden breath of Heav- 
en cooled the rage of the invading orb, and swept it far from the 
line on which it pursued its baleful course ; in an instant it is shiv- 
ered in fragments, hurled down from its fatal altitude among the 
old planets, and its intense heat has passed away as a holy and pu- 
rifying fire. Yes, there is no blasphemy, in calling that a holy and 
purifying fire, which /!u?-^ec/ the earth of restless demagogues and 
usurfiing Tyrmits — quelled the proud and rebellious spirit , aspir- 
ing to a self-government that brought in its train a load of practic- 
al evil for every grain of visionary good— allayed and subdued the 
malignant, factious passions, nvhich, under the pretext of freedom 
subverted universal liberty— tore off" the specious mask from the 
Tietv-fangled monster , modern philosophy —reconciled the turbulent 
and difsaffected to a regular and salutary government, better 
adapted to human nature— re-established, on a firmer basis than 
ever, the ancient order of things under legitimate sovereign pow- 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 101 

er — and created another moral and political world from the ruins 
of the old, placing a sad and painful experience, as an eternal bar 
to every future impious attempt to pull down the magnificent edi- 
fice thus agaia erected. The manij-hcadad hydra of the French rev- 
olution is crushed forever : its venom has been too kcvrdijflt., and its 
ungovernable, ?ind all-devouring appeiite has been glutted with vic- 
tims too precious ever to fear its revival, so fatal to the ha/i/tincss of 
all. Past sufferings nvill soon be forgotten ; and the blessings 
about to be enjoyed will only excite gratitude to that jio%verful and 
merciful Disposer of events, who thought fit to chastise us by grati- 
fying for a while our lawless wishes ; then applied a dreadful but 
lasting remedy to the calamities which grew out of our own pride 
and ambition. 

" Our joy is too pure to allow of any unhallowed admixture, aris- 
ing from the gratification of revenge or vanity; yet we may be 
permitted to congratulate ourselves on tlie signal success of our 
anticipations, embracing nearly the whole series of the late great 
events ; not for the purposes of self exultation, or of triumph over 
the deluded crest-fallen men, whose prophesies were all false, but 
merely to contrast our hopes and wishes with theirs ; ours, in fa- 
vour of the common cause of mankind, and theirs, in favour of the 
oppression of mankind, and, therefore, dishonourable and impious. 

" We have called these creatures men, only by courtesy, and in 
that spirit of forbearance which has been shown to their humbled 
leader ; but if we were to arraign them before the strict tribunal of 
justice, their right to the title might be severely questioned. For, 
if they be men, of what strange materials are they formed, since 
they can, while boasting of preeminent freedom, wed their souls to 
a spirit, at once the most tyrannical and slavish ; and in defiance of 
virtue, sense, reason and public shame, link themselves by choice 
to a monster, worshipped from necessity, abandoned from honour, 
abhorred of mankind, and denounced of Heaven ? No ; it is not in 
the history of man, that a parallel can be found to their horrid per- 
severance in self prostitution ; but only in the records of those re- 
bellious, obdurate, and unrepentant beings, who, rather than return 
to the light of truth, and into the presence of their God, preferred 
to follow Lucifer to his dismal abode below." 



102 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

To finish his career of a political Prophet, our author in the 
Palladium of June 17, 1814, gave the following sketch of " the 
talents of Bonaparte," which sketch ^yas almost immediately con- 
firmed by Chateaubriand's pamphlet, published in France and 
toucning upon the same subject, as copied, in extracts, into some 
of the American papers. 

" In imitation of the niagnaniraous conduct of the Allies towards 
the fallen oppressor of Europe, we shall not drag him forth from 
the obscurity in which he has taken shelter ; or, by reviewing his 
moral character, place a mirror before him where he may see all 
the crimes he is known to have committed, with the poor consola- 
tion that many more remain yet undiscovered. But we may be 
permitted to glance at that part of his character, which is connected 
with his supposed talents ; and which has been strenuously advo- 
cated and generally acknowledged. If we should be found to dif- 
fer in opinion from a great majority, we can only say, and say with 
truth, that our present sentiments are of old and unvaried growth, 
preceding Bonaparte's downfal, and not originating in that human 
weakness, which changes opinions with the misfortunes of a man 
once admired. 

" The unbounded and despotic power of Bonaparte, which ena- 
Bled him to humble nation after nation in quick succession,, and 
threw, over all minor defeats and errors, the dazzling mantle of sucf 
eess, preventing the eye of inquiry from a close inspection, was no 
symptom of his talents, but merely a proof of the energies inherent 
in France, and of his own adventurous boldness in seizing those 
energies; and bringing them rapidly and simultaneously into action. 
But as events have shewn, that this boldness was inconsiderate 
rashness on his part ; and that by venturing his all at once, though 
he overwhelmed others for a while, he soon wasted and squandered 
himself, thereby insuring and accelerating his own ruin ; the con- 
dusion is irresistible, that the very ground, on which his claims to 
talents are attempted to be established, is the strongest and most 
prominent on which such claims should be annulled. 

<« In the character of Statesman, he has given several unequivo- 
eai proofs of his incapacity. His invasion of Spain, whose nominal 
independence, protecting her from the British navy, and enabling 
her to draw her treasures from her American possessions, rendered 
her mpre useful to him, than if she were conquered and. under his 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 103 

absolute and undisguised control, was an unpardonable blindness 
to his immediate interests, and to his consequent and useless sacri- 
fices ; it was literally killing the goose that laid golden eggs for 
him, and paying at an extravagant rate for the trouble of killing. 
His attempt upon Russia, though supported by gigantic prepara- 
tions and unprecedented means, showing that he was not insensi- 
ble of the dangers of the contest and of the character of the enemy ; 
evince nevertheless, his misconception of the moral and physical 
capacity of Russia, his reluctance to profit by the experience he 
already had of the talents of her generals and of the prowess of her 
soldiers, his credulity in the false representations of her national 
temper and disposition, his premature rage to avenge her interrup- 
tion of his designs upon Spain, which designs, but for her tacit de- 
fiance and menacing attitude, would probably have succeeded ; and 
finally his extreme impatience, to achieve, by subduing her, the 
long meditated conquest of the whole continent, terminating iu 
that of Great Britain : all which furnish an evidence not of talents, 
but of unqualified arrogance, unchecked by foresight and prudence. 
Aptness in intrigue and corruption, rather reflected by his agents 
than possessed by himself, formed the sum total of his political 
wisdom. 

" As a Financier, he stands still lower. In waging a deadly and 
interminable war against Great Britain, he not ooly underrated her 
resources, but overrated his own. He forgot that, in a race not to 
be given up as long as the parties can breathe, the strongest runner 
must fall the last ; and though England might be precipitated into 
the gulf of destruction, she would undoubtedly be preceded by 
her antagonist. He never thought for a moment that in consum- 
ing the means of other nations, he exhausted his own with greater 
rapidity ; and though the British people complained of their priva- 
tions, and thus encouraged liim to persevere in the delusive hope 
of subduing them, the true source of these complaints was thsir 
old habit or privilege of complaining ; while his own people were 
suffering, in silence, real and serious calamities. His wanton per- 
secution of commerce, the chief sinew of national strength, is 
another striking instance of his foolish infatuation, which at once 
cut off his resources abroad, forced him to draw upon the interior 
stock, withQUt being able to replenish it, and thus, by the very 



IW POLITICAL PREmCTIONa. 

means he selected, destroyed his darling object. He acted like an 
inexperienced merchant, if such can be found, who by increasing 
the outgoings, and reducing the external supplies, expects 'to im- 
prove the capital he inherited ; or like a quack-doctor, who would 
undertake to cure a patient by bleeding him to death. Indeed Bon- 
aparte could not or would not understand, that the ruin of his ad- 
versary was more likely to be accomplished by a superior encour- 
agement of commerce in his own dominions, than by frightening 
commerce away, and by driving her, sword in hand, upon the wide 
ocean, where she would be at the mercy of Great Britain. His 
confined banking system, and the childish notion, that the circula- 
tion of specie and absence of paper money were the true criterion 
ot' national wealth and prosperity, when the experience of ages has 
dcnionstrated that a specie, exclusive of paper, is a proof of national 
poverty, and that no country ever attained the height of commer- 
cial preponderance without paper credit, plainly shew how young 
arid uninformed he was in this important branch of political sci* 
ence. His whole arrangement, or rather derangement of inte- 
riour fiscal concerns, weak in device, oppressive in execution, and 
inadequate to the object proposed, exhibits the like features of ig- 
norant and cruel despotism, with scarcely a single favourable ex- 
ception, 

" As a Legislator, his laws and edicts, always contradicting each 
other, prompted by sudden impulses, and forced from occasional 
*ircumstances into a permanent operation, are mere ebullitions of 
caprice, and the only credit he might have gained on this score 
would have come from their speedy abolition. Every foreign 
iiierchant who visited France and had to do with Napoleon's cus- 
tom-houses and lawyers, and every one had to do with them, 
win vouch for the truth of these assertions. 

" As a iTian, there is notliing edifying in Bonaparte's character, 
and we have already intimated our intention to spare him on this 
point. As a hero, there is not a single deed of his, which may 
shevv that either nature or education ever designed him for such. 
The very attempt to canvass his claims to this distinction would be 
injustice and an insult to the memory of those who are consecrated 
as Heroes. 



POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 105 

« As a Sovereign, Bonapaite's qualificalions amounted to one unit, 
which was force. Beyond this he had no idea of governing ; 
therefore, governed no longer than the force lasted. Neither had 
he the faculty of attaching his subjects or even his creatures to his 
person. The only expedient he knew and employed, was sordid 
interest, which led him into unheard of profusion and extravagance 
(no monarch ever granted such sweeping salaries to his officers,) 
offending many, while it reconciled but a few, and that feebly, and 
served him only in the absence of other stronger temptations, aris- 
ing from the prospect of favours more wisely distiibuted. He 
had no art to inspire his people with that love and confidence 
which, after all, are the strongest and most lasting links of union 
between a sovereign and his subjects. He had neither the courage 
to resist flattery, or hear the truth ; nor the ability of preserving 
his friends and advisers. He repudiated Josephine, the only friend 
he had in the world, and discarded Talleyrand, the only adviser 
that could check his disastrous temerity ; accordingly, his guardi- 
an angel at home, mediating between him and the nation, and his 
protecting genius abroad, shielding him from the united attacks of 
foreign powers, having both deserted him, his fortune began to de- 
cline, and his dovvnfal commenced. His reign produced no other 
effect but to revive with past recollections the love of the past, to 
reconcile the people to the sway of the Bourbons, and leave a pow- 
erful contrast in favour of the latter. 

" Were it necessary further to illustrate, by result and com- 
parisons, our judgment of Bonaparte, in reference to the pre- 
ceding topics ; we would only say that his failure amply 
proves his want of abilities, and that Peter and Frederick were 
successful, because their course over the same ground was totally 
©pposite to his. 

« There remains then to Bonaparte but one claim to talent in his 

military character ; a character, which he could never throw off or 

disguise for a moment, but which, in the field, cabinet, court, 

church, or drawing-room, he constantly obtruded on the spectator. 

Souwarrow and Moreau had pronounced him a great General j 

and the opinion of such men would be conclusive, had they seen 

him contending like themselves against Fortune, and struggling 

with Adversity, and thus possessed all the materials necessary to 
O 



lOS POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

form a fair ju(lg;ment. As long as the tide of success favoured his 
course ofamlntion, his promptitude, activity, boldness, and rash- 
ness itself, while of essential seivtce to himeslf, struck the world 
■with terror, and through a sort of biight artificial atmosphere, ex- 
hibited his pigmy figure in the magnified form of a giunt ; but the 
moment he encountered obstiuction, and the tide began to turn, 
these qualities became his bane, and he possessed ,or at least evin- 
ced no others more suitable to the emergency of the times. His 
invincibility, first shaken by the renowned Beningzen on the fields 
of Pultusk and Eylau, received another blow at Aspern from the 
hand of /Xrchduke Charles ; but as he soon recovered, and rose as 
formidable as ever from these disasters, bis reputation for talent 
rather increased than diminished. It w s, therefore, at the dread- 
ful battle of Borodino, the source and cause of all his subsequent 
misfortunes, that he received the first wound, from which, ever 
since, he has been dying by inches. It was there, that the venera- 
ble Kutuzow, the illustrious fellow soldier of the great Souwarrow, 
by beating him on the plain, and then entrapping him at Moskow, 
deprived him for ever of his doubtful invincibility, and of his skill 
till then scarcely any where questioned. Bonaparte, as if deter- 
mined from that moment to undeceive even his warmest admirers, 
soon gave proofs, that he either disdained or was not wise enough 
to profit by the experience so painfully purchased ; for we find that 
Xutuzow's plan has been since faithfully followed, and enforced on 
every occasion with the same invariable success, against the un- 
guarded Bonaparte. The way in which the allies dislodged him 
from Dresden, is precisely the same in which Kutuzow compelled 
him to quit Mosk.)vv ; and the tiuple attack they made upon him at 
Leipzic, is like the triple and scarcely less memorable attack made 
upon him, on the Berezina, by order of the Russian Veteran. 

" The entrance of the Allies into France, through Switzerland? 
which rendered the French fortresses useless, is also of the same 
character : indeed, their uniform manner of conducting the inva- 
sion, particularly their bold and decisive march to Paris, which 
suddenly placed them between this capital and Bonaparte's main 
army, reminds us stjoniily of Kutuzow's admirable position after 
the entrance of the French into Moskow, and of Tchitchagoff's 
march upon Minsk, which intercepted Bonaparte's main 
fpom Wilna, 



POLiriCAL PREDICTIONS. 107 

« III short, he not only has been fairly beaten in every encounter, 
but constantly out-niai>ceuvred and out-generalled ; and it must be 
one of his most gailini^ reflections, thai the Capiid, on which his 
safety depended, was wrested from him with his crown, not so 
much by a genernl defeat, as by the superior skill and judgment of 
his adversaries. 

" It may be urged in his defence, that his means, since the fatal 
Russian campaign, were greatly reduced, and that he could not 
Well resist the superior forces of the allies. We might, in reply, 
draw from this veiy defence conclusions against his former repu- 
tation, as it was always with superior forces that he conquered ; 
we might institute comparisons between him and his antagonists 
who, though more inferior to him, than he has since been to them, 
were more successful in averting their total overthrow ; we might 
maintain that if he possessed real talents to the extent supposed, 
his despotic command, united within himself, might more than 
overbalance the numerical superiority of the allies, directed by 
many heads ; we might also shew with how much smaller relative 
means Frederick and Souwarrow triumphed over all their enemies, 
and achieved exploits worthy of themselves ; but we are willing to 
concede the plea, and even to confess, that it is precisely on the 
ground of diminution in his resources, that we predicated all ouv 
opinions and expectations, now fully verified, of his final downfal. 
Great talents alone could redeem his sinking fortunes ; but our 
conviction that he was irrecoverably lost, is an additional evidence 
that we were then right, and are so now, in maintaining that he 
had no such talents. Allowing, however, the utmost latitude of 
the defence, which may thus be set up for him, we will ask, why, if 
he knew himself so much weaker, did he act as if he were so much 
stronger ? Why did he leave so many garrisons in German for- 
tresses, no longer in his power to preserve, and thus deprive him- 
self of numerous and veteran troops, at a most critical moment 
when they would be wanted to defend his nearer and infinitely 
more important interests ? If he were inferiour in means, why 
did he stay at Leipzic, as he did at Moskow, instead of retiring 
behind the Rhine, where, with his unbroken and collected legiot.s, 
he could have successfully defied, and, perhaps, repelled the allies? 
Why did he risk a great battle, under circumstances so confessedly 



108 POLITICAL PREDICTIONS. 

unfavourable to him ? It is in vain to resist the conviction to 
which these questions lead ; but this is not enough. A skilful 
commander, though he may be unfortunate, generally is able to 
preserve his army, and to make an honourable retreat. Indeed, it 
is in a successful retreat that the talents of a great general are the 
most forcibly displayed. Such was Moreau's retreat through the 
•Black Forest, which is the most precious jewel in his fame. Such 
was the unprecedented retreat of Souwarrow from Switzerland, a 
scene of constant triumphs, which imparted to his glory more 
splendour than all his brilliant victories, and which in fact was 
alone wanting to complete that glory. Shall we judge by these of 
the retreats of Bonaparte ? They were miserable routs, and igno- 
minious flights. Twice he was defeated, an,d twice he lost an ar- 
my. Ail then we can allow him, is that he was an able general to 
direct offensive operations ; but a very indifferent one to act on 
the defensive, 

"Upon the whole,therefore,we are decidedly of opinion, that this 
no longer formidable man, whose life we venture to predict will end 
in madness, unless cut off by the violence of others, will descend to 
the grave strip.fi.ed of the 07ily reputation he can claim, the reputation 
of a General j and ere long, his military abilities, so long the theme cf 
universal praise and admiration, will sink in public estimation, to 
the level of mediocrity, and instead of a " supereminent," he will he 
considered only a common being. During the whole of his retro- 
grade progress, the battle of Lutzen was the only one that seemed 
again to elevate him ; but the battle of Bautzen which succeeded 
it, and where, though doubly superior in numbers, he made but a 
feeble impression upon the enemy, soon dissipated the illusion 
which revived in many the conviction of his great talents adequate 
to save him. We still think highly of the battle of Lutzen ; 
and on account of this battle alone, have allowed him that portion 
of talent which we confined to his offensive career." 

We now conclude our collection, in the firm reliance, that wc 
have fully redeemed our pledge to our readers, in having given 
them the most curious, instructive, and amusing series of success- 
ful prophecies tlsat ever appeared from any political writer whatev- 
er. 

FINIS. 

M «. '> :? ^ ' ■ 



